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Abstract

INTERNATIONAL REGIME, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY: JAMAICA IN THE
INFORMATION AGE
by

Judith A. Duncker

Adviser: Prof. Howard H. Lentner

In September of 1988, the government of Jamaica heralded its official entry into
the information industry with the establishment of the US$2 million Jamaica Digiport
International facility. The significance of this announcement was surpassed only by the
state’s decision to close the domestic telecommunications sector to competition as the
global satellite regime and the global market embarked on its own course of
liberalization. This decision spelt victory for one of two contending factions. On the one
hand was Jamaica Promotions (Jarnpro), Jamaica’s economic development agency, which
attempted to liberalize the sector's use of satellite technology with the operation of the
American Satellite Company. On the other hand, the Ministry of Public Utility and
Transport, in conjunction with the international company Cable and Wireless,
Telecommunications of Jamaica, Industrial Commercial Development (ICD), the
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National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NEBJ) and the international support of Comsat,
elected to close the sector to competition.

The closing of the domestic telecommunications sector to competition raised two
salient questions which this dissertation addresses. First, what explains Jamaica’s failure
to liberalize the sector’s use of satellite technology, as demonstrated in its 1988 decision
to prevent competition? Second, how was it possible to undertake this measure amidst the
powerful forces of global market liberalization trends in the telecommunications sector as
well as within the international satellite regimes of Intelsat, whose principles and
practices endorsed liberalization in the provision of satellite services?

This dissertation concludes that there were two overriding sectoral characteristics
which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global forces. The first
was compelling domestic interests in the sector that led to its closing. The second was the
Intelsat regime itself, which acted to protect its monopoly. Intelsat's structure and the role
played by signatories within the system functioned to protect the status quo of the single
global organization and to bar the entry of other firms whose activities did not enhance
Intelsat’s investment goals. As a result, Intelsat’s monopoly remained intact because of
limitations placed by its signatories on the operation of competitive firms given that the
liberalization of Jamaica’s domestic satellite services was inconsistent with its signatories
and their interests.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VI

Preface

This dissertation began as an interest in one small developing state’s attempt to
acquire satellite technology and the extent to which the information highway could create
new opportunities for development in small states that would allow them to bridge the
economic gap between the industrialized and small developing states. However, it later
shifted to the question of the impact of increasing economic openness upon a state’s
capacity to govern its national economy1 The overriding questions of interest are how
states respond to the challenges of managing their economic systems in the face of
increasing economic openness? Are states free to follow different paths in response to
openness? Do they abandon old norms and institutional arrangements and assume new
policies and new arrangements that are consistent with competitive neo-liberal norms? If
so, what might these paths be, and what determines the path a state pursues? This case
study would forge a theoretical nexus between the dynamics of state, bureaucratic
politics, international politics, multinational corporations, international
telecommunications satellite policy, modernization and development and international
satellite regimes to address this issue.

Linda Weiss, ed. States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions
Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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1

C H A PTER ONE

Introduction
In September of 1988, the government of Jamaica heralded its official entry into
the information industry with the establishment of the US$2 million Jamaica Digiport
International facility. The significance of this announcement was only surpassed by the
state’s decision to close the domestic sector to competition simultaneously as the global
satellite regime and the global satelite market embarked on its own course of
liberalization. This decision, however, spelt victory for one of two contending factions.
On the one hand was Jampro which initated the policy that attempted to liberalize the
sector's use of satellite technology using the American Satellite Company. On the other
hand, the Ministry of Public Utility and Transport, in conjunction with Jamaica’s
telecommunications providers, Cable and Wireless, Telecommunications of Jamaica, and
other interested parties elected to close the sector to competition.

This process which resulted in the closing of the sector to competition raised
two salient questions which this dissertation addresses. First, what explains Jamaica's
failure to liberalize the sector's use of satellite technology as demonstrated in its 1988
decision to prevent competition? Second, how was it possible to undertake this measure
amidst the powerful forces of global market liberalization trends in the
telecommunications sector as well as the powerful international satellite regimes of
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Intelsat whose principles and practices endorsed liberalization in the provision of satellite
services?

This dissertation concludes that there were two overriding sectoral
characteristics which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global
forces. The first was compelling domestic interests in the sector that led to its closing.
The second characteristics was the Intelsat regime itself. Intelsat’s structure and the role
played by signatories within the system therefore functioned to protect the status quo of
the single global system and to bar the entry of other firms whose activities did not
enhance Intelsat’s investment goals. Intelsat's leadership therefore served as gatekeeper monitoring the entry of non-Intelsat satellite firms within the global market. As a result,
the monopoly status quo remained intact because of limitations placed by Intelsat’s
signatories on the operation of competitive firms because the liberalization of Jamaica’s
domestic satellite services was inconsistent with signatories and their interests.

This dissertation examines both international and domestic factors that
impinged on the outcome of the Digiport project. The analysis begins with an
understanding of the historical evolution of the Intelsat system that led to new rules and
regulations among which was the decision to allow competition and that produced the
new separate satellite systems and policies supporting them. These factors were at the
heart of the tensions that Jamaica experienced as it sought to liberalize its satellite sector.
This study also examines the implications of these changes on Jampro’s decision to
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liberalize the provision of satellite services and the implications it had on international
politics.

An understanding of the structure of Intelsat and the role played by signatories
within that structure is also central to this study. That role conditioned their domestic
preferences on the issue of telecommunications liberalizing within the domestic satellite
sector. It provides the foundation for understanding the way in which the Intelsat
monopoly regime impinged on the outcome of the Jamaica Digiport decision and the
closing of the sector.

In addition to external characteristics that impinged on the satellite negotiation,
this study will address the domestic factors that led to the outcome of the Digiport
negotiatons. In laying the foundation for explaining why Jamaica failed to liberalize its
services in satellite technology, this study will examine the domestic contexts within
which the negotiations were embedded and that also impinged on the Digiport decision.
Its focus will be on the central actors in the sector and their interests and needs that
might impinge on the outcome of the negotiations.

Domestic Institutions and the T eleport Initiative
The Digiport negotiations involved several participants, each of which exercised
differing degrees of influence. The participants were: a)The Jamaica Promotions, Inc, or
Jampro, b) the Jamaica telecommunications providers: Jamaica International
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Telecommunications Company (Jamintel), Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC) and
Telecommunications of Jamaica, the parent of both entities; c) Cable and Wireless, the
Jamaican subsidiary of the British telecommunications company;2 d) the Ministry of
Public Utilities and Transport, e) Industrial Commercial Development Ltd., an indigenous
enterprise with investments in Jamintel, and f) the prime minister’s office.
All of the participants played major roles at different levels of the satellite acquisition.

The Teleport project was initially conceived in 1985 by the Jamaica National
Investment Promotion (JNIP) which was later transformed into the Jamaica Promotions
(Jampro) in April 1988. Jampro was the result of a merger between three bureaucracies:
the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation (JIDC), the Jamaica National Export
Corporation (JNEC), and JNIP. It was established as a limited liability company in 1988
but was changed to a statutory body in 1990. The purpose of the merger was to achieve
greater efficiency and to streamline the economic development process.

Jampro’s new mandate was “the development and implementation of programs
to encourage investment, provide training, modernize industries and stimulate export

2At the beginning of the negotiations the Jamaican government owned the majority
share in JAMINTEL; however, in subsequent negotiations with the IMF, Jamaica was
forced to abandon its shares, increasing those of Cable and Wireless, and selling the
remaining shares to Industrial Commercial Development Ltd.[See Canute James, “State
Reduces Holdings in Jamaica Telecoms Group,”in The Financial Times (London), Sept.,
6,1988, p.27)]. "
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trade for Jamaica.” " It was also given the charge to “create jobs and increase productivity
in targeted industries through the effective delivery of technical promotional and
facilitatory services.”4 Jampro’s jurisdiction was the Ministry of Production, Mining and
Commerce; however, it had its own board of directors which consisted of 14 members
that were drawn from the private sector.

Cable and Wireless, the British multinational corporation, owned 80% of
Telecommunications of Jamaica, the parent company of Jamintel. Jamintel was the
division of Telecommunications of Jamaica that was responsible for the overseas traffic
of telecommunications service. Jamintel was also Jamaica’s signatory to Intelsat. Cable
and Wireless and Jamintel were both firmly committed to the Intelsat monopoly system
of which they were a part’s owner Eli Matalon purchased 21% of Telecommunications of
Jamaica in 1987 when the Jamaican government privatized telecommunications, making
him the only private individual investor.5

Deryck R. Brown, ed. Evaluating, Learning and Caribbean Development,
(Kingston, Ja.: Canoe Press. U.W.I., 1998)p. 42.
4

Ibid.

See unpublished paper by Pablo T. Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson. Regulation.
Institutions and Commitment: The Jamaican Telecommunications Sector. March 23,
1993, p. 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The interested parties to the negotiations fell in two distinct camps. On the one
hand was Jampro whose intent it was to avail itself of newly emerging foreign technology
and expertise. On the other hand were the domestic telecommunications suppliers- Cable
and Wireless and Telecommunications of Jamaica. The former sought to diversify into
new technology whereas the latter sought to remain within the Intelsat system through
which it had economic ties. The winning coalition in the negotiations desired the
continuation of the Intelsat monopoly which the sector enjoyed since 1963 and with
which they had established . This monopoly operation using both Cable and Wireless and
Telecommunications of Jamaica was instituted by the Ministry in 1988. Its actions were
part of a restructuring plan that was designed to prevent the operation of competitive
satellite systems in the domestic component. The goal of the restructuring plan was to
facilitate the new cross-subsidization policy to protect the domestic component.

Paradoxically, the decision to allow the use of separate satellite systems was
authorized by Intelsat’s signatories whose interest it was to have the sector remain closed
to competition. In Jamaica, the signatories had an interest in the market’s remaining
closed, and they would benefit from such a closing. As a result, Intelsat’s signatories
failed to act to open the market in accordance with Intelsat’s policies. Coalition politics
had a greater effect on Jamaica's failure to liberalize the use of satellite services than
global trends and regime practices. These domestic interests in the sector served as the
second set of factors that led to the closing of Jamaica’s sector to competitive satellite
technology.
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Jampro was unsuccessful in liberalizing the Jamaican telecommunications sector
because the needs of the domestic signatory were at odds with the prevailing international
regime norms. As a result of the structure of the international telecommunications regime
and the enormous influence of the signatories in Intelsat, Jamintel and Comsat were able
to override the international regimes’ separate satellite systems policy in its attempt to
preserve Jamaica’s monopoly status quo. Jamaica was then able to block competition at
the domestic level.

Jamaica Digiport Negotiations
For more than two decades, beginning in 1963, the International
Telecommunications Satellite Company (Intelsat) stood at the apex of a highly
centralized international satellite regime where it served as the single legitimate supplier
and regulator of international satellite service. However by 1984, the regime began to
change its character with the introduction of new firms and the passing of a separate
satellite system policy by the United States which allowed the operation of non-Intelsat
companies. Nevertheless, despite the changing character of the international satellite
regime at the international level, nations seeking to take advantage of the new permissive
climate found themselves stymied at the domestic level. Those seeking to avail
themselves of newer non-Intelsat satellite systems were finding it impossible to do so.
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In 1989, the fifth year of Jampro negotiations to acquire licenses for the operation
of a United States’ satellite company in Jamaica, the negotiators failed. Jampro was
unsuccessful in acquiring the domestic license for the operation of the US satellite
company despite their initial success in gaining approval from Intelsat and the United
States’ Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Approvals from both of these
agencies were requisite for the use of satellite companies operating outside the Intelsat
system. Nevertheless, despite Intelsat and FCC approval, the Jamaican government
ultimately continued operating within the Intelsat satellite system in Jamaica instead of
using the competitive non-Intelsat satellite system which Jampro originally intended.

Jampro’s failure to acquire the license to operate the non-Intelsat satellite system,
which compelled Jamaica to remain within the Intelsat monopoly system, occurred after
the historic decision to permit the operation of non-Intelsat satellite systems. It also
occurred during the decade in which economic liberalization, primarily but not only in the
telecommunications sector, spread throughout the industrialized nations in the United
States, Western Europe and Japan and then throughout the globe.

This dissertation examines why liberalizing changes in the telecommunications
regime at the international level failed to take root at the domestic level and why it was
that Jamaica chose to remain within the Intelsat system using Intelsat satellites despite the
availability of more competitive satellites. Ignoring international approval to utilize an
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outside satellite and the more liberalized international telecommunications climate,
Jamaica chose to remain faithful to the single global system.

Jampro was unsuccessful in acquiring a domestic license to operate the separate
satellite system. Instead, the government chose to remain within the Intelsat monopoly
system even after Intelsat and its most powerful members, the United States and Great
Britain, approved the operation of separate satellite systems within Jam aica’s borders.
The dissertation seeks answers an answer to why Jamaica made such a decision at the
historical juncture that it did when liberalization had indeed taken root in the
telecommunications as well as in other sectors. Developing nations were also seeking
relief from dominant monopolies within their borders.6 These issues are examined
through the lens of the Jamaica Digiport International project negotiations.

Jamaica’s failure to liberalize its telecommunications sector was a peculiar
occurrence for several reasons. First, it transpired at a historic juncture when

6

Ben Petrazzini, The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in
Developing Countries; Privatization and Liberalization in Comparative Perspective
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995). See also Paul Cook and Colin
Kirkpatrick, eds. Privatization in Less Developed Countries (New York: St. M artin’s
Press, 1988); Bella Mody, Joseph D. Straubhaar and Johannes Bauer, eds.
Telecommunications Policy: Ownership and Control of the Information Highway in
Developing Countries ( Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 1995); Alex E.
Jilberto and Andre Mom men eds. Institutional and Economic Change in Latin America.
Africa and Asia (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Christopher S. Adam, William P.
Caverdish, and Percy S. Misty, Adjusting Privatization: Case Study for Developing
Countries (Oxford: Heinemann, 1993).
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liberalization of domestic telecommunications sectors had crescendoed across the globe.
Second, at the helm of this movement were the system’s leaders from the industrialized
nations of the United States, Europe and Japan who were determined in their goal to
liberalize the telecommunications regime. Third, Jamaica’s failure to liberalize occurred
in an issue area which was highly institutionalized, one in which regime rules were
established through a hierarchical structure and where rule enforcement was paramount.
The goal of this dissertation is to determine how domestic interests were able to prevail
given the new order of liberalization in the international telecommunications regime;
global leadership committed to this new order and institutionalized system where
enforcement was paramount.

While analysts have stressed the importance of either the domestic political
process, the structure of the international system or both in explaining policy outcomes, I
will argue that explanations which refer solely to either domestic processes or
international systems are necessary but not sufficient to explain the international satellite
sector. This analysis will define a sector as a population of firms producing a specified
range of potentially or actually competing products and the institutional arrangements
required to coordinate the activities generated within sectors or across sectors. So while
this analysis acknowledges that both domestic political processes and international
regime processes are important for explaining the decision to remain within Intelsat’s
single global system, the defining factor for understanding policy outcomes is the sectoral
characteristics that impinge on both domestic and international political processes. These
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structural characteristics of the international satellite sector include the number and type
or firms in operation and the role played by these firms in both the domestic and
international processes.

Globalization and the Liberalization of the International Telecommunications
Sector
The decade of the 1980s was characterized by the liberalization of the
telecommunications sectors of many nations within the global economy. This was the
process in which domestic telecommunications sectors which had restricted the sector to
the operations of one firm, had released these restrictions to accommodate multiple
operators. These changes began first in the equipment market and moved to include
services, rapidly eroding the position of monopoly suppliers. Beginning first in the United
States, Britain and Japan, the changes moved throughout the industrialized nations to the
post, telephone and telegraph (PTT) agencies of the developing nations. The wave of
liberalization resulted in the breakup of large monopolies in Europe and Latin America
and Japan, the privatization of state-owned telecommunications enterprises (SOTEs),
liberalization of domestic markets and the deregulation of many domestic
telecommunications sectors in developing nations.

Within the industrialized nations, liberalization came as a result of internal
pressure from several sources. The first source of pressure came from governments of
nations caught up in the information revolution. These governments held the view that,
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for them to make the transition into the new post-industrial society, it was imperative that
they “unleash the competitive and entrepreneurial drive of the private sector.”7 They then
allied with large corporate users in service industries such as international banking and
finance, the mass media and transportation which relied heavily on telecommunications,
believing that the only efficient means at arriving at this post-industrial information age
was through the liberalization of the economy. The changing needs of industries required
more customized and diversified telecommunications services. The telecommunications
sector needed to be free from the burden of regulation as members of the sector moved
into a new sphere in which new telecommunications technology began to merge with new
computer technology. Both the telecommunications sector and the computer sector
preferred a more liberal telecommunications sector where more competition would result
in cheaper and more specialized services and equipment, thereby benefitting the nation
and the economy as a whole.8

The breakup of the AT&T monopoly into smaller firms in the United States began
a series of liberalization measures within the global telephone and telegraph sector. A
similar trend subsequently spread throughout the major industrialized nations in Europe
and Japan, ending in the demise of many national telecommunications monopolies and in
the creation of competition. In the international satellite sector, liberalization was not

7

Kelly Lee, Global Telecommunications Regulation: A Political Economy
Perspective (London: Pinter, 1996), p 109.
8

Ibid, p. 112.
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without restraint. Intelsat, with the support of Japan and the major industrialized nations
in Europe and the United States, agreed to the use of non-Intelsat systems solely on
condition that they did not conflict with or undermine the Intelsat global monopoly.

Unlike the situation in the industrialized nations where liberalization emerged as a
result of internal pressures from competition, in the developing nations liberalization was
a result of pressures outside the telecommunications sector. Liberalization was
precipitated by pressures from international financial institutions in response to the
economic and fiscal crises these governments faced. These externally recommended
privatization and liberalization of SOTEs were readily adopted by these states as the
solutions to the fiscal and economic crises these governments faced.

In the early 1980s developing nations began to give considerable attention to the
reform of their telecommunications sectors where liberalization had till then failed to take
root. Petrazzini’s insightful work attempts to understand why nations fail in their attempts
to liberalize their telecommunications sectors. The author argues that a nation’s failure to
liberalize can be explained by two factors: a) the economic profile of the nation and b) the
timing of the nation’s liberalization attempt vis-a-vis attempts to privatize. Nations that
are not appealing to major investors or who are experiencing economic crises, such as
Jamaica and Argentina, those with “poor economic prospects,” the author argues, are
more likely to fail in achieving privatization and liberalization simultaneously than
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nations that attract major investors - those “an attractive economic profile.” 9 In nations
with “reasonable economic prospects” such as Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand,
liberalization had a greater likelihood to succeed if it occurred simultaneously with the
sale of the SOTE.

In the event that a nation chooses to liberalize its telecommunications sector prior
to privatizing the sector, Petrazzini argues, the state has to resist the deeply entrenched
domestic anti-liberalization coalitions consisting of state managers and state employees.
Opposition to liberalization was relatively high. Nevertheless, when liberalization
targeted non-basic services, such as the provision of satellite services, opposition to
liberalization was found to be low due to the fact that most national carriers in developing
nations were unable to provide non-basic services in the short ran; therefore,
liberalization was expected to succeed. Other nations, such as Argentina, sacrificed
liberalization which allowed the entry of multiple firms in favor of successful
privatization where state-ownership was replaced by private ownership.10

The analysis of the Jamaica Digiport Initiative supplements Petrazzini’s analysis
in several ways. First, it highlights the differences in the characteristics of the
telecommunications satellite sector from that of the telephone and telegraph sector, a
difference which will be explained by the international structure of governance. Second, it

9

Petrazzini, pp. 30-33.

10

Ibid.
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addresses and introduces an additional scenario in explaining liberalization in the
telecommunications sector distinct from those addressed by Petrazzini, that is,
liberalization after privatization. Third, it adds the dimension of liberalization in the
context of non-basic services. Finally, it contributes a fuller understanding of the role of
nonstate actors in the international telecommunications sector.

International Telecommunications Sector
The international telecommunications sector consists of three elements:
international governance, a global network of national telecommunications governance
systems, and international markets (Figure 1-2). The governance of the sector consists of
international regulatory agencies such as the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), which oversees international telephone and telegraph services, and Intelsat, which
oversees international satellite and space technology services as well as
telecommunications operations at the national level. These international institutions set
the rules within which companies operate in the international telecommunications system.
At the international level, the ITU provides governance in the area of telephone and
telegraph while Intelsat provides governance that is limited to the telecommunications
satellite sector. A third telecommunications institution, the International Maritime
Satellite Organization (Inmarisat), provides governance in the area of marine
telecommunications
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The second element of the international telecommunications system consists of
national telecommunications regulatory systems. National regulatory agencies, such as
Jamaica’s Ministry of Public Utility and Transport, are governmental agencies or national
post, telephone and telegraph agencies (PTTs) that oversee and regulate the supply and
use of domestic telecommunications services. In many developing nations, where the
telecommunications companies that supply telephone and telegraph services have most
often been foreign multinationals, these bureaucracies negotiate the terms of the
contractual arrangements under which the corporations that supply domestic
telecommunications service operate. These bureaucracies may also prevent companies
from providing services by denying a license to operate.

The third element of the international telecommunications system is the global
market which consists of major telecommunications multinational corporation suppliers
or carriers, such as Cable and Wireless and American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T).
These suppliers design, manufacture, and distribute telecommunications goods and
services such as telephone, telegraph, satellite, computer equipment and related services.
These services are sold or distributed to both corporations and households.

The ownership-control structures of suppliers of telecommunications services in
the national markets have ranged from public (100% government-owned) companies to
privately owned telecommunications companies. Within this range are suppliers with a
combination of private and public ownership. This variety of ownership structures not
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only characterizes the global market but may also describe variations in the internal
structure of a supplier, for over a period of time a corporation may also shift between
private and public ownership.

One subset of the telecommunications market is the market for satellite goods and
services (Fig. 1-3). This segment has grown in importance as a result of to the rapid
changes and developments in information technology since the 1980s. In addition to the
proliferation of technological innovations and increasing demand in this sector, there has
also been increased participation of both international and national regulatory agencies in
the governance and regulatory activities of the sector.

The breakup of AT&T in the United States in 1984 opened the way for new
competitive firms to enter the international telecommunications market. Similar breakups
were to follow in other industrialized countries. In the same year the state-owned British
Telecom (BT) of Great Britain began selling its shares to private investors as a prelude to
the creation of a more competitive industry. Concurrently, a similar contagion swept
through other European nations as well as Japan — all of which experienced breakups of
their telecommunication monopolies and privatization of their telecommunications
operations.

Similarly, new companies emerged in the satellite sector. Some companies, such
as MCI and Sprint, had already been in existence but were restricted by Intelsat and FCC
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regulations from fully accessing the global marketplace. Other newly-created companies,
such as Orion and PanAmSat, needed the necessary FCC authorization to operate in the
global marketplace and provide services. (Appendix III). Many of the newly created
firms that emerged in this period were equipped to supply satellite and other
telecommunications services to both developed and developing nations, but while barriers
to entry into the telephone sector were eliminated, in the telecommunications satellite
market new satellite companies still encountered barriers to free competition. The
increasing number of firms seeking to participate in the international satellite market
wereexpected to later impact Intelsat and the international telecommunications satellite
regime, resulting in the transformation of its existing operating procedures.

Intelsat and the International Satellite Regime

Figure 1-1: International Telecommunications Satellite Regime
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Jamaica’s decision to close the telecommunications sector to competition was
determined by two sets of forces - one internal and the other external. The external force
which played a large role in the outcome of the sector was the Intelsat regime. Intelsat
was an international intergovernmental organization established by the industrialized
nations in 1963 as the governing body of the international satellite system. The
organization had two types of members: corporate members, known as signatories, and
state representatives. The corporate representatives consisted of both the domestic
monopolies of developing nations through which member nations received Intelsat
satellite services and technology as well as corporations appointed by industrial nations
— such as Comsat — to represent their national satellite interests. Participating nations
were represented by government officials as well as signatories — both having the
responsibility of formulating Intelsat’s rules, while being subject to Intelsat Board of
Directors.

Intelsat’s dual membership structure reflected the organization’s dual function in
the international telecommunications satellite system. One function of the organization
was to govern the international satellite system through legislation and regulation. It
established the rules by which the market for satellite technology and services operated.
Its second function was that of the principal supplier of commercial satellite services to
member nations, a function that was carried out through its signatories. As a commercial
organization, Intelsat drew on those of its signatories which manufacture and innovate
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satellite technology which the organization’s manager in turn distributes to its member
nations.

In Intelsat’s earlier years, its commercial activities were carried out by the
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), the United States’ signatory, which also
served as manager. During the first decade, Intelsat was the only supplier and regulator of
the international satellite system. In that initial stage of Comsat’s management, its
primary responsibility was supplying satellite services to member nations and to engaging
in research and development. Comsat’s own commercial satellites were utilized in the
provision of satellite services through the Intelsat system. Comsat also became the
primary beneficiary of the organization’s research endeavors.

Intelsat’s commercial operations began to thrive under Comsat’s management.
However, Com sat’s domination of the research, development and manufacturing of
satellite technology became a source of contention among the other European signatories
seeking a competitive edge in the satellite technology race. Added to the European
opposition to Comsat was the mounting opposition from the new firms within the United
States such as Sprint, MCI and PanAmSat, which later served as catalysts for change of
the international satellite system.

By the late 1970s, when the new firms began to emerge, a new and more
competitive international satellite system began to take shape. The new
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telecommunications suppliers consisted of the newly-formed Orion and PanAmSat, as
well as other regionally owned or operated systems such as Arabsat of the Arab world,
Eutelsat of Europe and Association of South East Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) Palapa
(Appendix II). The member nations from which these new satellite companies emerged
welcomed the new satellite systems on the grounds that they provided services in areas
which Intelsat did not or could not reach. As the heavily-trafficked North Atlantic route
continued to grow, more satellite companies attempted to enter the international satellite
market to challenge Intelsat’s monopoly in the provision of services within the heavilytrafficked North Atlantic route. PanAmSat was the first of these firms seeking to
challenge Intelsat’s monopoly.11

The entry of new firms in the international market did not signify an end to
Intelsat’s monopoly since new companies could not operate without the authorization of
Intelsat. Instead, the growing number of new firms only increased the regulatory
responsibilities of Intelsat. Because many had the capability of competing with Intelsat’s
services, states desiring the use of these new firms had to petition Intelsat’s executive
board, known as the Board of Governors, for approval.

Terry Dodworth, “Launch Of Private Satellite To Challenge Intelsat’s Monopoly,”
Financial Times (London), October 5, 1987, p.44. See Chapter 3 for a list of other firms
that emerged with similar intent.
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The Board of Governors makes decisions regarding the use of both international
and domestic satellites. Approval would be granted provided that companies did not
interfere, either economically or technically, with the provision of Intelsat satellite
services.12 Intelsat allowed non-Intelsat corporations limited opportunities to supply
satellite services only if approval from Intelsat and other domestic authorities were
granted. Intelsat continued to maintain its monopoly over satellite services by reserving
the right not to approve the operation of firms that compete with Intelsat. Nevertheless
limited opportunities existed for newer companies to operate in areas that constituted new
services or where Intelsat did not possess the technical capability to operate.

The non-Intelsat satellite system had to pass the technological scrutiny of the
organization. This meant that such systems had to be technologically compatible with
Intelsat satellite systems. The non-Intelsat system also could not jeopardize Intelsat’s
economic security. A new company could also not interfere with Intelsat's ability to make
a profit. All non-Intelsat companies — without exception — were required to undergo the
approval process since these new suppliers were perceived by Intelsat’s members as
competitors to Intelsat and a threat to Intelsat’s income.

Any system that failed to adhere to Intelsat’s technological or economic criteria
would be forbidden to provide satellite services to the global marketplace. This regulatory

See Chapter 3 for more details.
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process provided the needed assurance to Intelsat members that Intelsat’s income would
not be threatened by its competitors. At the same time Intelsat allowed the newer firms to
assist in the provision of services in the heavily-trafficked areas, where increased supply
was needed, on condition that their activities did not jeopardize Intelsat’s income in these
markets.

S eparate Satellite Systems and the International Telecommunications Regime
In the United States in 1984, following the break up of AT&T, new firms
attempted to gain licenses from the FCC to provide satellite services in the international
markets. The FCC received a number of applications filed by films petitioning for
authorization to establish separate satellite systems to operate globally. The volume of
new applicants and subsequent pressures to grant approvals led to the issuance of
Presidential Determination Number 85-2 in 1984, which was later known as the United
States’ separate systems policy.13 This policy authorized the operation of separate satellite
systems in the US. It constituted a shift in US domestic policy that would significantly
transform Intelsat’s twenty-year commitment to Intelsat as the sole provider in this single
global system.

Ibid.
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The United States’ decision generated a variety of responses both domestically
and internationally.14 Several new firms such as the American Satellite Company seeking
to enter the international satellite market, welcomed this new policy because it promised
new opportunities for them to provide services. Intelsat signatories such as Comsat, Cable
and Wireless, and Jamintel, strongly opposed the new policy allowing the operation of
private firms.1'1 However, despite the internal opposition of many of Intelsat’s members,
Intelsat adopted its own separate satellite system policy allowing the operation of new
companies under specified conditions.16

Jamaica and the Political Econom y of the Teleport
The new separate satellite systems offered new opportunities for Jamaica’s
economic growth as well as opportunities for potential conflict. The new policy opened
the way for an array of new firms and new services, broadening the scope of services
provided by Intelsat. It provided competition among new firms, promising lower costs. In
1984, at the beginning of these cascading international changes, Jampro, the agency with

14

Judith Tegger Kildow, INTELSAT, Policy-Makers’ Dilemma. (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1973).
15

See INTELSAT, “INTELSAT Director General Statement on United States’
Actions Regarding Separate Satellite Systems,” BG-64-76E, August 19, 1985.
16

Ibid. Intelsat approval would be granted only if the proposed service would not
cause economic or technical harm, that is, only if Intelsat could not provide the service
and if the proposed service was either new or significantly different from those services
offered by Intelsat.
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the responsibility of formulating and implementing Jamaica’s economic development
plans — decided to establish the Jamaica Digiport International.17 The Digiport was
Jamaica’s attempt to avail itself of the changes in information technology which would
allow Jamaica to establish its offshore processing industry.18 The upgrading of the
infrastructure meant the acquisition of a high speed teleport facility that could most
effectively transfer large amounts of data to be processed using more sophisticated
satellite systems.

As a result of the liberalization in telecommunications in the industrialized
nations and the United States, there were a number of satellite companies available to
provide satellite services at a cost that was lower than that of the Intelsat system. 19 From
the increasing number of available firms, Jampro selected the American Satellite
Company as its carrier, based on research on its technology and its costs. Jampro

17

Hereafter known as the Digiport

is
Interview with Mr. Winston Gooden, a former Vice President of Jampro in charge
of Production and Promotion from 1983 to 1994 at the Jampro headquarters in Kingston,
Jamaica, on July 21, 1993.
19

Federal Communications Commission, Separate Satellite Systems for
International Communications: In the Matter of Establishing Satellite Systems Providing
International Communications,@ 101 F.C.C. 2d 1046 (1985), pp 290-291. Also
Interview with Mr. Winston Gooden, a former Vice President of Jampro in charge of
Production and Promotion from 1983 to 1994, on July 20, 1993. Also see Memo from
Teleport International to JNIP dated May 1984, located at the Jampro Archive (JA) in
Kingston, Jamaica, West Indies.
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determined that the American Satellite Company was the company which offered the
most efficient technology at the lowest cost.20

The selection of a United States non-Intelsat satellite company required three
levels of negotiation. Jampro required negotiations with Intelsat, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and finally with Jamaica’s Ministry of Public
Utilities and Transport. Intelsat’s separate satellite systems policy required that Jampro
first seek approval from Intelsat.21 Jampro required FCC approval because the American
Satellite Company was a United States company.22 Third, Jampro needed the Ministry’s
approval for the American Satellite Company to operate locally. These negotiations
lasted from 1984 and 1989.

20

A teleport is a state of the art telecommunications facility that has three distinct
elements; the ability to transport data, voice and images from one location to a next, a high
speed satellite that is capable of carrying enormous amounts of information very long
distances in relatively short periods of time at lower costs, and a private telephone network
that provides special services to businesses, such as 800 numbers.

INTELSAT, “Technical compatibility Consultation”, BG-70-7; INTELSAT,
“Preparation for the next Assembly of Parties,” BG-70-3E; INTELSAT, “Economic Harm
Discussions,” BG-70-10E. See also INTELSAT, "Events in the United States Relating to
Separate International Satellite Systems", BG-72-44E B/6/87, Pg 5. The document may be
found at the FCC office in Washington, D.C., United States of America.
22

Ibid. See also Federal Communications Commission, Separate Systems Notice.
100 FCC 2d at 294, 314; Separate Systems Order. 101 FCC 2d at 1090; Separate System
First Reconsidered paragraph 5.
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Jampro’s commitment to securing the American Satellite Company was met with
opposition from several sources. Jamintel, Cable and Wireless, and the Ministry
disapproved of the use of American Satellite Company.23 They perceived that decision as
an economic threat to their interests in the Intelsat system.24 They argued that
Telecommunications of Jamaica was capable of supplying the requisite satellite services,
making use of the American Satellite Company an infringement on the domestic supply
of services.2:1

Industrial Commercial Development also voiced its opposition to the use of the
American Satellite Company. Eli Matalon argued that the introduction of a newer
telecommunications company constituted a violation of the contract between the
Jamaican government and Cable and Wireless, and would undermine Cable and Wireless'
ability to generate future profits. Industrial Commercial Development joined with the

23

The Ministry raised opposition to Jampro in a letter dated August 28, 1985, (JA).
See also a letter to both JAMINTEL and the Ministry from Cable and Wireless dated
April 5, 1986, (JA); a letter to JAMINTEL and the Ministry from the chairman of the
board of Directors of Cable and Wireless, April 5, 1986, (JA); a letter to the Prime
Minister from Mr. Mayer Matalon, brother of Eli Matalon, Chairman of the Board of
Industrial Commercial Development, the Chairman and CEO of the Jamaica Telephone
company, on April 15, 1986. (JA);
24

A letter to JAMINTEL and the Ministry from the chairman of the board of
Directors of Cable and Wireless. April 5, 1986, (JA).
25

Ibid. Opposition was based on JAMINTEL’s “Proposal for he Provision of
Enhanced Telecommunications Services for Jamaica’s Free Zone,” (JA).
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Ministry in maintaining their committment to maintaining the use of the Intelsat system,
of which Industrial Commercial Development and Cable and Wireless were a part.26

At the end of the five years of negotiations with Intelsat, the FCC and the
Ministry, Jampro managed to acquire two of the three authorizations - that of Intelsat and
FCC. Despite the approvals, the prime minister and his cabinet made the determination to
maintain the Intelsat monopoly in Jamaica. Thus, Jampro was unsuccessful in acquiring
the authorization for the American Satellite Company to operate in the Digiport project.
Instead, Cable and Wireless, AT&T and Jamintel entered into a partnership which
allowed them to operate the Digiport project using the Intelsat satellite system.27 Coalition
politics was crucial to the outcome of the negotiations

The alliance of Industrial Commercial Development with Cable and Wireless,
Jamintel and the Ministry, all desiring to preserve the Intelsat monopoly, resulted in the
preservation of the Intelsat monopoly status quo and insuring the use of Intelsat satellites
for the teleport. Internationally, Com sat’s successful challenge of the FCC approval of the
American Satellite Corporation in the US courts further solidified its monopoly of the
international satellite market. The powerful influence of the winning coalition was

See footnote 16.
27

TCanute James, ’’AT&T, Britain Join In Jamaica Data Project,” Journal of
Commerce, February 23, 1988, p.5a. See also “AT&T In Joint Venture Agreement To
Establish Digiport.’T he Daily Gleaner. Kingston, Jamaica, Feb. 19.
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responsible for its success and Jam pro’s failure to negotiate the license needed to
liberalize the operation of a separate satellite system in the sector. The result confirms
that coalition politics had a greater effect on Jamaica's failure to liberalize the use of
satellite services than global trends and regime practices as a result of domestic interests.

Overview
Chapter Two explores the international relations literature, particularly the way in
which the present literature has evolved in its analysis of the relationship between
international and domestic politics in explaining domestic policy outcomes. The chapter
will argue that even though there has been a narrowing of the gap in the literature which
has evolved in its inclusion of both realms in the analysis of domestic outcomes, in the
area of international regimes, more effort is still needed. This study of the Jamaica
Digiport negotiations will be used to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this endeavor. The
chapter will argue that in the issue of the international telecommunications satellite, a
model that includes both domestic and international systemic analysis is indispensable for
understanding domestic as well as international policy outcomes.

Chapter Three is the first of two chapters which lays the international context on
which Jamaica’s decision to establish the Digiport decision using a competitive domestic
satellite system was undertaken. It accomplishes two objectives. First, it analyses the
historical evolution of the Intelsat system which produced the regulations that allowed
competition. The chapter describes the conditions that preceded Jampro’s decision to use
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a separate satellite system. The chapter also analyses the structure of Intelsat and the role
played by signatories within that structure. It examines the challenges to this system
posed by liberalization in the telecommunications sector and the subsequent separate
satellite systems rule and the responses of its constituents to the new challenges. Finally,
the chapter lays the framework for understanding how Intelsat affected the domestic
satellite policy outcomes of member states, as was seen in the Digiport negotiations.

Chapter Four, the second of the two chapters which addresses the international
context which impinged on the Jamaica Digiport negotiations, looks at the evolution of
the international satellite industry in the United States and Western Europe. In 1984,
when the negotiations were under way, the global market began to experience
transformations in its structure, where it moved from a sector with few firms and
significant barriers to one with many firms and more accessible to newer commercial
entities. It examines the way in which the international telecommunications satellite
market has been transformed through the emergence of new companies. The chapter
examines the evolution of the international satellite market from 1960 until it
experienced significant transformations in 1989 when the Digiport decision was
implemented, highlighting the technological changes that occurred and the implications
of these innovations for the Digiport negotiations. Finally, the chapter examines the
implications of these transformations on the global market.
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Chapter Five begins the analysis of the Digiport negotiations by examining the
domestic context within which the telecommunications sector was located at the time of
the negotiations. The chapter begins with an examination of the historical evolution of the
sector and demonstrates how it progressed from multiple providers to that of the single
Cable and W ireless monopoly. Second, it examines the domestic and international
economic contexts that impinged on a state-directed restructuring of the sector that
resulted in Cable and W ireless’ emergence as the dominant supplier of the sector and the
ways in which this restructuring impinged on the Digiport negotiations. The chapter lays
the foundation for explaining why Jamaica failed in its attempt to liberalize its services in
satellite technology.

Chapter Six examines Jamaica’s negotiations for permits from Intelsat, the FCC
and the Ministry for the use of a United States’ non-Intelsat satellite corporation. The
chapter examines the interaction between the domestic political processes and the
changing international telecommunications regime processes that resulted in Jampro’s
failure to win the battle for the non-Intelsat satellite company. The chapter examines the
process of intense opposition from Cable and Wireless, Jamintel and the Ministry that
ended in defeat for Jampro. Despite liberalization and the apparent openness of the
international telecommunications regimes, the choice of satellite technology was still
restricted by constraints that can best be understood by an analysis of the sector.
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Finally, Chapter Seven concludes that there were two overriding sectoral
characteristics which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global
forces. The first factor that led to the coalition’s success was the structure and processes
within which the regulation of the global sector occurred. The Intelsat system functioned
by setting guidelines for the operation of the global satellite. Among the guidelines was
the separate satellite systems policy whereby national systems were permitted the use of
separate systems which do not undermine Intelsat’s operations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

CHAPTER TWO

D O M ESTIC PO L IT IC S , IN TER N A TIO N A L R ELA TIO N S AND TH E

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Introduction
The last two decades have seen a proliferation of international relations literature
emphasizing the importance of combining both domestic politics in the analysis of
international relations as well as incorporating international factors in explaining
domestic decisions.28 This reflects a measure of progress that has occurred in the field
since the post W orld War era when the realist paradigm gained preeminence as the most
acceptable conceptual framework for understanding and explaining interstate relations.
This system level paradigm was the dominant mode of international politics analysis.
Realism was one approach that devalued the role of nonstate actors, international

28

Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the
Nation-state” American Political Science Review, Vol 72, #4 (1978), pp. 1276-87; and
G. John Ikenberry, “The State and Strategy of International Adjustment” World Politics,
Vol 39, #1, 1986, pp 53-77; Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theories and Empirical
Studies of International institutions,” International Organization at Fifty: Explorations
and Contestations in the Study of World Politics: , Vol 52 #2, See G. John Ikenberry,
David A. Lake, Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining
American Foreign Economic Policy” in International Organization Vol 42, no. 1, Winter
1988, pp. 1-14.
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institutions and domestic politics as viable elements in understanding and explaining
decision-making within the global arena as states sought to increase their power while
pursuing the wealth of the nation.

The need to pay attention to the role of domestic and international political
variables must begin with Singer’s analysis of the two methodological approaches to the
study of international politics - the system level paradigm and the national level
paradigm.29 In the former approach, a high degree of universality is assumed,
exemplified by M orgenthau’s traditional realist assumption of “ [all] statesmen think and
act in terms of interest defined as power,” thereby producing a “black box” or “billiard
ball” concept of decision makers.30 This generalization which created a separation
between the international and domestic realms for analytical purposes was considered
necessary' to understand fully understand either sphere of activities. The usefulness of this
modus operandi to explain political behavior has since been questioned, especially within
the global context of heightened interdependence where domestic and international
spheres are heavily intertwined and where the actions of nonstate actors and the presence
of civil society in international decisions are prevalent. This dissertation removes this

29

See I. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”
World Politics, Vol 14, No. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays. (Oct, 1961),
pp. 77-92.
30

Ibid, p. 81
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false dichotomy and unites both realms which is necessary for understanding Jamaica’s
decision.

This chapter examines the progression of the literature in international relations
and demonstrates the ways in which the incorporation of both levels has been useful in
explaining the outcome of the JDI project. It begins with a review of the three major
approaches to the study of state decision-making. These approaches are system centered,
state centered and society centered.31 The goal of the chapter is to develop a multi-level
analytic approach which combines the panoramic view of the international system while
focusing on the microscopic view that the domestic decision unit provides in explaining
the domestic outcome. The chapter will also uncover the limitations of analyses that
separate domestic from international levels of analysis and seek an analytic approach that
bridges both levels.

System -C entered Analyses
The system centered approach views international politics through the lens of the
international system of states as a whole while treating the nation-state and its policy

31
Ikenberry et al. “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign
Economic Policy.”
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making process as a black box.32 Here, states’ behaviors are conditioned more by
systemic forces and less by factors internal to the individual states that are the principal
actors in the international system. In explaining state behavior, the systems approach rests
on a greater understanding of the international system and how it works.

The most significant system approaches are realist and neorealist theories. Realist
theory begins with three fundamental assumptions about the international political
system: a) states are the central actors and therefore the primary units of analysis in
international politics, b) in the international arena states are rational and coherent .as they
pursue their interests, which is the national interest, and c) human nature is inherently
conflictual and as a result so is international politics. As a result of these assumptions,
international politics becomes the arena in which states struggle to maximize their power

Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International
Trade,” World Politics Vol. 28 (April 1976) pp. 317-343; Robert Keohane, “The Theory
of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes” in Ole Holsti,
R. Siverson and A. George eds.. Changes in the International System (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1980); Duncan Snidal “Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.” International
Organization Vol 39 (Autumn 1985) pp. 579-614; Kenneth Waltz, Theories of
International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979);
Emanuel Wallenstein, The Modern World System Vol. 1,2 (New York: Academic Press,
1974)
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by controlling the military and economic resources necessary to pursue their national
interest.33

Within this perspective, international organizations such as the United Nations
and Intelsat are understood as merely arenas in which states convene to pursue their
national interests, rather than viable institutions capable of acting in their own right to
influence domestic output:

The contributions international functional agencies make to the well-being
of members of all nations fade into the background. W hat stands before
the eyes of all are the immense political conflicts that divide the great
nations of the earth and threaten the well-being of the loser, if not his very
existence.34

The neorealist construct of the international system is one in which two elements
are significant for understanding international politics - the structure of the international

33
E. H.. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Knopf, 1978); Arnold
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1962); Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of
International Relations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), translated by Richard
Howard and Annette Baker Fox.
34

Morgenthau, 1960, p. 528.
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system and the interactions that occur between the units or states. Waltz defines the
structure of an anarchical international system as consisting of two elements: a) the
organizing principle which is anarchy, and b) the distribution of power and capabilities.
Understanding the structure of the system is to understand and explain behavior of states
and policy outcomes. While neorealists concurred with realists that the state is the unit of
analysis in international politics, neorealists attributed the behavior of states to their wish
to preserve their respective positions in the international system.3'-’

Structural theories of international relations have also looked to the structure of
the international system for an explanation of the creation, maintenance and demise of an
international order. Structure refers to the organizing principle and the distribution of
power and resources in the system.36 In an anarchic structured international system,
cooperation can best be explained by hegemonic stability theory. The hegemon is that
nation that possesses a preponderance of power and dominance over other states in the
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Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1979).
36
Charles P Kindelberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational
Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the
Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (April 1976): 317-347. Duncan
Snidal, "Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" International Organization. Vol. 39,
pp.579-614.
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system.37 Hegemonic stability theory suggests that international cooperation and the
creation of international institutions are best achieved by the hegemon which establishes
the rules that govern the system. A change in the hegemonic power weakens the old order
and leads to the creation of a new international order of cooperation, under a new set of
norms and values.38

Gilpin’s analysis of the international system maintains the traditional realist
beliefs that the state is the primary unit of analysis and that the nature of the international
system is contlictual which he attributes to human nature and its drive for power. He,
however, argues that the international market and the pursuit of wealth and control of
market forces are important national interest objectives of the state. Central to his
definition of the international systemic structure is state power and the formation of

37

See Charles Kindelberger, W orld in Depression (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973) and "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy:
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Keohane "The Theory of Hegemonic
Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977" in Ole
Holsti, ed., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press,
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economic blocs.39 The neorealist position of both Gilpin and Waltz agree that
international organizations such as the United Nations and Intelsat are merely instruments
for the maximization of state interests, without the potential to be viable actors in their
own right in the international system.

Unlike realism and neorealism, liberal and neoliberal theories explain
international outcomes more through the relationships between and among states in the
international community and less in terms of the structure of the international system.
Mitrany’s classic functionalist approach begins with the premise that the authority of
international organizations was based on functional criteria performed within these
international institutions. Mitrany predicted that functional loyalties would eventually
supersede national loyalties, resulting in increasing instances of international corporation
and decreasing incidences of international conflict.40

Keohane’s A fter Hegemony challenge the two fundamental assumptions of
hegemonic stability theory - a) that a strong hegemonic power is necessary for economic
regimes and b) that a hegemon is necessary for the stability of the system. Keohane
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argues three points. First, he argues that a) a hegemon is not a sufficient condition for
strong international regimes; b) that hegemonic cooperation is not the only possible form
of international cooperation and c) that other forms of non-hegemonic cooperation do
occur, such as multilateral institution.41

Keohane and Nye’s neoliberal institutionalism also challenges many of the
assumptions of the realist and neorealist paradigms. First, realists perceive the
international system as the domain of states who are the primary unit of analysis.- Second,
the neoliberal institutionalist position challenges the realist view of the international
system as an inherently conflictual domain. Third, they established the importance of
international cooperation and international institutionalization. They advance the theory
of international cooperation to argue that in a world of complex interdependence, nation
states are not the only actors in the international system. Neither are security issues and
the maximization of national interest the sole nor predominant driving forces behind state
action. States are motivated to pursue other economic and social issues. Other actors
include multinational corporations (MNCs), government bureaucracies, individuals and
groups who may sometimes be at odds with their own official state policies:
The existence of transgovernmental policy networks leads to a different
interpretation of one of the standard propositions about international
politics — that states act in their own interest. Under complex

41

Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
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interdependence this conventional wisdom begs two important questions:
which self and which interest? ... The ambiguity of the national interest
raises serious problems for the top political leaders of governments. As
bureaucrats contact each other directly across national borders (without
going through foreign offices), centralized control becomes more difficult.
There is less assurance that the state will be united when dealing with
foreign governments or that its components will interpret national interests
similarly when negotiating with foreigners. The state may prove to be
multifaceted, even schizophrenic. National interests will be defined
differently on different issues, at different times, and by different
governmental units.42

Complex, interdependence consists of three models of interactions: transnational,
transgovernmental and intergovernmental relations.43 Transnational relations are activities
between individuals and groups in one state with individual and groups in another — all
of which occur outside the realm of official state behavior. Rissen Kappen defines
transnational relations as “regular interactions across national borders when at least one
actor is a nonstate agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an

42

Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, “Complex Interdependence, Transnational
Relations, and Realism: Alternative Perspectives on World Politics,” in Charles W.
Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, The Global Agenda: issues and Perspectives (New
York: Random House, 1988), p. 268.
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international organization.44 Transgovernmental relations are activities between branches
of government that also bypass high-level channels of foreign policy relations.
International intergovernmental relations are interstate activities that involve official
governmental actors.44 These three approaches have traditionally failed to examine the
process through which decisions are made and those actors who influence outcomes,
thereby blurring the distinction between domestic and international politics.

Unlike their place in realism and neorealism, under complex interdependence,
international organizations play a major role in the international system. They exemplify
one mechanism through which international intergovernmental (IGO) relations take place.
They have the capacity to set global agendas and build international coalitions.

While Keohane and Nye’s models of interaction identified the role of nonstate
actors and domestic governmental bodies in international relations, the introduction of
these categories left room for developing a better understanding of the role of private
individuals and nonstate domestic actors and their effects on IGOs. Further developments
are needed for a clearer insight into the interaction between these categories, elucidating

Rissen Kappen. Bringing Transnational Relations Rack in
Ibid.
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the ways in which individuals, national bureaucracies, state representatives and
international regimes interact to affect policy outcomes at all levels.46

T he State-Centered Approach
While the system level analysis of international politics excludes domestic
politics by virtue of the “black-box" assumption which allows some generalization about
state behavior, the state-centered approach, by contrast, focuses on the internal dynamics
of states as the unit of analysis. This approach sees the state as “an important intervening
or independent variable between international forces on one hand and foreign policy
made at the domestic level.47 The state is that entity that connects both the international
and domestic arenas 48 Since the state is the institution charged with the responsibility of
conducting the nation’s foreign policy, as the unit of analysis, it is used by the statecentric approach to connect international outcomes with decisions made within the
context of the domestic political process.
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Snyder et al also argue that in order to understand state action, what is needed is
an understanding of the goals, wants and needs of the individuals acting

011

behalf of the

state. The actors’ perception of the potentially relevant variables within both the domestic
and external setting will have an impact on the choices that are made.49 These variables
may include economic capabilities, military capabilities, other domestic actors,
international alliances, bilateral relations or supranational structures. These factors drive
the “because o f ’ and the “in order to” motivations of the significant actors involved in
state decisions.50

There are two dominant views of the role of the state. One, the statist paradigm,
views the state as an actor whose goal it is to maximize the “national interest” while
insulating itself from narrow parochial interests51 Krasner views the state as an
autonomous actor rather than a summation of private interests. The state, Krasner argues,
is a set of roles and institutions, having its own peculiar drives, compulsions and aims
that are separate and distinct from those of societal groups. The goals of the state are
based on its perception of the “national interest.” It is in striving to carry out that

49

Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin in James N. Rosenau ed. “The
Decision-making Approach to the Study of International Politics” in James N. Rosenau
ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. (New
York: The Free Press, 1969), 199-206.
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perception of the “national interest,” Krasner argues, that the state encounters resistance
from both domestic and international societal groups.

Critics of this perspective reject the notion of the “national interest” on several
grounds. First, it presumes an identifiable policy alternative that is distinguishable from
other alternatives one that assumes an objective reality outside of the realm of politics,
devoid of influence by private interests.52 Others argue that the role of the state is to
advance the interests of the capitalist class and the needs of the capitalist system as a
whole.'’3 Yet others argue that the state is not an autonomous actor but depends on special
interests whose interests they articulate. State policy is seen as the result of societal
pressures, “the resultant of effective access by various interests.”54 Still other critics also
argue that the capitalist system is symbolic of ties between the capitalist class which
controls the state and public officials.55
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See Joseph Frankel, National Interest (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970). See
also Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration pp. 147-166.
53
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The state-centric approach is one that engages in the structural analysis of the
state. Katzenstein notes that the state’s foreign policy is determined by a range of factors
that include the level of autonomy from societal groups, the relative strength of the state
and the degree of fragmentation along bureaucratic lines.56 He argues that while the
liberal, the marxist and the realist approaches identify different external limitations on
domestic policy outcomes, the “critical” intervening variable between international
interdependence and political strategies is the domestic structure of the nation-state and
the ability of state officials to realize state objectives/'’7 The domestic structure is defined
as the coalition between business, the state and the policy networks that link the public
and private sectors.

56

Ikenberry et a!. See also Peter J. Katzenstein, ’’Conclusion: Domestic Structures
and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy” in Katzenstein ed., Between Power and
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World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).
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One contribution to the state-centric approach is Graham’s bureaucratic politics
model.''8 This model holds that a state’s domestic and foreign policies are the outcome of
a series of rivalries, bargains, and compromises among different bureaucratic entities at
the domestic level. The decision-making process is where state policies are formulated
after much compromise between competing state bureaucracies with unequal levels of
power, authority and resources.

Allison argues that state decisions and actions often involve bureaucracies which
hold different perspectives, different goals and different objectives. Often these goals and
objectives are parochial, contradictory and conflictuai. State decisions are the result of
compromise, bargains and coalition-building among bureaucracies which seek to promote
their own power, interests and goals and are affected by the sheer power and/or
bargaining skills of the actors.'19

58
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971); Morton H. Halpern, Bureaucratic Politics
and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974); and Graham T.
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Implications" World Politics, Vol '24 (Spring 1972).
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Both domestic and foreign policy decision-makers participate in bargaining games
with each other. The players from different departments bring to the proverbial table
different perceptions, different motivations and a variety of personal objectives. Decision
makers’ parochial priorities and perceptions, coupled with their different stands, goals,
interests and stakes, all affect the final outcome of state policy.60 The dominant actor in
the bureaucratic conflict is the one who would determine the outcome of state policy
because “what a government does in any particular instance can be understood largely as
a result of bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government.”61

Figure 2-1: Bureaucratic Politics Model
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The bureaucratic politics model stressed the major role played by mostly state but
also non-state actors at the domestic level. The weakness of this approach, however, is
that it understates the importance of decisions made in the transgovernmental and
transnational contexts. It also understates the significant role played by nonstate actors,
such as and international institutions and multinational corporations, both nationally and
internationally, in domestic decision-making.

In their analysis of bureaucratic politics, Laver and Schepsle make the distinction
between cabinet ministers who formulate policies that affect domestic output and civil
service bureaucrats who actually implement those policies. They argue that effective
power to both make and implement public policy lies more in the civil service than within
the cabinet. The reason for its effective power, they argue, is the fact that cabinet
ministers are generally politicians who come and go. Since career civil servants are there
to stay, they are therefore in a “very strong position to effectively determine government
policy outputs.”62 They note that the preferences of civil servants and bureaucrats may
differ from those of elected politicians.63 Garrett and Lange argue that bureaucrats will

62
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not change the way they make and implement policy in lockstep with the preferences of
government or societal actors. The more authority over policy rests in the hands of
independent bureaucratic agencies, they argue, the less policy change should be
associated with a given change in the constellation of preferences in the private sphere.64

The bureaucratic politics approach is one that opens the “black box,” providing
more insight into the decision-making process that impacts interstate relations. Critics of
this model have argued that this approach is problematic in its inability to identify the
importance of interests and motivations of individuals and demonstrate their impact on
policy output.66 The model is also incapable of demonstrating the ways in which societal
actors affect policy outcomes.

Putnam argues that the limitation of the bureaucratic politics model is that it is
“state-centric.” It is therefore insufficient to grasp the complexities Involved in the
domestic-international mix. Instead of the state-centric approach, he recommends a
society centered approach that incorporates politics, parties, social classes, interest

64
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groups, legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials
and institutional arrangements.66

The Society-centered Approach
The society-centered approach looks at the role of societal actors, particularly the
dominant groups or social classes and the manner in which they impact domestic and
foreign policy. State officials and institutional processes are not the only significant
factors in the policymaking outcome.67 Migdal acknowledges different levels of
disaggregation where policy is made, ranging from the commanding heights of agencies’
central offices to dispersed field offices to the trenches. He disaggregates the state rather
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than viewing the state as a monolith.68 Vitalis also identifies divisions within states,
which he attributes to divided business interests.69

Migdal, Kohli and Shue note that boundaries do exist between state and societal
actors.70 Kohli and Shue, however, note that the boundaries between both state and
society are blurred. They have the effect of mutually transforming the nature of statesociety interactions.71 Markovitz acknowledges that boundaries between the state and
civil society is in fact blurred. However, he argues that the state and civil society are more
than intertwined, for the elements of civil society are not merely affected by the state, but
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are seated in the state.72 He notes that the connection between state and society cannot
really be understood if we persist in seeing the state and civil society as separate,
balancing entities.73

In the African political economy, Markovitz notes that the state and civil society
are intertwined into “networks and webs of relationships,” that are “not of individuals,
but of families” which are “repeated and systematic encounters over time.”74 These occur
when civilians from organizations or interests in civil society are loaned or
seconded to the institutions of government that are responsible for the
oversight, management or conduct of those organizations or interests;
when the structures and organizations of civil society are created,
enhanced, supported and promoted by structures, organizations and
officials of the state, or the reverse.75

Irving Leonard Markovitz, “Uncivil Society, Capitalism and the State in Africa,”
in Nelson Kasfir, ed. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives
(London: Frank Cass, 1998)p. 21.
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Their actions occur within an international and national framework that supports and
limits the liberty of interests within civil society.76

Markovitz’s conception of the “organizational bourgeoisie” is also helpful in the
analysis of state-society relations. Markovitz defines the “organizational bourgeoisie” as
“a combined ruling group consisting of the top political leaders and bureaucrats, the
traditional rulers and their descendants, the leading members of the liberal professions,
the rising business bourgeoisie, and top members of the military and police forces.77 The
“organizational bourgeoisie”is distinct from both the classical and the state bourgeoisie.
Its distinction lies in the fact that the business bourgeoisie does not merely use states as
instruments or as its allies but it occupies state offices, wielding power and controlling
the terms of economic activities.78 The organizational bourgeoisie not only managed, they
exploited as well.79
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The power of this class, both cause and consequence of occupying
positions of state authority, is such that the state serves its ends to the
extent that the two spheres of the public and the private ... have if
anything become, in certain ways, at all levels more tightly bound
together.80

Krasner sees the state as independent from societal forces. He notes that the
society-in-the-state position as articulated by Markovitz, fails to explain why some
governments have been successful in pushing forth positions that were not supported by
dominant groups. He also notes that the society-in-the-state position cannot explain why
some governments have prevailed in the presence of conflicts between the state and
private corporations.81

Nordlinger argues that the actions and inactions of the democratic state are
determined by the contours of civil society, in conjunction with the distribution of
political resources, and the policy preferences of those societal groups that control the
greatest amount of societal resources.82 However, Nordlinger’s position is distinctly
different from the latter position when he argues that he sees the state as :
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It is most implausible that the democratic state — the elected and
appointed officials who populate this large, weighty, resource-laden,
highly prized ensemble of offices — is consistently unwilling or unable to
translate its preferences into public policy when they diverge from those
held by the politically weightiest societal groups.83

Unlike the Marxist, pluralist and social corporatist perspectives which view the
state as “malleable” in the hands of the most powerful group, Nordlinger asserts that
when state and society preferences diverge, the society centered model denies, ignores or
downplays possibilities of public officials acting on their own preferences and denies
states turning their preferences into authoritative action when opposed by societal actors
who control the weightiest political resources.84 He concludes that when state and societal
preferences diverge, it is the preferences of public officials that are translated into
authoritative action.83 In addition, Nordlinger’s analysis presumes the existence of
monolithic state preferences rather than a variety of conflicting preferences among
competing bureaucracies that often exist around issues before the state.

Ibid, p. 3.
Ibid, p.7.
Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58
Systems Analysis and Domestic Politics: A Combined Approach
Others have acknowledged that both the systemic and domestic perspectives fail
in their respective individual attempts to fully explicate the complexities of decisions
within the international political economy. Since a knowledge of each level is important
in the understanding of domestic policy processes, and since each approach is insufficient
without the other, a more fruitful endeavor would be a combined approach — one that
looks at the way in which both domestic and international factors affects domestic
political output. Keohane echoes this sentiment and argues that

[A]n international-level analysis ... is neither an alternative to studying
domestic politics, nor a mere supplement to it .... On the contrary, it is a
precondition for effective comparative analysis. W ithout a conception of
the common external problems, pressures and challenges . . . w e lack an
analytic basis for identifying the role played by domestic interests and
pressures .... Understanding the constraints imposed by the world political
economy allows us to distinguish the effects of common international
forces from those of distinctive national ones.86

Keohane's liberal international relations approach begins with the assumption that
state behavior is shaped by both domestic influences and the transnational society in
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 16.
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which it is embedded.87 On the one hand societal forces influence the way states behave
by shaping state preferences defined as the fundamental social purposes underlying the
strategic calculations of governments.88 The fundamental actors within domestic and
transnational interaction are individuals and private groups whose endeavor is to promote
their interests. The state represents a subset of domestic society, the interests of which
determine state preferences and which forms the basis of state action in world politics.
The new liberal international relations theory, therefore, requires relaxing the
fundamental systemic assumption of the state as a unitary actor, instead assuming a
polyarchic structure of the state.89

Polyarchy, Milner argues, assumes that different groups within the state have
different preferences and goals.90 A polyarchic analysis therefore allows a more detailed
look at the domestic political struggle that ensues among the domestic actors. It fosters
the identification of different goals, objectives, motivations, and perspectives within both
the state, as well as those external to it.
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This combined approach is useful for two reasons. First, Milner and Keohane note
that the context within which national decisions are made is a global context. They argue
that we can no longer understand domestic politics without a realization of the linkages
between national economies and the global economy. Second, forces at one level impact
actions at the next. The world economy alters domestic politics by creating new policy
preferences and coalitions.91 It also affects political institutions since when actors’
preferences change and new policies are pursued, institutions also change.92 Policy
preferences of actors within countries fluctuate based on their global economic interests.93
Preferences also change as a result of political pressures from powerful actors within the
international system such as United States and the International Monetary Fund.

Milner argues that while the international system impacts domestic politics,
domestic politics also has the capacity to impact the international system. Domestic
political institutions can mitigate the effects of internationalization and offset changes
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from occurring even in the face of systemic pressures.94 Milner notes that domestic
politics and international relations are intricately bound because a nation’s international
position affects its internal politics and economics. Conversely, a nation’s domestic
situation impacts its foreign relations. To overlook domestic politics by assuming the
state is unitary actor as realism does, Milner argues, overlooks key elements in explaining
state behavior and misinforms our analysis.95

The course of action for international political scholars is, therefore, to develop a
theoretical position that successfully “acknowledges and accounts for the power of agents
[at the domestic level] and recognizes the causal relevance of ‘structural factors.’”96
Dessler argues that “ [s]ince social action is a result of both structural and agential forces,
a strict structural or agential e\p l ination of action will necessarily be incomplete. One
alone won't do.”97

The research agenda of the past decade has pursued this new course. Milner’s
analysis of international trade policies looked at the critical role of domestic interest
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groups, national governments and foreign governments in the making of trade policies.
She argued that the distribution of power among the actors impacts the economic policy
outcome and the distribution of wealth.98 Frieden also identified the role of the domestic
system in the analysis of international political economy, arguing that globalization defined in terms of a global system of highly-integrated financial markets with a high
level of international capital mobility - has a clear impact on the domestic environment.
He demonstrated that globalization had a different impact on local interests. Local
interests, he noted, in turn applied pressure on the domestic political system to ensure the
implementation of policies in their best interests.99

Mastanduno et al., using a realist perspective, also incorporated a multilevel
analysis. The authors argue that one consequence of interdependence is that international
developments constrain the ability of governments to pursue domestic politics effectively.
The success of domestic politics depends on the ability of state officials to secure
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accommodations in the international arena. Therefore, in order to pursue their
international goals, states also needed success in the pursuit of domestic goals.100

Weiss also argues that the state’s ability to respond to international pressures,
which she identifies as its transformative capacity, is a result of the state’s priorities, its
domestic linkages and the nation’s key economic actors.101 Katzenstein noted that state
capacity depends on the ways in which societal groups are organized. His foreign
economic policy model is one that includes political and economic forces operating, both
at home and abroad, that have an influence on state bureaucracy.102 Evans argues that
state capacity is based on a set of institutions that insulate the economic bureaucracy from
special interests at the same time having established channels of cooperative links
between state bureaucrats and organized business.103 This state of “governed
interdependence” is one in which both spheres maintain their autonomy while
cooperating to advance the interests of each.
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While Evans sees a separation between the state and societal actors, Milner, on
the other hand conflates the two spheres. Her model of state-society relations is one that
identifies the interaction of public institutions, political actors and private interests as they
converge to determine policy. The author notes that domestic politics arises due to the
fact that the state is not a unitary actor. It consists of different societal and political actors
with different policy preferences. Economic actors can be identified by their common
interest which is the maximization of income and profits whereas the interest of political
actors is to retain political office. While interests remain constant among each group,
policy preference does not. Policy preference is the means through which actors interests
are realized. Policy outcome is the result of competing policy preferences.

Policy outcome, Milner argues, is determined by the structure of domestic
preferences which varies with issue area. Outcome is also based on the ranking of
preferences of actors based on the relative power of internal actors. The most powerful
actors are the political executive (president or prime minister, the legislature and interest
groups.104 Interest groups are the primary source of information and their access to
information affects the power of the group. Information is also central to the outcome in
this model. Milner’s analysis generates the following hypotheses from her model:
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a) When the most dovish domestic actor (closest in preference to foreign
country) holds greater internal decision-making power in domestic politics, the
outcome is positive, that is the absence of armed conflict.
b) When the more hawkish actor is most powerful in the domestic decision
making unit, the policy outcome is negative, or armed international conflict
c) When the executive and the legislature have policy preferences that are far
apart, the government is far more divided and cooperation is less likely.Kb

Milner’s analysis introduces another key element in the explanation of policy
outcomes - the notion of the “divided government.”106 The divided government is the
situation in which there is a lack of consensus between or among the primary state
decision-making bureaucracies. This may occur between the executive and legislature
branches of government or among cabinet members themselves within the executive
branch. The author argues that when the government is divided, successful policy
outcomes are the result of factors other than the structure of preferences. In a divided
government, the author notes, policy outcome is more the result of party dynamics and
coalition formation rather than the ranking of preferences. Divided governments occur in
both presidential and parliamentary systems.

Ibid, Chapter 3.
Ibid, p. 38.
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Interest groups have a significant impact on divided governments, Milner argues,
as a result of the dual role they play. First, they act as information providers to policy
makers, directly helping to shape their preferences. Second, by providing financial
support in the form of campaign contributions and by their capacity to mobilizing votes,
they serve as pressure groups, whose goal it is to directly affect the policy preferences of
decision-makers. The preferences of interest groups, the author notes, depend on the
distributional consequences of the policy under consideration.107

Milner’s analysis of the divided government clearly dispels the commonly-held
assumption of the state as a unitary actor.108 It elucidates the many of the complexities
that impinge on policy outcomes. However, what is missing from the analysis is a model
which better informs us as to why different structures of preferences emerge and vary
from issue to issue. The model needs a clearer elucidation of domestic political processes.
Such a model helps us to understand the domestic-international link, as well as which sets
of actors’ preferences and institutions at each level can be expected in the decision
making process.
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Putnam’s “two-level games” is another model that establishes the theoretical link
between international politics and domestic outcomes. The author argues that
international negotiations in which the statesman is located at the point where
international and domestic politics intersect.109 The statesman is strategically located
between two “tables,” one representing domestic politics and the other international
negotiations. Each context is equally dependent on the outcome of the other.110

At the national level, domestic interest groups compete against each other to have
their interests represented in international negotiations as state policy. At the international
level states try to gain the maximum benefits that are in line with domestic interests.
Decisions that may be rational at one level may be totally irrational at the next. Pressures
from local interests that are not in harmony with the interests of competing states are
likely to obstruct international cooperation.111
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Knopf argues that Putnam’s two-level-game approach has three shortcomings.
First, it fails to incorporate the complexities of domestic-international interaction.112
Second, it overlooks yet a third level o f interaction, namely institutional alliances
between groups of states. This third level is especially relevant in understanding the role
of military alliances in international security negotiations. Third, Putnam’s approach fails
to draw out the role that domestic groups play in initiating international negotiations.

Knopf introduces a “three-three approach” to understanding international regimes
consisting of three levels of analysis and three types of domestic interaction. The three
levels of analysis are international, national, and the group level. The three types of
domestic-international interactions are: a) trans-governmental interactions where internal
divisions result in state bureaucracies from one nation connect across borders with the
like-minded faction in the next b) transnational interactions where different societal
groups from one nation connect across borders with groups in the next as in international
non-governmental organizational relationships and c) cross-level interactions where
leaders from one nation connect with societal groups of a next. Examples of each, Knopf
argues, are apparent in the US-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in
the 1980s.
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Knopfs work incorporates international institutions, alliances, state and non state
actors in the analysis of international negotiations. K nopfs analysis, however, contains
one weakness. In his explanation of the way international regimes and domestic politics
impinge on domestic output, K n o p fs model is unable to explain why the specific
domestic-international interaction emerged and why some patterns of domesticinternational interactions are more likely to emerge in some issues and not in others.

A successful model needs to explain why we are more likely to see a greater level
of transgovernmental interactions over transnational interactions in some issues more
than in others. It ought also to inform us of when we can expect to see a greater degree of
cross-level interactions in some issues and not in others. As with Putnam, the focus on the
negotiator as the unit of analysis is insufficient to give us the depth of details required to
address the broader issues of transnational and transgovernmental interactions.
Nevertheless, the strength of K nopfs analysis is its inclusion of both domestic and
international interactions as they impinge on international institutions, a move which
many have argued has been seriously lacking in the international regimes literature.

Theories of International Regimes
The study of international regimes had its beginnings in discourse on the role of
the hegemon in maintaining international corporation and stability. Keohane and Nye’s
neoliberal institutionalist position argues that while the hegemon may facilitate
international cooperation, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fostering
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international cooperation. Instead, they argue that international cooperation is possible in
the absence of a hegemon because shared interests can result in the creation of
international regimes.113 Strong international regimes, especially economic ones, depend
on a hegemonic power for sustenance and stability. Similarly, the demise of an
international regime could have been attributed to the decline of the system’s hegemon.114

An international regime is defined as embodying “sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” 11'’ Haggard and
Simmons identify four categories that have traditionally defined the study of international
regimes. These categories are structural, functional, game-theoretical and cognitive."6
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Three of them- structural, functional, and game-theoretical - approach their analysis from
the level of the international system.117

The structural approach, where international regimes are viewed through the
prisms of the realist perspective, explains international regimes largely through the role of
the powerful states. The functional approach to international regimes explains the
presence of international regimes by the extent to which they provide benefits for their
member nations and satisfy the needs of the international community. Benefits include
reduction of uncertainty, reduction of costs (information costs and transaction costs), and
correction of market imperfections.118

While changes in the world political economy affect the regime’s ability to
continue to provide benefits to its members, the expected result would be changes in the
international regime that would seek to address emerging needs. Keohane and Nye point
to the examples of technological changes and changes in the world political economy
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which make existing international regimes obsolete.119 New international regimes would
emerge to address new functions and new needs as a result of changes in the system.120

Nevertheless, in spite of major technological changes that create new needs and
that require new norms, older international regimes often fail to address the new reality
even after the conditions from which they emerged have vanished. Once institutions and
their norms are established, the authors argue, they are quite difficult to eliminate even
when they become obsolete. When significant international economic changes fail to
produce regime change, several underlying factors may be at play. Keohane and Nye
argue that when important economic changes take place and regime changes fail to occur,
bureaucratic inertia often serves as an obstacle to change.121 Elsewhere, Keohane also
argues that regimes continue to exist despite the disappearance of those conditions under
which they were created because the regimes perform functions that are important to the
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states they serve, one of which is the arena for cooperation in which states interests are
harmonized.122

The third approach, the game theoretical approach, looks at international regimes
as games in which states have clearly defined goals and objectives. States, diligently
pursuing power and wealth under conditions of anarchy, are rational utility maximizers,
pursuing their national interests.123 In so doing conflict of interest situations arise among
players who interact according to predetermined rules.124 Each actor faces its own sets of
benefits and stakes which determine its level of participation. Regime change occurs
when the benefits and stakes are no longer the same as different sets of rewards and
payoffs emerge among actors.

While the game theory approach provides insight into the range of options that
elicit certain responses from states, the approach has failed to incorporate non-systemic

122

See Keohane, After Hegemony

123

R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International
Cooperation, "American Political Science Review 70 (June 1983), pp. 330-46; Robert
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation New York: Basic Books, 1984) and "The
Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists", American Political Science Review 75 (June
1981) 306-318; George Downs and David Rocke, Tacit Bargaining. Arms races and Arms
Control, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Andrew Kydd and Duncan
Snidal, "Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regime" in Volker
Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993)."
124

James T. Tedeschi, Barry R. Schlenker and Thomas U. Bonoma, Conflict. Power
and Games (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1973).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74
factors such as domestic political factors. It also has not helped us in understanding of
how regimes’ benefits and stakes are established and changed. For that we need to
examine the domestic context out of which regime actors emerge.

The fourth approach to the analysis of international regimes, the cognitive
approach, begins with the assumption that international regimes are made up of humans
who selectively respond to their environment. Chister Jonsson argues that the definition
of international regimes — “Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge (Jonsson’s emphasis) in a given issue area”
— seems to set the stage for a strong cognitive thrust in the analysis of international
regimes. This definition, therefore, places us in the cognitive world of the decision
makers.125

This approach looks at individuals in the context of international institutions
responding to their environments, on behalf of their states.126 The key elements that
condition international cooperation, according to the cognitive perspective, are the shared
ideology and world view of the actors, how they define their reality and interests and the
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limitations imposed on their rationality.127 These factors lead to the creation and
maintenance of international regimes that facilitate cooperation.128 Jervis also adds that a
decision-maker’s beliefs about politics, the images he holds of key players, and instances
of misperception will play a key role in international interaction.129

The cognitive approach is significantly different from other approaches to the
study of international regimes in that it demonstrates the importance of the roles played
by ideology, belief systems, information and learning of individuals as they define the
interests of actors. The approach attributes changes in these factors to changes in
international regimes130 Nye has shown that regime changes have resulted from changes
in the learning process. Regimes, he states, change in response to new information,
therefore learning is the principal factor that accounts for regime change.131 The learning
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process is where actors acquire and use new knowledge for the purpose of adopting
“different, and more effective, means to attain one’s end.”132

In their critique of the literature on international regimes, Haggard and Simmons
noted that the literature has been written largely from a systemic level of analysis, to the
exclusion of domestic politics and nonstate actors.1’3 As a result the structural, functional
and game theory approaches have fallen short for several reasons in explaining
international outcomes. First, they assume the state as a rational and unitary actor. Their
analyses therefore fail to inform us of the way in which domestic politics and the
domestic policy process impact international outcomes. The authors argue that what has
been missing from the literature on international regimes is a discussion of the domestic
political determinants of international cooperation and how international regimes
influence policy choices at the national level. They advocate an approach to international
regime analysis that not only looks at the interaction among states, but that also looks at
the interaction of nonstate actors at the domestic level, international level and between
cross-national coal itions.134
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Haas cites yet another factor that affects regime change — the epistemic
community.135 He credits the epistemic community as a source of new knowledge and
notes that it promotes learning within regimes.136 The epistemic community is the
community of intellectuals from the realm of academia or government or other sectors of
knowledge in society which provides the intellectual justification for a particular
outcome. It is “ ... a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect
relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values, ... shares a common
vocabulary, common political objectives, a common network in which findings are
exchanged and shared concerns are formulated, common world view and concerns about
the same subject matter.” 137

As the source of ideas and knowledge which sometimes ran counter to the
established mode of thinking of those in power, epistemic communities provide
legitimacy for emerging social groups that are in opposition to the dominant groups and
their ideas. As a result they greatly inform us on the genesis of regime change. The goal
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of emerging social groups is to implement their new policies and objectives. Policy
makers with different points of view often refer to the epistemic community for
information and policy advice. It is the epistemic community that validates the new
information and the changes in belief system, ideology, and ultimately the changes in the
international regime.

Haufler attempts to broaden the scope of systemic analysis by including the role of
nonstate actors in international regimes. The author argues that states sometimes build on
a foundation of norms and practices that have been laid down by nonstate actors. States
may use nonstate actors to implement some of the functions of the regime, nonstate actors
may also create their own regimes or they may at times play an equal role with states.
Where nonstate actors play an equal role with states, a “mixed parentage” regime, state
actors do not always determine the outcome. Nor do states always prevail in decision
making when conflicts arise.138 The author cites Amnesty International as an example of a
nonstate international organization that is often successful in achieving its objectives in
conflicts against the state. Haufler’s analysis notes a relationship between domestic
politics, international regimes and nonstate actors. However, the analysis does not
identify the ways in which each factor can be expected to influence international
outcomes.
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Martin and Simmons also advocate the introduction of domestic politics back into
the analysis of international institutions. They argue that international institutions can
change state behavior by substituting for domestic practices. The crucial variables, they
point out, are the conditions under which domestic actors are willing to substitute
international institutions for domestic institutions; identifying the beneficiaries of this
transfer of power; and the possibilities of enforcibility and compliance with international
institutional decisions by domestic institutions. They concluded that domestic actors
intentionally delegate policy making authority to the international level when it means the
advancement of their interests.1’9

International Regime and Domestic Politics
In their analysis of the relationship between international regime rules and norms
and domestic policy outcomes, Cortell and Davies begin by asserting that international
rules and norms do have an influence on national policy. This influence is exerted when
domestic political actors incorporate international regime values and belief systems in the
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standard operational procedures of bureaucracies as well as when regime values and
norms are incorporated in domestic laws and policy measures.140

International regimes become more relevant in the context of bureaucratic
conflicts. When bureaucratic actors or societal groups choose to question the legitimacy
of a competing position or seek to justify an unpopular position, each side in the conflict
may appeal to international regime rules and norms to justify its particular stance. The act
of bringing international regime norms and rules in the national policy debate, the authors
note, is a strategy that has been frequently employed by both bureaucrats and interest
groups in their attempts to influence policy outcomes.

For such a strategy to successfully affect policy outcomes, Cortell and Davis note
that two conditions must be present. First, the issue around which the conflict is
generated, and on behalf of which the international rules or norms are being appealed,
must be a salient issue. Second, the appropriate domestic decision-making structure that
fosters societal penetration must also exist. The authors classify the range of possible
domestic decision-making structures along two continua. The first continuum is the
degree of centralization of the decision-making authority whereby decision-making
institutions may be centralized to decentralized. The second continuum is the pattern of
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state-society relations that relate to the issue to be considered whereby the relations
between state and society may either be distant to the decision-making process or close.
These two categories result in four types of decision-making structures (Fig. 2-3).141
These structures are centralized states with distant societal relations, centralized states
with close societal relations, decentralized states with distant societal relations and
decentralized states with close societal relations. Type I and Type II structures are
centralized decision-making units that involve fewer bureaucratic players while type III
and Type IV are decentralized involving more bureaucratic players. Type I and Type II
structures are expected to be more independent of international regimes where decision
makers are unlikely to appeal to international rules and norms to validate their positions
whereas Type III and Type IV, are more likely to appeal to international rules and norms
to validate their positions.

Ibid, p. 457.
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Type I and Type III are distant structures where decision-makers may or may not
make appeals to relevant international rules and norms to validate their positions,
depending on the salience of the issue. If they do appeal to international rules and norms,
their appeal may or may not be successful. In Type II and IV structures where there are

Figure 2-2: Cortell and Davis’ typology of domestic structural contents
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close relations with societal actors, societal actors are more inclined to appeal to
international rules and norms to influence policy outcomes. When there are close societal
relations, in the event of domestic conflict, the international regime rules and norms
become central to the resolution of the conflict. The successful appeal to international
regime rules and norms to resolve the conflict, Cortell and Davis argue, is more likely to
occur in a decentralized decision-making environment where societal groups play a role
and when one side appeals to international regime rules and norms to legitimize its
position. This is especially relevant when
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...the societal actor utilized a domestic procedure that sets in motion the
prescriptions of an international institution. In this case, the institutional
arrangements linking societal actors to the policy process serve a dual role,
not only enabling societal actors to invoke the international rule, but also
according them a legal right by which to elicit the government's
implementation of the rule's prescription.142

Risse-Kappen’s analysis of domestic output addresses the one major shortcoming
of Cortell and Davis. Like that of Cortell and Davis, the author’s analysis seeks to
determine under what domestic and international conditions transnational actors and
coalitions will induce policy change in a specific issue-area. The author identifies two
factors that affect the ability of transnational actors and coalitions to successfully
determine state policy. The first factor is the degree of international institutionalization of
the issue-area. International institutionalization is defined as “the extent to which the
specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or
international organizations.” 143 The more the issue-area is regulated by international

Cortell and Davis, p. 457
143

Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction”
in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In : Nonstate Actors.
Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA :
Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.6.
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Figure 2-3: Tvpes of Structures and Countries Investigated
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regime norms of cooperation, the more “permeable” the domestic society becomes as a
result of these transnational activities.144

The second factor that impacts domestic outcomes is differences in domestic
structures. Domestic structure is the avenue that facilitates the penetration of transnational
actors into the political system. Risse-Kappen’s domestic structure consists of three
elements: a) the structure of the state, b) the structure of society and c) the policy
network. The state may be centralized or fragmented, the society may be weak or strong,
and the policy network may be consensual or polarized. From this scheme emerge six

144

Ibid, p. 5.
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types of domestic structures: state-controlled, state-dominated, stalemate, corporatist,
society-dominated and fragile.145

The state-controlled structure is highly centralized with strong government and
weak societal organizations to which belong the USSR, East Germany and Romania.
Here, the society is too weak to counter the power of the state. State-dominated, on the
other hand, also possesses a strong state and centralized domestic structures. In this
category we find Singapore, South Korea, Zimbabwe. However the political culture and
societal organizations provide more of a challenge to the power of the state than exists
under the state-controlled structure. Under the stalemate domestic structure, to which
belong India and pre-1989 Hungary, a strong state faces strong social organizations in a
decision-making system that is highly polarized.

In the context of weak state structures, the corporatist structure is one that
operates in the face of powerful social organizations where continuous bargaining takes
place, the resuit of which is often compromise. Here, Risse-Kappen places the Japanese
state. The society-dominated system, also possessing a weak state, consists of
fragmented and decentralized government where there are strong societal interest groups.
Here we find Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the USA. To this category, this author
adds Jamaican. Finally, fragile domestic structures are also systems that possess

Ibid, pp. 22-24.
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fragmented state institutions and weak social organizations. In this category, we find
Kenya and Russia. Based on these ideal types, Risse-Kappen makes the following
conclusion. Given similar international conditions, variation in the policy impact of
transnational actors will be determined by differences in domestic structures. It is the
domestic structures, the author argues, that “mediate, filter, and refract the efforts by
transnational actors and alliances to influence policies in the various issue-areas.” 146

Risse-Kappen also notes that two hurdles must be overcome in order for
transnational actors to affect policy outcomes. First, they must gain access to the domestic
political system. Their ability to gain access is largely a function of the domestic
structure. Access is most difficult in state-dominated or controlled structures, and easiest
in fragile or society-dominated structures. In state-controlled domestic structures,
governments have the freedom to restrict transnational access, whereas in fragmented
states the governments are less capable of preventing transnational activities. In societydominated and fragile structures, transnational actors have easy access and are able to
penetrate the political system.

While access is a necessary first step to control of policy outcomes, Risse-Kappen
notes, it is not sufficient to achieve the desired outcome. The second hurdle and necessary
step is generating winning coalitions or alliances among social groups that lead to the

Ibid, p. 25.
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implementation of predetermined policy objectives. The structure of the state is what
determines the ability to not only gain access, but more important, to form winning
coalitions.147

The third, and important element which, the author argues, plays an important role
in mediating the policy impact of transnational actors is international structures of
governance. The more institutionalized and regulated the international environment, the
more transnational activities are expected to flourish and the less national governments
should be able to constrain them. However, in an atmosphere that is unregulated by
international agreements, domestic structures should account “almost exclusively” for the
differences in policy impact, the author notes.148

International institutions, the author argues, are expected to facilitate the access of
transnational actors to the national policymaking process and increase the availability of
channels which transnational actors can use to target domestic structures in order that
they might influence national outcomes. In so doing they reduce the effects of domestic
structures on domestic outcomes. International regimes and organizations provide the
channels into the domestic political systems which domestic structures might otherwise
limit. The author concludes that international institutions facilitate access to national
political processes, enabling the creation of transgovernmental networks. Secondly,

147
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international institutions in the respective issue-area are expected to reduce the coalitionbuilding requirements for transnational coalitions, particularly those advocating norm
compliance.149

Risse-Kappen’s analysis identified three important elements that affect domestic
output. First is the nature of the domestic decision-making structure and the ability of
societal actors to gain access to that structure. The second is the international structure of
the issue and the extent to which the issue is regulated and institutionalized. Third is the
ability of societal groups to generate winning coalitions in order to achieve desired policy
objectives.

Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that Jamaica’s failure to liberalize the
domestic telecommunications satellite regime by acquiring the domestic license for the
operation of the US separate satellite system at a time when economic liberalization had
permeated the global economy can be explained by three characteristics of the domestic
satellite sector. First, the sector’s monopoly was control by the Cable and
Wireless/Jamintel partnership which doubled as supplier of telecommunications services
as well as Intelsat signatories doubled as enforcers of the rules of the international
satellite regime. Intelsat’s structure was one in which signatories occupy the dual role as

Ibid, p. 32.
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both rule-makers and rule enforcers in the international satellite sector. Their rule-making
function occurred within the Intelsat global context whereas their rule-enforcement
function is carried out within the confines of the domestic telecommunications sector.

Second, Cable and Wireless/Jamintel partnership maintained a close relationship
with the state regulatory institution. This relationship allowed the partners the dual
capacity to effectively nullify the rules of the system by simply failing to enforce them.
Therefore, while the mandate of the new separate system policy was to create a
competitive environment, Jamintel’s mandate was to eliminate competition. As the
environment gave way to a new climate of liberalization internationally, the new
competitive climate were at odds with the interest of domestic telecommunications
companies, such as Jamintel. Therefore, despite approvals from both Intelsat and the
FCC, Jamaica remained within the Intelsat due to pressures from Cable and Wireless,
COMSAT and Telephone Company of Jamaica to maintain a closed domestic industry.
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CHAPTER THREE

T H E IN TER N A TIO N A L TELEC O M M U N IC A TIO N S SA T ELL ITE

ORGANIZATION (INTELSAT)

Introduction
For two decades the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(Intelsat) stood at the apex of the global satellite system and played a major role in
international and domestic satellite decisions. From- its inception in 1963, it oversaw and
regulated all aspects of international and domestic transactions, requiring domestic
authorization prior to all transactions involving satellite technology. As a result,
Jamaica’s decision to broke new ground in international satellite communications by
using a non-Intelsat satellite company warranted their intervention and prior approval.
Jamaica’s decision therefore had international as well as domestic repercussions.

This is the first of two chapters which lay the international foundation on which
Jamaica’s decision to establish the Digiport decision using a competitive domestic
satellite system must be understood. It has two objectives. First, it outlines the historical
evolution of the Intelsat system that led to new rules and regulations among which was
the decision to allow competition. This history includes a look at the conditions that
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produced the new separate satellite systems and policies supporting them - all of which
were at the heart of the tensions that Jamaica experienced as it sought to liberalize its
satellite sector. The chapter examines the implications of these changes on Jampro’s
decision to liberalize the provision of satellite services and the implications it had on
international politics.

Secondly, this chapter also analyses the structure of Intelsat and the role played by
signatories within that structure. That role conditioned their domestic preferences on the
issue of telecommunications liberalizing within the domestic satellite sector. It provides
the foundation for understanding the way in which the Intelsat monopoly regime
impinged on the outcome of the Jamaica Digiport decision and the closing of the sector.
The chapter presents the view that the decision of the Intelsat signatories Cable and
Wireless and Jamintel to close the sector was one which benefitted the Intelsat and
provided its signatories with a motivation to maintain a closed sector. Chapter Four
examines the changing satellite market over which Intelsat presided.

The Intelsat System
It began as an international intergovernmental organization when a group of 18
industrial nations attempted to meet their own domestic and international satellite needs
and the needs of other nations in the world. This intergovernmental organization was
established to function as a global satellite monopoly. In addition to government
representatives, its primary members also included national telecommunications
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companies which collectively owned and operated Intelsat’s communications satellite
system. The purpose of the organization was cooperatively to provide uninterrupted
global satellite services to all interested nations.

The Intelsat satellite system consists of a two segments: space segment and an
earth segment. Together they comprise the equipment required for the transmission of
Intelsat services. The space segment consists of 15 satellites in geosynchronous orbit
above the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Geostationary satellites are located
exactly 22,238 miles above the Equator. At that orbit the satellites rotate at the same
speed as the earth, making them perfectly synchronized with the earth stations that send
messages back and forth between them. The space segment is fully owned by Intelsat.
Member nations possess investment shares in the space segment based on their respective
use of the satellite system. Nations with high telecommunications volume such as the
United States possess a larger number of shares of the space segment than smaller
developing nations whose level of usage is relatively lower. The United States’ signatory,
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), owns the largest proportion, 61% of
total shares.

Intelsat has made great strides in the development of its space segment. The first
satellite for commercial use, Intelsat I, was launched and placed in orbit in April 1965
over the Atlantic. A second set of satellites, the Intelsat II series, was launched two years
later, placing two satellites in orbit over the Atlantic and two over the Pacific.
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Components of the third series, Intelsat III, were launched between 1968 and 1969 and
were placed in orbit over the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
The Intelsat IV series of satellite were launched in 1970 at Cape Canaveral. It had the
capacity of transmitting six thousand telephone calls and twelve simultaneous television
programs. It was designed by Hughes Aircraft Company. By 1984, Intelsat had launched
five new generations of satellites, each generation more powerful in their capabilities and
more extensive in their global reach. Six new Intelsat V satellites were in operation. In
addition to the newer generation, the number of earth stations also increased from five in
the United States, France, Great Britain, West Germany and Italy, to 300 stations in 146
countries in 1982.1'>0

The ground segment consists of each nation’s earth stations. Intelsat has
established the standards for earth stations to which each signatory is bound to comply.
Adhering to these standards allows the proper transmission of services to more than 1600
earth station-to-earth station paths. Communications between the earth stations and the
satellites have resulted in the existence of more than two thousand paths that transmit
services between satellites and earth stations for business users located in the member
nations. Services include television, telephone, data, telex, facsimile and specific business
services such as video conferencing, electronic mail and high speed data services.
Intelsat’s services are made available to all member nations at the same rate regardless of

15 0

Edward Plowman, Space, Earth and Communication (Westport: Quorum Books,
1984) p. 82.
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a nation's membership status. Membership is extended to any nation which is a member
of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). While Intelsat owns the space
segment, the earth stations are owned and operated by the signatories or
telecommunications companies of the countries in which they are located.

The Origin of Intelsat
In 1962, partly as a result of the reaction of Congress to the 1957 launch of the
Soviet satellite, Sputnik, and partly to advance its own fledgling space program, the
United States took the initiative in forming Intelsat by passing the Communications
Satellite Act.1’ 1The Act stated that:

...it is the policy of the United States to establish, in conjunction and in
cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable, a
commercial communications network, which will be responsive to public
needs and national objectives, which will serve the communications needs
of the United States and other countries, and which will contribute to
world peace and understanding.152

151
Richard R. Collino, “Global Politics and Intelsat: The conduct of Foreign
Relations in an Electronically Interconnected World,” Telecommunications Journal
September 1986, pp. 195-208.
152

Section 102 of the United States Communications Act of 1962.
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In late 1962, the U.S. began preliminary discussions with the United Kingdom and
Canada, followed by a series of negotiations with the nations of western Europe,
Australia, Canada and Japan,
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Tabic 3-1: INTELSAT'S FOUNDING MEMBERS
% Shares

Country

Date o f Entry*

Australia

23612

2.372

Belgium

23782

9.49

Canada

23608

3.234

Denmark

23803

0.345

France

23759

5.261

Germany

23640

5.261

Ireland

23654

0.302

Israel

23710

0.564

Italy

23810

1.898

Japan

23608

1.725

Netherlands

23608

0.863

Norway

23619

0.345

Portugal

23755

0.345

Spain

23608

0.949

Sweden

January 18, 1965

0.604

Switzerland

23635

1.22

United Kingdom

23608

7.245

United States

23608

Vatican City

23608

Source: Comsat Annual Report, 1970, pp. 101-106
*date on which agreement was signed
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to determine the specifics of the new organization. The new organization was formed
with eighteen member nations (Table 3-1), which together controlled more than 80% of
world telephone traffic.

The US Communications Satellite Act authorized the creation of Comsat to
provide the United States with official representation to Intelsat. Comsat had as its head a
fifteen-man board of directors. Six of these were appointed by the United States Congress
to represent the public shareholders, three were appointed by the President and six were
appointed representatives of carrier shareholders. Of the six carrier representatives, three
represented AT&T, two represented ITT, and one represented the Hawaiian
Telecommunications Company (HTC). By 1969, ITT and HTC had sold their shares in
Comsat to the public, giving up their seats on the Board and leaving AT&T as the only
common carrier with representation on the board.

Organizational Structure: the Old Agreement
Early discussions between COMSAT and the founding member states resulted in
the establishment of specific guidelines within which the organization would function.
These early discussions yielded two separate but interrelated agreements: a) the
intergovernmental “Agreement Establishing an Interim Arrangement for a Global
Commercial Communications Satellite System" or Interim Agreement and b) the “Special
Agreement and Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration’’ or Special Agreement. Both
agreements resulted in the creation of a four-part organizational structure. This structure
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consisted of a) the consortium of states, b) the consortium of signatories c) the executive
organ, the fCSC, and d) the manager Comsat. This four-part structure was put in effect in
August of 1964.153

The Interim Agreement created a consortium of member states, whereas the
Special Agreement authorized the creation of a consortium of officially-designated
national telecommunications agencies or signatories. Signatories range from 100%
government-owned operations to 100% private enterprises, such as Comsat. The Special
Agreement also assigned ownership of the Intelsat space segment to the signatories “in
proportion to their respective contributions to the costs of the design, development,
construction and establishment of the space segment.” 1'’4 Both state representatives and
signatories shared the responsibilities of establishing and implementing long range policy
goals and objectives.

153

United States Department of State, “Agreement Establishing Interim Agreements
for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System,” Treaties and International
Acts Series. No. 5646, Article VIII.
154

Ibid, Article HI.
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The Interim and Special Agreements authorized the establishment of two
additional bodies, an executive body and a manager. The Interim Communications
Satellite Committee (ICSC) served as the executive body while Comsat served as the

Figure 3-1: The Organization and Services of Intelsat in 1970
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manager. The ICSC established guidelines on operational issues such as the criteria for
joining, the use of services by nonmembers, payment of dues and penalties for lack of
payment, withdrawal from the organization, minimum shares, procurement matters ancl
the rights and obligations of Signatories and Parties. Decision-making in the ICSC was
achieved by voting. Each nation’s vote was equivalent to its ownership share or use of
Intelsat's space segment. Comsat controlled 61% of the organization's shares; the
European nations controlled 30%; and the remaining 9% was owned by Canada, Australia
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and Japan combined. Because of its technical expertise, Comsat agreed to assume the role
of manager.

In the first decade of its operation, the organization’s decision-making was
plagued by disagreements. Disagreements revolved around three major issues. The first
was whether Comsat was in fact exercising excessive control over Intelsat with limited or
no accountable to Intelsat’s members. Accusations of excessive control emerged from
European nations, led by France. Europeans perceived a conflict of interest between
Comsat’s role as the majority shareholder of the Intelsat space segment and its role as the
space-segment manager. The Europeans members argued that Comsat’s decisions were
designed to maximize Comsat’s gain vis-a-vis the other service providers. As a result,
Comsat’s research and development decisions were viewed with suspicion, being
perceived instead as directed towards maximizing its Comsat’s corporate profits rather
than those of the international community. I;,?

A second range of issues revolve around the growing power imbalances between
developing nations and industrialized nations within the organization. Since decision
making was allotted according to ownership shares and since more than 80% of the
shares were owned by the industrialized nations, the organization’s control rested heavily
in the hands of the industrialized nations and to whom also accrued the sector’s profits.

155
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INTELSAT Global Satellite System, p. 69.
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Developing nations desired that Intelsat begin to address the growing concerns of
inequity within the organization and look for ways in which this issue could be resolved
to the satisfaction of all.156

The third issue of concern was the structure of the international
telecommunications satellite system itself. Comsat continued preference was for the
single global system despite opposition whereas others sought the liberalization of the
international satellite regime by allowing the operation of separate satellite systems.157
Separate systems were privately owned communications satellite system established to
provide new or specialized communications needs outside of the Intelsat system, that led
to the opening of the international telecommunications market to outside competition.158
Whereas in the United States and several European nations there were considerable
domestic pressures in support of separate satellite systems, Europeans, nevertheless
preferred the establishment of their own regional systems where they could control
decisions concerning research and development and technological innovation.159

15f>
Judith Tegger Kildow, INTELSAT. Policy-Maker’s Dilemma. (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1973), p. 63.
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Twentieth Century Fund. Task Force on International Satellite Communications.
Communicating by Satellite: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
International Communications (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1969) p. 3.
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The New Operating Agreement
By 1973 when Intelsat’s membership had grown from the original 18 members to
83, they met to negotiate a new set of agreements, the Operating Agreement that replaced
the temporary Interim Agreement. The Operating Agreement was established as a
mechanism through which the organization attempted to address the issues of Comsat
control, the power imbalance between states and the issue of access to the global market.
The new agreement maintained the four-tier structure which consisted of a) the Assembly
of Parties, b) the Meeting of Signatories, c) the new Executive Organ of the Board of

Figure 3-2: The Organization and Services of Intelsat in 1989
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Governors which met four times per year, and d) Intelsat’s management led by the new

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
Director General.160 Under this new arrangement, the Board of Governors replaced the
Interim Communications Satellite Committee, and the Director General replaced Comsat.

The newly created Assembly of Parties consisted of a representative from each
member state as it did under the old arrangement. Representatives met every two years to
transact the business of the organization and to discuss constitutional matters and long
term issues. Voting in the Assembly was based on a one-nation one-vote policy allowing
all nations equal representation. A two-thirds vote was required formally to approve
decisions that came before the Assembly.

The Meeting of Signatories convened annually to discuss technical, financial and
operational matters. Like the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signatories, had a onenation one-vote policy. Membership was open to any ITU nation or its signatory that
wished to join. Membership continued to increase annually as states sought to avail
themselves of the benefits of access to and use of the space segment.

The Board of Governors, which replaced the ICSC, consisted of twenty-seven
members chosen by the Assembly of Parties to reflect the geographic diversity of the
organization. The Board’s responsibilities were to supervise the organization’s mandate

160
United States Department of State, “International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization, Agreement between Intelsat and united States of America,’’ Treaties and
International Acts, Series # 7532.
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to design, develop, construct, establish, operate and maintain the Intelsat space segment
and any other activities upon which Intelsat was authorized to embark. The Board
established a new system of voting that allowed all nations representation. Unlike the
ICSC, where a system of weighed voting tied a nation’s voting power to its level of
investment, the new arrangement limited large investors such as the United States, which
possessed more than 40% of Intelsat shares, from exercising more than 40% of the vote,
opening the way for the inclusion of other nations in decision-making. Under this new
arrangement, representation on the Board was not limited to nations with large amounts
of shares, but was open to any nation that possessed more than 1.5% of shares.

For those nations whose shares fell below the 1.5% minimum range for board
representation, the Board reserved five additional seats as set-asides. These set-asides
could have been used by either the individual nation whose shares fell below the
minimum or by a group of nations who, together, failed to fulfill the minimum of shares
required for representation on the Board. Nations below the range were permitted to form
coalitions with similar nations to gain representation on the Board or to increase the level
of representation that they already possessed. This new arrangement was designed to
prevent excessive influence by a small number of large investors and to prevent the
exclusion of small developing states. The new voting rule also created a wider geographic
base, allowing more developing nations representation on the Board for the first time
(Appendix I).
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The fourth structure, an Executive Organ, was established in Washington, D.C.,
under the leadership of the Director General. Appointed by the Board of Governors, the
Director General, was the new structure that had been created to replace Comsat as
manager of Intelsat and reported directly to the Board of Governors,. The manager was
responsible for technical staffing, budget and finance, administration, and other
operational functions. Comsat continued to function as Management Services Contractor
of technical affairs until 1979. After 1979, its role have been reduced to that of an
independent contractor as the Director General’s office assumed Comsat’s managerial
role.

The role of the manager was to “design, develop, construct, establish, maintain,
and operate the space segment of a the global commercial communications satellite
system.” 161 To bring greater accountability to the process, however, the Director General
appointed foreign staff “assignees” for specified periods and created a committee to
review all Comsat decisions. Foreign “assignees” were non-U.S. staff appointed to create
a more nationally diverse institution. The review process continued until Comsat’s role of
Management Services Contractor ended in 1979.162 It was successful in ensuring that
Comsat’s influence was reduced.

See Collino. The INTELSAT System, p. 61.
Ibid p. 62.
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Separate Systems and International Satellite Communication.
The Intelsat monopoly persisted virtually unchallenged in the first two decades
following its inception, occasionally making allowances for other suppliers to provide
services under specified conditions. However, in 1984, the deregulation of the
telecommunications industry in many industrialized nations resulted in a plethora of new
satellite suppliers seeking to enter the world market. As the AT&T monopoly was
dismantled, in the United States, satellite companies such as PanAmSat, Orion and
Tel star, emerged and petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for
approval to provide satellite services to the global community. Pressures from these new
firms resulted in the introduction of the first separate satellite system rule in the United
States which permitted new companies to operate under specified conditions. This new
rule posed the first real threat to the stability of the Intelsat monopoly.

Despite the domestic opposition of the new firms to the international satellite
monopoly, their presence, however, was not enough to erode Intelsat’s domination of the
global satellite market monopoly. Intelsat’s continued dominance can best be explained
by structural characteristics of the international satellite sector which distinguishes it
from other international regimes. Since Intelsat’s inception, the national signatories have
played a central decision-making role through Intelsat’s Meeting of Signatories. All
decisions to allow competition in the global satellite market have to meet with their
approval. Intelsat’ structure allowed national telecommunications suppliers to play
significant decision-making roles while being isolated from bureaucratic politics in
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member states. This structure empowered signatories to selectively restrict competition
from nonlntelsat suppliers.

The tensions over the issue of separate satellite systems was addressed in the new
agreement was that of competition within the global system. In the first decade of its
operation, competition in the provision of international satellite services was prohibited.
However, in the second decade of its operation, the consensus around this position began
to erode, creating major disagreements among members as to how the international
satellite system should and would be organized. The resistance to the Intelsat monopoly
system emerged in the second decade of the organizations and had its roots among the
Europeans.

The United States’ initial support for a single global system was based on
technical and commercial criteria: “There are political, economic and technical reasons
for the basic United States objective of a single global system .... With a single global
system, there would be avoidance of major problems of interference, and more efficient
use of the frequency spectrum.” 163 As a result, the parties to the Interim Agreement agreed
a single global telecommunications system and agreed not to participate in any satellite
system other than Intelsat. The agreement did acknowledge that there might be times
when other satellite systems would be needed in order to meet the unique needs of some
governments or that the creation of separate satellite systems might be necessary for the

163

Kildrow, p. 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108

sake of the national interest. While allowances were made for such needs, nevertheless
the overriding mandate was a commitment to the monopoly system that discourages
competing satellite systems.

The European discontent stemmed from a distrust of COMSAT’s control of
research and development and its control of contracts for services. l64They argued that
separate satellite systems would achieve greater operational flexibility at a substantially
lower cost when compared to that of using Intelsat services, and that Carriers could
provide business data and video distribution services at a comparatively lower cost .lfo
Separate systems, they argue, would stimulate technological innovation, improve
network efficiency, reduce user costs and create new business opportunities resulting in
major benefits for the public without economic harm to Intelsat. Intelsat would not be
harmed economically, they argued, because the proposed separate systems would be
established only in areas in which Intelsat did not operate and had no intention of
operating in the future.166

Comsat deeply opposed the operation of separate satellite systems. Comsat argued
that separate systems seeking to enter the global market were from companies that were
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supplying the same technology and services as those provided by Intelsat, resulting in a
loss of traffic and revenue for Intelsat. The consequences, Comsat argues, was be an
increase in Intelsat’s rates with devastating consequences for developing nations.167

Despite its objections, Comsat acquiesced to separate systems within the Intelsat
framework under certain circumstances. The system had to be technically compatible
with Intelsat, should not result in loss of income or traffic for Intelsat, and must not
interfere with Intelsat’s ability to carry out its primary function, which is to transmit
voice, record and data traffic. These conditions were established as the criteria for
Intelsat’s approval of separate satellite systems.168 However, Comsat maintained its
opposition to regional satellite systems.

In March of 1983, in reaction to the impending breakup of AT&T and the
creation of competition in the United States’ telecommunications industry, the FCC
received petitions from several United States’ firms for authorization to establish separate
satellite systems independent of Intelsat. These petitions (Table 2) prompted the FCC to
reexamine existing US policy to determine whether separate systems should be allowed
to operate in light of existing laws, treaties and foreign policy. As a result, in 1985, the
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These recommendations came out of the Report of the Twentieth Century Task
Force, op. cit.
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FCC establish a committee to review the concerns of separate satellite systems and to
propose changes in United States’ international satellite policy established in 1963.

The outcome of the review was President Reagan’s 1984 Presidential
Determination Number 85-2, which marked the beginning of a monumental shift in US
policy when the Federal
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Table 3-2: United States Companies Licensed, Operational, and with Applications
Pending to Provide International Satellite Communications Services (19841994)
Type of System

Licensed

Operational

Unlicensed, with
Application
Pending

Geostationary169

4

4

0

Big LEO 170

3

0

3

Little LEO171

3

1

6

Broadcasting satellite services172

0

0

1

28 Gigahertz frequency or higher173

0

0

11

Source: The U nited States general A ccounting O ffice, Telecom m unications: C om petition Issues in
International Satellite Com m unications. W ashington, D .C.: N TIS, O ctober 1996), page 27.

169

These satellite systems were located 22,300 miles above the earth and operated on
the C band (4 to 6 gigahertz portion of the spectrum) and the Ku band (12 to 14 gigahertz
of the spectrum).
170

Big LEOs transmitted radio signals above i gigahertz portion of the spectrum.
These satellite systems were generally used to send voice and facsimile, as well as data
transmissions.
171

Little LEOs transmitted radio signals below 1 gigahertz on the spectrum. These
satellite systems were generally used to send only non-voice data transmissions.
172

These satellites are geostationary but were licensed by the FCC under a separate
licensing category. They offer one-way communications. These satellites were not in
competition with Intelsat.
173
These satellite systems were either geostationary or LEOs. Their services included
on-demand data or video applications directly to the home. These satellite services were
also not in competition with Intelsat.
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Communications Commission (FCC) authorized the operation of alternative satellite
systems for reasons of national security.174 These private commercial international
satellite systems were permitted to independent of the Intelsat system. The new FCC
policy included the following restrictions established by Intelsat to prevent new suppliers
from undermining the flow of traffic and profits to the Intelsat system:

a) separate systems may not interconnect directly or indirectly with the
existing public-switched network, that is, the Intelsat network,
b) separate systems operators cannot operate common carriers, that is,
providers of telephone and telex services
c) the use of separate systems by United States carriers require
authorization from the FCC in accordance with Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934.17:1
The FCC's decision authorizing the operation of United States domestic separate
systems was met with a variety of responses. The United Kingdom supported the
introduction of competition:

174

Senior Interagency Group on International Communication and Information
Policy. A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems (Springfield, Va: National
Technical Information Services, 1985).
17?
Federal Communications Commission, “Separate satellite Systems for
International Communications: In the Matter of Establishing Satellite Systems Providing
International Communications,’’ 101 F.C.C. 2d 1046 (1985), pp 290-291.
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It is the United Kingdom's continuing strong commitment to Intelsat as
the principal organization responsible for the provision of global satellite
facilities for international communications. [However its support of
separate systems] was clearly consistent with the United Kingdom
government's support for the development of competing international
telecommunications systems, both satellite and cable, in response to
market needs. .. .Intelsat must be prepared to meet competition.176

The position of the FCC and its counterpart in the United Kingdom conflicted
greatly with the principles, norms and values of the Intelsat regime. As Intelsat’s Director
General stated in his response:
It is well known that Intelsat Governments (Parties) and
telecommunications entities (Signatories) have steadfastly opposed any
change in the policy embodied in the Intelsat Agreements which provides
for the establishment and operation of a single global communications
satellite system. These member Governments and telecommunications
authorities have expressed both outright opposition to the authorization of
separate international communications satellite systems apart from
Intelsat, and serious reservations about the change in U.S. policy reflected
in the 28 November Presidential Determination. They have communicated
both directly with appropriate agencies of the United States’ Government
and through the passage of unanimous resolutions by the Assembly of

176
A letter to the Director General of Intelsat dated August 22, 1986 from Mr. Robert
Priddle of the United Kingdom department of Trade and Industry in response to an
inquiry from Intelsat regarding the United Kingdom’s position on separate systems.
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Parties, the principal organ of Intelsat, and the Meeting of Signatories,
representing the investing telecommunications entities of Intelsat.177

Intelsat remained committed to a single global system with limited use of separate
satellite systems despite growing domestic pressures for change. Even the ensuing
changes in domestic policy we see in the United States, Great Britain and will see in
Jamaica, were insufficient to alter Intelsat’s fundamental operating principle of a single
global system which remained intact. The principle of the separate satellite system did not
take root in Intelsat despite the proliferation of private satellite companies (Appendix III)
and changes in the domestic policy of its representatives. National representatives
continued to maintain strong support for a single global system. While national
governments continued to press for the use of separate systems, rather than resulting in
changes in Intelsat policy, domestic pressures and domestic policy changes only resulted
in an inconsistency between domestic policy on separate systems and that of the
principles and norms of the international regime and states’ representatives.

Inconsistencies between domestic satellite policy and the position of national
signatories within Intelsat can be attributed to the organizational structure of Intelsat. At
the heart of the inconsistency were the Intelsat structures the Meeting of Signatories and
the Meeting of Parties. The signatories were the primary decision-makers as well as the

177

INTELSAT, “INTELSAT Director General Statement on United States’ Actions
Regarding Separate Satellite Systems," BG-64-76E. August 19, 1985.
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organization’s principal investors in the Intelsat system and therefore sought to maintain
and protect its investment. The signatories’ interests were clearly enhanced by the
preservation of the Intelsat monopoly. The Assembly of Parties is also empowered to
protect the organization’s investments. Intelsat’s structure therefore functions to protect
the status quo of a single global system and deter entry of competition or any changes that
are inconsistent with the investment goals of the organization.

International Telecommunications System and International Regime Change
To summarize the dynamics of the first three decades of the organization’s
existence - first, the regime experienced a significant growth in membership during its
first three decades. The new members, which consisted mostly of developing nations,
sought more of a voice in the organization. While these developing nations sought to
increase their power, they echoed the European nations’ demand for a reduction in the
power and influence of Comsat.

The number of new states seeking to participate in the governance of the satellite
regime was only surpassed by the number of new firms seeking to enter the global
satellite market. The new firms posed a threat to the single global satellite system as it
sought to end the Intelsat monopoly. While the needs of developing states and the new
firms placed new demands for change on Intelsat, the developing states were initially
more successful in realizing their objective of reducing Comsat’s influence.
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One analysis that proves useful in explaining why new states were more
successful than the new firms within the international satellite regime is Stephen
Krasner’s analysis of international regime change.I7S In his analysis, Krasner argues that
there are two kinds of changes that occur in an international regime - internal and external
regime changes. Internal regime change is where there are changes in regime principles
and norms and changes that occur in rules and procedures.179 By contrast, external regime
changes occur where there are changes in principles and norms. This latter change,
Krasner argues, constitutes a change in the regime itself. On the other hand, Krasner
argued that a lack of coherence in a regime’s principles, norms, rules or decision-making
procedures results in the weakening of the regime, making the regime less coherent or
highly inconsistent.

The Intelsat members were successful in negotiating the Definitive Agreement. It
introduced changes in the organization’s rules and decision-making procedures. These
changes constituted the successful internal adjustment that occurred in Intelsat’s internal
organizational structure. These changes in the Definitive Agreement were the outcome of
the inclusion of the growing number of developing nations in the organization’s decision
making and the reduction of the control of the largest member, the United States. The

178

Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables” in Stephen D. Krasner eel., International Regimes (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1983) pp 3-4.
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Agreement reflected internal regime adjustments rather than regime change and was
successful in making significant adjustments to Intelsat’s rules and decision-making
procedures.

The Agreement was not an attempt to transform the regime’s single global system
structure. The separate satellite system policy, on the other hand, constituted an attempt to
fundamentally transform the regim e’s character by changing its principles and norms. If
successful, it would bring a significant transformation to the very character of the Intelsat
system, changing it from monopoly to a more competitive system. As a result, it met with
resistance from Comsat and those who benefitted from the monopoly system.

Conclusion
There were many changes in the international telecommunications sector in the
1980's which impinged on the Intelsat regime. Chief among these changes was the
deregulation of the telecommunication industry in the United States that resulted in the
end of the AT&T monopoly. As other nations followed suit the character of the global
telecommunications industry changed from one of monopoly control to one where
competition became increasingly acceptable. As the industry changed globally, pressures
from the domestic systems were exerted on Intelsat to introduce a separate systems policy
that reflected the changes that were already evident in the international
telecommunications regime.
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Intelsat’s national signatories, such as those of the United States, Great Britain
and Jamaica, battled internally with competing economic interests over the introduction
of separate satellite system into the global satellite market. Comsat had been the strongest
major supporter for a single satellite system. However, the deregulation of the United
States telecommunications market resulted in the creation of new competitive satellite
firms which posed a threat to the continuation of the single global system. The use of
separate satellite systems conflicted with the interests of national signatories and created
the basis of conflict between domestic groups seeking their use.

Jamaica’s teleport demonstrated several features of the global satellite sector.
First, it described the obstacles inherent in the attempt by a separate satellite system to
penetrate the Intelsat dominated global system. Second, it uncovered the mechanisms that
were in place that serve to preserve the monopoly status quo in the face of new and
conflicting principles that emerged to challenge the monopoly status quo that would
undermine the liberalization of the sector. Third, the project highlights the ways in which
transnational cooperation between satellite systems in both the United States and Jamaica
impact the sector. The combined strategies of both Comsat, Cable and Wireless and
Jamintel were employed to keep intact the global organizational structure of Intelsat as
well as the national satellite sector.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SECTOR:
ITS HISTORY AND TRANSFORMATION

Introduction
There were two kinds of changes taking place in the international
telecommunications satellite sector in 1984. One was the change in the international
regime which governed the sector. The second change, which precipitated the change in
the regime was the change in the international telephone and telegraph market. The
satellite sector had also been impacted by these significant transformations.

In 1984, when the liberalization of the global market began, the global market
began to experience transformations in its structure, where it moved from a sector with
few firms and significant barriers to entry to many firms and more accessible to newer
commercial entities. Other changes can be partly attributed to technological innovations
in the telecommunications sector and in the computer industries. These innovations
facilitated new enterprises which brought about an increase in the number of actors
seeking to provide services. However, Intelsat continued to place limitations on new
entrants so that they operated within the context of governmental regulations and
authoritative oversight.
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The chapter examines the evolution of the international satellite market from 1960
until it experienced significant transformations in 1989 when the Digiport decision was
implemented. It was over this market that Intelsat presided. The chapter highlights the
technological changes that occurred within that period and discusses the implications of
these innovations for competition and change. It sheds some light on the conflicts and
contradictions of this sector as a result of these changes that later culminated in the
separate satellite system policy. Finally, it reflects on the implications for competition
within the satellite sector for the future of the Intelsat regime.

The History of the Development of the International Telecommunications Satellite
Industry
In 1957, the Soviet Union launch its first satellite, Sputnik. This launch created an
urgency in the United States to develop its own satellite sector. As a result, in 1960
AT&T applied for and received an FCC license to engage in experimental satellite
communications with the goal of implementing an operating satellite system. As a result
of this experimentation, TELSTAR was launched in 1962. In 1963, RCA and Hughes
Aircraft Company, both of which had also been granted the same privilege by NASA,
also launched their projects - RELAY and SYNCOM, respectively. These innovations led
to the passage of the US Communications Satellite Act in 1962 which authorized the
formation of Comsat. The satellite systems of RCA and Hughes became the basis on
which Comsat formed its operation. Then in 1965 Comsat launched its own commercial
communications satellite, EARLY BIRD.
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These innovations in the United States prompted Canada to launch its first
domestic communications satellite in 1972. Two years later, Western Union launched the
first United States private domestic satellite, WESTAR. RCA also followed soon
thereafter with the launch of a second domestic satellite, RCA SATECOM. By 1976,
AT&T and Comsat had collaborated in the launch of the COMSTAR series of satellites
which were intended for voice and data transmission. This satellite series provided a
tremendous boost to the television and cable industries.

Of the satellite corporations that played a role in the emergence of the satelli te
sector, Western Union, one of the primary forerunners of the industry, is no longer in
existence. Hughes continues to operate and is currently a manufacturer of satellite
systems. However, Hughes, which had partnered with GTE, in the early 1960s, now
provides satellite services for the domestic market and does not interfere with the
international market controlled by Intelsat. AT&T still operates satellites but is no longer
in partnership with COMSAT.

By 1978, fourteen years after Intelsat was established, these companies began
gearing their operations for real competition in the international telecommunications
market. As a result, for the first time, Intelsat faced the possibility of competition from
the new companies attempting to operate outside of the Intelsat system and furthering
their own private pursuits. While these domestic companies were emerging, suppliers
from other regions of the world also began to surface as another possible source of
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.

competition. In 1976, PALAPA, a regional system, was launched in Indonesia. The same
year, Japan launched its domestic satellite system, followed by India in 1982 and
Australia, Mexico and Brazil in 1985. The major challenge to Intelsat, however, came
with the creation of Pan A mS at in 1983 and later Orion in 1984. Both firms attempted, for
the first time, to provide services to a market dominated by Intelsat. Technological
innovation also posed a major challenge to the Intelsat system, creating potential
alternatives to satellite technology.

Technological Challenges
The transformation of the telecommunication sector was affected not only by the
deregulation of the telephone and telegraph markets but also by the proliferation of
technological innovation in fiber optics, personal communications systems and in
maritime and mobile technology. These technological changes provided alternatives to
satellite communications and posed a threat to Intelsat’s market. The greatest threat from
these technological changes, however, was that they provided a point of accessibility to
the international satellite market for potential new separate satellite systems.

The technology that had a significant impact on the satellite sector was fiber
optics. In 1988, the first fiberoptic trans-Atlantic telephone cable, known as TAT-8, was
laid across the Atlantic ocean. Trans-Pacific cables were soon to follow. Fiber optic
technology had the potential of transporting a greater volume of telephone, data and video
traffic at a significantly lower cost than satellite technology. Fiber-optics, however, unlike
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satellite technology, was designed to only relay information from point to point and not
from point to multipoint as television broadcast technology. Nevertheless, the ability of
fiber optics technology to transfer larger volumes of telephone calls provided an
alternative to satellite communications.

A second innovation that directly affected the international satellite system was
personal communications systems (PCS) technology. PCS is a new generation of wireless
phone technology that three types of digital technology - Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA), Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM), and Time Division
Multiple Access (TDM A).180 Digital technology is a significant improvement over the
former analog technology. The difference is not only in the quality of the reception
received, but also in the range of service possibilities. Digital phone technology provides
a variety of user possibilities - wireless phone, paging, message services and data
services. PCS technology, which operates through low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, has
the capable of being used anywhere. The major drawback of PCS technology is that with
the three digital technologies, phones using one of the digital technologies may not work
on another. 181

A third technological innovation, which provided a challenge for the international
communications satellite industry, occurred within the area of maritime and mobile
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technology, also. In 1976, COMSAT launched a new type of satellite — MARISAT —
for the purpose of providing mobile services to the United States Navy and other
maritime clients. Europe followed shortly after with the launch of MARECS. As a result
of both endeavors, in 1979 the United Nations International Maritime Organization
established the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) to regulate
services in that sector in the manner similar to Intelsat. At its inception, INMARISAT
utilized both MARISAT and MARECS, doing so until it launched its own satellites,
INMARISAT II and INMARISAT III. The maritime and mobile telecommunications
market for the first time offered alternative means of communication thereby posing a
threat to the land-based satellite systems which Intelsat represented.

Competition and the International Telecom m unications Satellite Industry
The gravest threat to the international telecommunications satellite industry,
however, came from companies seeking to compete in the market with Intelsat.
Beginning in 1983, the FCC received five applications from satellite companies seeking
licenses to operate in the international satellite market. The companies were Pan
American Satellite Corporation (PanAmSat), Orion Satellite Corporation. International
Satellite Inc., RCA American Communications, and Cygnus Corporation. The FCC
immediately began its deliberations on PanAmSat, International Satellite Inc. and
RCA AC. However, deliberations on Orion Satellite and Cygnus were postponed until a
later date. PanAmSat’s goal was to provide services between North America and Latin
America while RCA ’s was to provide services between the US, Europe, and Africa.
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Based on the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, satellite companies outside
the Intelsat system were not permitted to operate unless the United States determined that
their operation was necessary and required in the national interest. The Senior Interagency
Group on International Communication and Information Policy was established to review
existing policy to determine whether the operation of separate systems would be in the
national interest. It was the recommendation of this committee that the national interest
would be enhanced allowing the operation of separate satellite systems. As a result, on
November 28, 1984, the president of the United States issued a determination which
permitted the operation of separate satellite systems on the grounds that they enhance the
national interest.182

Prior to the November 1984 declaration, United States firms faced restrictions
from both Intelsat and the FCC that limited their ability to provide satellite services
internationally. They were allowed to compete only in the area of television broadcasting,
video, data and voice transmission. They were restricted from entry into any area of
telephone services between companies and individuals that involved the use of local
telephone services. This restriction resulted in the protection of 85% of Intelsat's income
since firms were allowed to operate on condition that the services they provided caused
neither technical nor economic hardship to Intelsat.183

Department of State Bulletin, Communications Satellite Systems, 1985.
New York Times, July 26, 1985.
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United States firms providing satellite services overseas encountered additional
restrictions imposed by foreign regulatory agencies which limited their overseas
operation. As a result of these restrictive policies, these companies diverted their efforts
from providing telephone services into operating private communications networks and
providing international television and video services.184 Both markets, particularly the
international television and video market have been the least restrictive of the
telecommunications markets and where private firms have managed to create a niche.

The international television and video market can be distinguished by regional and
international or transoceanic broadcasts. United States firms as well as foreign firms have
found the market for regional broadcasts more profitable and traditionally have formed a
market characterized by fewer restrictions than the telephone service market. As a result,
this market became an area of growth for satellite service providers. The international and
transoceanic broadcasts market, however, was largely controlled by Intelsat which
continued to dominate the television and broadcast market due to its excess capacity, its
market access and its size. Services such as local news media, transmitting news from one
region to another, generally relied on Intelsat services, so fewer providers emerged in this
area.

As a result of Intelsat’s dominance in transoceanic broadcasting, regional
broadcasters tended not to develop the capacity for transoceanic broadcasting. Companies
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entering the market for transoceanic services were often government-owned or had strong
ties to government. This relationship allowed them added privileges in the setting of the
price for the services they offered.

The international television and video market

became the avenue through which emerging firms, such as PanAmSat and Orion could
launch their entry into the international satellite market.

PanAmSat
PanAmSat was the first private commercial entity that emerged to challenge
Intelsat’s dominance in the international satellite market. While PanAmSat led the way
for the introduction of separate satellite systems, its survival within the satellite sector
remained dubious. As a result it waged a long and protracted battle both domestically and
internationally to establish its operation. Its battle for survival persisted against what it
perceived as unfair competition, despite its successful presence in the global satellite
markets.

In May 1984 PanAmSat, which is owned by Alpha Lyracom, a Connecticut-based
sole proprietorship, filed an application with the FCC for the establishment of a private
satellite system in Latin America to provide international satellite services between Latin
America and the United States. This application came in the light of President Reagan’s
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1984 declaration that private satellite operators be allowed to compete with the Intelsat
system in global satellite communications. As the first privately-owned international
communications satellite system, PanAmSat was the first commercial entity to officially
challenge the Intelsat monopoly. Prior to the PanAmSat launch, US and foreign
companies used satellites within their borders but no one sought to challenge the Intelsat
monopoly. PanAmSat’s goal was the establishment of international satellites for business
communications and television links between the US, Latin America and Western
Europe. Using its geostationary satellite, PAS I, which had the capacity to beam
television programs, video, audio and data signals to all sites in the United States, Europe
and Latin America, it could simultaneously cany 36 TV channels.

A year after it requested FCC approval, PanAmSat was granted the conditional
approval requested for the construction of its satellites.186 In its bid for approval,
PanAmSat was required to disclose to Intelsat the full range of equipment it planned to
use in its operations and where and how this equipment was to be used. The nations
which would be the recipients of these intended services also had to send documents in
support of the claims made. Intelsat responded to the bid for approval with a request that
PanAmSat demonstrate financial qualification by the end of the year, without which the
approval for operation would not be granted.

This occurred on September 3, 1985.
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After several requests from PanAmSat for extensions for meeting the requirement
of financial qualification, on July 9, 1986, Intelsat’s board of governors rejected
PanAmSat’s bid to launch and operate its satellite system on the grounds that PanAmSat
had failed to fully inform Intelsat of how it had planned to use its 24 transponders.187 The
United States and Peru had provided information for only five transponders that would be
used to transmit video, data and private voice services between the United States and
Latin America instead of twenty-four.188

A year later in April of 1987, Intelsat granted conditional approval for
PanAmSat’s operation of twenty-four transponders, including the five Latin American
transponders between the US and Peru. Six of the 24 transponders were designed for
traffic between Europe and North and South America. The satellite, which was located at
the eastern tip of Brazil, would also handle data, telex and radio communications for the
financial, manufacturing and mining industries. It was also designated to broadcast 36
television channels simultaneously.
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The battle for entry into the international satellite market was soon followed by
the battle over who would dominate the market. After Intelsat’s approval of PanAmSat, a
series of confrontations between PanAmSat and Intelsat soon surfaced. PanAmSat
accused Intelsat of promoting an international boycott against its satellites by putting up
“bureaucratic roadblocks” that prevented PanAmSat signals from being received in places
where Intelsat had control of the market. Both Intelsat and Comsat vehemently denied
PanAmSat charges, claiming instead that Intelsat had increased PanAmSat’s access to
Intelsat member nations instead of embarking upon a strategy of obstruction.189
PanAmSat also accused Comsat of unfair competition and petitioned the United States
courts to intervene.

In September of 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that PanAmSat could
pursue a $1.5 billion antitrust suit against Comsat, alleging that Comsat practiced
predatory pricing and that Comsat had discouraged other signatories from doing business
with PanAmSat. Because Comsat’s action was the result of its role as the US signatory to
Intelsat, a prior court had earlier decided that, because it was an international
organization, Comsat was immune from U.S. antitrust laws. The 1.991 Court decision was

189

Los Angeles Times, November 27. 1988 in
Http://web.lexis-nex is.com/universe/document.
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a reversal of the earlier lower court decision, where it concluded that Comsat was not
immune. 190

Additional charges of unfair business practices and obstructions to PanAmSat’s
efforts had also come from outside the United States. Since launching PanAmSat, its
parent company, Alpha Lyracom, has been embroiled in a battle with Entel, the state-run
Argentinian telephone and telegraph cartel and seven independent TV network stations.
The networks desired to be linked to PanAmSat’s satellite.191

Peru had initially chosen the Intelsat system. However, it later decided against
Intelsat, particularly because only a small percentage of Intelsat’s transmitting capacity
was allotted for television broadcasting. That allotment had already been dominated by
Entel who, as Argentina’s signatory to Intelsat, also owned the only microwave grid that
TV broadcasters needed to transmit programs to stations. By restriction of access to the
microwave grid, Entel denied potential broadcasters the ability to transmit programs
using PanAmSat satellites.

In 1985, PanAmSat was successful in luring business away from the Intelsat
network when its parent company Alpha Lyracom, offered Peru the use of a highpowered video transponder that would cover Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Northern Chile

190

See “Monopoly in Orbit,” The Economist, October 26, 1991, p. 19.
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for a mere $1 per year. Despite the many obstructions, by 1995, PanAmSat’s income
managed to rise to $116.1 million, almost doubling from the previous year’s $63.7
million.192

Orion
The second private domestic satellite company to receive both Intelsat and FCC
approval was the Orion Network Systems. Though the first to apply for approval before
the FCC, Orion followed PanAmSat in breaking the 25-year Intelsat monopoly on
international communications between nations. Orion launched two geostationary
satellites to locations above the Atlantic, the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. Its
licenses prohibited telephone calls on the public telephone network.

After a long battle with Intelsat which began in 1983 when it petitioned the FCC
for approval for the provision of voice, data and video services for corporations and
government agencies between the US and the United Kingdom, Orion finally won
approval from the FCC in 1987. Two years later, Orion received an approval from Intelsat
to operate its commercial satellites.193 Its licenses prohibited the use of telephone calls on
the public telephone network.

New York Times, June 16, 1996.
This occurred on June 22, 1989.
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Unlike PanAmSat, which planned to provide services between the United States
and Latin America, Orion was the first firm that attempted to provide services between
nations that were outside of the United States. It was designed to be the first transoceanic
separate satellite system engaging in intercontinental provision of services and as a result
would be in direct competition with the Intelsat market.194 Also unlike PanAmSat which
focused on transmitting television signals through its satellites, Orion concentrated 20%
of its efforts in video and 80% in private telecommunications networks for businesses. It
was therefore expected to cause Intelsat “significant economic harm.” In spite of the
impending threat, the decision was made by Intelsat to grant approval for Orion to operate
after receiving assurances from United States and the United Kingdom that both nations
would remain committed to do business with Intelsat in the long run and that Orion’s
operations would be limited to private corporate networks.193

Factors Affecting Competition
In spite of PanAmSat and Orion's presence in the international satellite market,
sustained international competition failed to take root within the international
telecommunications market. The failure of competition can be attributed to several
factors. First, Intelsat’s signatories had close ties to their governments. As a result, their
194

PR Newswire Association, Inc., “Intelsat Board of Governors Consults Orion
System,” Washington, June 22, 1989.
195

John Burgess, “Rockville Company Rejoices Over Satellite Network Okay,” The
Washington Post, July 19, 1989. p. F I. Also Nancy Dunne, “Board of Intelsat Backs
Competitors”, The Financial Times (London), June 23, 1989, p. 8.
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governments were willing to protect them at any cost, from outside competition. As in the
instances of the American Satellite Corporation in Jamaica and PanAmSat in Peru, new
firms seeking access to foreign markets were denied access as governments imposed
regulations to prevent separate satellite systems’ access to the local market.

Competitors had to seek permission from domestic licensing bureaus to provide
services to a country. Domestic telecommunications bureaus were entrusted with the
authority to approve applications for use of the specific spectrum of radio frequencies, for
setting up ground stations to send or receive satellite signals or to interconnect with the
domestic telephone system. These bureaus served as an extension to the International
Telecommunications Union Radiocommunications Sector (ITU-R), whose responsibility
it is to allocate radio frequencies and to register radio frequency assignments in the
geostationary satellite orbit in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations
of different countries. Again, as in the case of Peru, the necessary approvals were not
forthcoming.

Second, the Intelsat signatories were often the only domestic institutions
authorized to grant licenses for the operation of competitive firms. They therefore lacked
the incentive to approve service providers who posed challenges to the existing or future
markets served by the signatories. Signatories had a financial motive to restrict
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competitors’ access to local markets.196 In 1996, seventy one percent of Intelsat’s
signatories were directly responsible for making the decisions concerning licensing,
spectrum allocation and market access, allowing them to restrict or deny licensing of
prospective competitors.197 An additional fourteen percent of the signatories were separate
from but nevertheless related to the licensing bodies and were able to exert some
influence on decisions.198

The third restriction to competition is that, in the event that a separate satellite
system did gain access, there were no guarantees that needed access would continue in the
future for that company. A company getting approval for access for a period of one year,
would not be guaranteed for another, neither would there be any guarantee that other
companies seeking access to that country’s market thereafter would be successful. Each
non-Intelsat company had to negotiate entry into a foreign market to provide global
services each time access was desired, with no guarantee of success. Intelsat’s access, on
the other hand, was automatic and it never needed to negotiate its privileges.

19 6

United States General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: Competitive
Impact of Restructuring the International Satellite Organizations , Report to the
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-96-204 p.5.
19 7

United States, General Accounting Office, k‘ Telecommunications: Competition
Issues in International Satellite Communications. Report to the Chairman, Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation - United States Senate, October 1996,
GAO/RCED-97-1, p. 27.
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A fourth factor hindering competition in the telecommunications market was that
separate systems first had to secure agreements from local companies to provide services
after which negotiations with Intelsat for access would take place. Because the
negotiation process was lengthy and time consuming, time delays resulted in heavy
financial losses for separate satellite systems. New companies’ abilities to freely compete
in these markets were undermined by the possibility of denials and delays.

Finally, Intelsat had been the recipient of special advantages that were not
available to its competitors. Intelsat had easy access to financial capital and enjoyed other
special privileges, the most important being exemptions from taxation and easier access
to orbital slots (locations in space). It also enjoyed special immunity from lawsuits. These
advantages gave Intelsat a competitive edge while undermining the survival of new
companies.

COMSAT argued that there were no special advantages given to Intelsat over
competing firms. It noted that the existence of separate satellite systems was itself an
indication that there were few barriers to entry and that Intelsat had no market
dominance.109 Intelsat, COMSAT argued, bore tremendous responsibilities for providing
universal services at nondiscriminatory prices to the international community, especially
to developing nations, thereby posing limitations on its ability to compete in the market.
COMSAT also noted that because Intelsat was an intergovernmental organization, its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
efficiency as an economic entity was greatly undermined since consensus was needed on
all decisions. The organization was thereby impeded in its attempts to respond rapidly to
changes in the market. Intelsat’s competitors disagreed with this stance.200

Restructuring
By 1996 new domestic and foreign companies had surfaced (Tables 4-2 to 4-4)
resulting in the creation of the Alliance for Competitive International Satellite Services
(ACISS). This was a seven-company lobbying group that was created within the United
States to oppose the market advantage that Intelsat possessed.201 Members of the
consortium agreed that in its initial stages Intelsat had served a vital function in creating a
global network. However, they argued that the needs of the satellite sector had changed,
As a result, Intelsat’s preferential treatments - its tax privileges, immunity from lawsuits,
preferential access to radio spectrum and space for satellites - had become a hindrance to
the satellite sector. ACISS was organized to press for a change and to urge a restructuring
of the satellite sector.

One proposal for restructuring called for the elimination of the Intelsat
intergovernmental arrangement. The intergovernmental arrangement has allowed it to

200

Ibid. p.27.

20]

ACISS consisted of PanAmSat, Orion Network Systems, Columbia
Communications Corporation, Motorola Inc., Odyssey Worldwide Services, Orbital
Communications Corporation, TRW and Loral Space and Communications Limited.
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authoritatively allocate commercial benefits such as its tax exemptions and preferential
access to radio spectrum to the organization, thereby resulting in market advantages. For
its opponents, the elimination of the intergovernmental arrangement would also mean the
elimination of benefits that Intelsat received and ultimately Intelsat’s global market
dominance, making it possible for the creation and entry of new firms into the global
satellite market.

Many developing nations had grave concerns about the elimination of the
intergovernmental arrangement. They believed that the arrangement not only allowed the
organization benefits but with it also came the responsibility of ensuring the provision of
basic satellite services to developing nations. As a result, they argued that access to basic
telecommunications services such as telephone using satellites would be threatened in the
absence of Intelsat’s intergovernmental arrangement. Should the intergovernmental
arrangement be relinquished, these states would be unwilling to rely on the private sector
to ensure the provision of these basic services.

A second proposal for restructuring which was also advanced by ACISS, was to
split Intelsat into three companies in order to reduce Intelsat’s size and market
dominance. Under this arrangement, Intelsat would remain an intergovernmental
organization, and create two affiliate companies, the shares of which would be sold to the
public. The two affiliates would focus on improved satellite services, whereas Intelsat
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would focus on basic telephone services, especially for developing nations. The affiliates
would have no special privileges or immunities.

The third proposal for restructuring Intelsat, endorsed by the US government, was
to divide the organization in two entities - an intergovernmental arrangement and an
entity for providing advanced services. The first entity would be the intergovernmental
arrangement which would be 20% owned by signatories. This entity would continue to
focus on basic telecommunications services such as telephone. The affiliate entity would
be privatized, and would concentrate on providing more advanced services such as video
and data. The privately owned affiliate would have no special privileges or immunities.
Business transactions between the two entities would take place as if they had no prior
economic relationship. The affiliate would be subject to competition laws in the countries
in which it operates.

ACISS’s proposal for restructuring was turned down on the grounds that “[t]hat
view does not have any support in the rest of the world.”202 ACISS argued that the
restructuring effort could not be successful unless Intelsat’s large transoceanic capacities
were reduced and countries were willing to accept the new companies. However ACISS,
the United States government and COMSAT all agreed that the market was capable and

202

Statement made by John Mattingly, vice president and general manager of Comsat
quoted in Investor's Business Daily, September 12, 1996.
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willing to offer services such as video, data and mobile telephone services and should be
open for such ends.

Conclusion
The transformation of the Intelsat system began in the United States with one
firm, PanAmSat receiving a license to operate and less than a dozen looming in the
background awaiting their approval to operate. Internationally, other firms followed suit.
PanAmSat’s approval set a precedent that paved the way for future transformations of the
international telecommunications satellite industry and that later affected the decisions of
companies such as the American Satellite Corporation which were now able to act as
intermediaries to deliver satellite services for international business transactions.
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Table 4-1 Significant Events in Communications Satellite: 1945 - 1990203
1945
1956
1957
1960
1960
1961
1962
1962
1963
1964
1965
1969
1972
1974
1975
1975
1976
1976
1979
1988

Arthur C. Clark’s article: “Extra-Terrestrial Relays”
First Trans-Atlantic Telephone Cable: TAT-1
Sputnik: Russia launches the first earth satellite
First successful DELTA Launch Vehicle
AT&T applies to FCC for experimental satellite communications license
The start of TELSTAR, RELAY and SYNCOM programs
TELSTAR and RELAY launched
US Communications Satellite Act
SYNCOM launched
INTELSAT formed
COMSAT’s Early Bird — the first commercial communications satellite
INTELSAT-III series provides global coverage
AN IK: The first Domestic Communications Satellite (Canada)
WESTAR: The first US Domestic Communications Satellite
INTELS AT -IV A :
RCA SATECOM: The first operational body-stabilized communications satellite
M ARIS AT: The first mobile communications satellite
PALAPA: Indonesia launches domestic communications satellite
INMARSAT formed
TAT-8: The first Fiber-Optic Trans-Atlantic telephone cable

203

Source: David J. Whalen, “Communications Satellites: Making the Global Village
Possible,” http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/satcomhistory.html.
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Table 4-2: The United States Domestic Satellite System204
PanAmSat
Orion Network Systems
Columbia Communications Corporation
Motorola Inc.
Odyssey Worldwide Services
Orbital Communications Corporation
TRW
Iridium
Globalstar
Design Publishers, Inc.
Dialink Satcoms, Ltd
WESTAR
GTE

Table 4-3: Domestic Satellite Systems in the Americas205
Satellite Systems

Nation

Anik
Solidaridad
Hispasat
Nahuelsat
Brazilsatk

Canada
Mexico
Spain
Argentina
Brazil

204

By 1995 there were a total of 30 US operational domestic satellites authorized by
the FCC. There are the top firms in operation.
Source: Comsat’s written comments on the GAO Draft Report:
“Telecommunications: Competitive Impact of Restructuring the International Satellite
Organization,” p. 29.
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Table 4-4: European Domestic Satellite Systems206
Satellite Systems
EUTELSAT
Astra
Telecom
Italsat
Turksat
DFS-Kopernicus
Hispasat
TV SAT/Tele-XThor

Nation
Pan-European
Luxembourg
France
Italy
Turkey
Germany
Spain
Nordic countries

Table 4-5: Regional Satellite Systems207
Satellite Systems

Nation

Arabsat
Amos
Optus
Asiasat
Apstar
Chi nasat/Dongfangong
In sat
Koreasat
Me as at
Palapa
Rimsat
Thaicom
BS
J-SAT
N-STAR
SCC/Superbircl

Pan-Arab
Israel
Australia
(Private)
(Private)
China
India
Korea
Malaysia
Indonesia/Asean countries
Tonga
Thailand
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
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Tabie 4-6: International Satellite Systems and their Investors

Competing satellite system

Intelsat Investors

Astra
Telecom
Optus
Asiasat
Hispasat
DFS-Kopernicus
Palapa
Solidaridacl
Brazilsat

British Telecom
France Telecom
Cable and Wireless
Cable and Wireless
Telefonica
Deutsche Telecom
Deutsche Telecom
Telecom Mexico
Embratel

Ibid
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE JAMAICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
Introduction

The rapidly transforming global satellite market of the 1980’s had a cascading
effect on the domestic telecommunications market, and as international competition
increased, so did concerns for the viability of these domestic sectors. In the decade
between 1980 and 1990, two patterns began to emerge in the revenue of the Jamaican
telecommunications sector. First, the revenue in the international component of the
sector began to escalate, while simultaneously, a pattern of decline of revenue in the
domestic sector, set in. The decline, which began in 1980, continued until 1989, the
period of the Digiport negotiations. It resulted in more than a 50% reduction in the
income accruing to the domestic component of the sector. [Fig 5.1]

The concerns for the viability of Jamaica’s domestic telecommunications segment
emerged from both Cable and Wireless and the Ministry of Public Utilities and
Transport (MPUT) - both sought an immediate solution to the decreasing revenue in the
domestic component and the possible impact on the continued provision of domestic
services. The Ministry's solution to the decline in revenue stream, proposed in 1985,
was a policy of cross-subsidization, whereby income generated from the international
component was transferred to the domestic component. This transfer was intended to
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offset the costs of the provision of services in the domestic component. 209 The cross
subsidization policy was adopted in 1989.

The restructuring of the Jamaican telecommunications sector initiated in 1985 by
the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport (MPUT) to address the decline in revenue
began shortly after several significant global events; most notably, the opening of the
global telecommunications market to competition, and the action of the global satellite
regime, led by Intelsat, to allow limited competition in satellite services.

The

restructuring consisted of three stages: a) the privatization of the sector, b) the merger
of domestic and international operations under a single entity - Telecommunications of
Jamaica (TOJ), and c) a revised regulatory regime that would solidify Cable and
W ireless’ control of the sector. It ultimately resulted in the elimination of all
competition within the sector, and subsequently, it led to the closing of the sector to
international competition. Moreover, Jampro’s attempt to liberalize the sector using the
services of the American Satellite Company for the Digiport was defeated, as it
represented a threat to the state’s restructuring of the sector.

Several key actors facilitated the restructuring the Jamaican telecommunications
sector. These actors were Cable and Wireless, Jamintel, Jamaica Telephone Company,
Telephone of Jamaica, the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport, the National
Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ), and Industrial Commercial Development. Cable
and Wireless International initially supplied international services but later supplied all

209 Spiller and Sampson, p. 66.
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telecommunications services. The Jamaica Telephone Company and Jamintel were
domestic entities in partnership with Cable and Wireless to provide domestic and
international services respectively.

The Industrial Commercial Development was an

indigenous firm with ownership shares in the telecommunications sector. The stages of
the restructuring were conducted under the auspices of the National Investment Bank of
Jamaica.

This chapter will begin with an examination of the historical evolution of the
telecommunications sector in order to demonstrate how it progressed from its previous
use of multiple providers to that of the single Cable and Wireless monopoly. Secondly,
it will examine the domestic and international economic contexts that impinged on the
state-directed restructuring of the sector and which resulted in Cable and W ireless’
emergence as the dominant supplier of the sector. Thirdly, the chapter will look at the
impact of the restructuring on the Digiport negotiations and Jampro’s decision to use the
American Satellite Company, a competitive non-Intelsat satellite system. And finally,
the chapter will examine the roles played by these actors in the restructuring of the
sector in order to determine the causes of restructuring and its effects on both the
liberalization of the sector and the Digiport negotiations.

The chapter lays the foundation for explaining why Jamaica failed to liberalize
its services in satellite technology. The creation of new telecommunications firms and
the establishment of the separate satellite systems policy of both the U.S. and Intelsat
posed a potential threat to the viability of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector, which
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led to the state’s decision to eliminate competition.

Germane to the closing of

Jamaica’s telecommunications sector to competition was the new cross-subsidization
policy, which involved its full restructuring. Cross-subsidization was designed to rescue
the

sector

from

the

diminishing

returns

from

the

provision

of

domestic

telecommunications services. Under the new restructuring agreement, all attempts to
liberalize the sector using non-Intelsat satellites would be eliminated.

The History of Jamaica’s Telecommunications Sector
The Jamaica telecommunications sector, which began in 1870 under the colonial
regime of Great Britain, consisted of both a domestic and an international component.
The first international telephone was installed that same year by the state-owned West
India and Panama Telegraph Company (WI&PT), which later was renamed Cable and
Wireless. Because West India and Panama Telegraph Company (WI&PT) and Cable
and Wireless were imperial operations, Jamaica’s relationship with the companies was
an intrastate relationship, which changed in 1962 at the onset of Jamaica’s
independence.210

During the colonial period, the domestic segment of the sector had been served
by a succession of monopoly telecommunications providers. In 1892, the Jamaica
Telephone Company was incorporated to provide services once provided by the W est
India and Panama Telegraph Company (WI&PT). Its operator was the British Telephone
210Pablo T. Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson, “Telecommunications Regulation in
Jamaica” in Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller eds. Regulations, Institutions and
Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 45.
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and General Trust (T&GT), Jam aica’s first telecommunications service provider and the
majority shareholder in the Jamaica Telephone Company. It provided services on a non
exclusive basis until 1925 when it received its forty-year exclusive license to operate in
the capital area of Kingston and St. Andrew. The All Island Telephone System provided
services for the rest of the island under the ownership of the Jamaica Post Office.

In 1945, the Jamaica Telephone Company acquired the All Island Telephone
System, resulting in its provision of services to the entire island. Telephone and General
Trust (T&GT) became the provider of services to the domestic component. It received a
forty-year exclusive right to provide such services under the All-Island License, which
stipulated that the provision of domestic services would be under private ownership and
that there would be a “fair” as well as an “attractive” rate of return.211

Jamaica

Telephone Company operated under this agreement until 1966. Prior to this period, the
telecommunications sector consisted solely of telephone and telegraph services, and had
experienced a “modest but continued growth” in services.212

Shortly before the nation’s independence from Britain in

1962, T&GT

announced its refusal to continue to invest in the Jamaica Telephone Company’s

21'Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson p.39. See also Alvin G. Wint, “Pioneering
Telephone Privatization: Jamaica,” in Ravi Ramamuti, ed. Privatizing Monopolies: Lessons
From the Telecommunications and Transport Sectors in Latin America. (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press. 1996), also p. 63.
212Spiller and Sampson, p. 39.
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operation in the domestic component because of uncertainties in both the market as well
as the in the newly independent political regime. After independence, T&GT began
negotiations to renew its license. These negotiations lasted three years and ended in
1966.

T&GT’s unprofitable operation in Jamaica resulted in the sale of 50% of its

shares in the Jamaica Telephone Company to a Canadian holding company, the
Continental Telephone Company, which was contracted to provide domestic services
and to increase existing levels of investment in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector.
Continental’s expectations, however, were greatly inflated, and the company soon
suffered extensive losses from which it never recovered.213

The sector’s instability extended beyond its service providers to its regulatory
framework. The post independence period saw a change in the sector’s regulatory
regime: from a system of ad hoc and temporary regulatory boards, to one replaced by the
permanent and independent Jamaica Public Utilities Commission in 1966. The
Commission issued new licenses to the Jamaica Telephone Company, and vowed to
introduce a “Jamaicanization” plan designed to increase the percentage of indigenous
ownership of the sector that would be implemented by the year 1971.214 However, by
1975, the Commission was disbanded with the nationalization of the Jamaica Telephone

2l3Ibid. pp. 49-50.
214Ibid.
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Company. It, nevertheless, later resurfaced as the Ministry of Public Utilities and
Transport in 1976.215

The Continental Telephone Company made various attempts to extricate itself
from its troubled performance, making several petitions to the utilities commission for a
rate increase. Each petition was met with opposition from both the regulatory
commission and the Seaga regime. In 1975, when the Manley regime assumed power,
the prime minister undertook the full nationalization of the domestic sector - a decision
that was welcomed by Continental Telephone. It availed itself of the opportunity to sell
all its holdings to the state, thereby initiating the process of the nationalization of
domestic telecommunications in 1975. These domestic holdings remained nationalized
until 1987. Cable and Wireless continued to maintain control of 51% of the shares in
the international component.

Negotiations to privatize all domestic holdings began in 1985 with the return to
power of a new government headed by Seaga, and under the influence of the
privatization recommendations of the IMF Structural Adjustment Program of 1982.
Negotiations began two years later and Cable and Wireless emerged as Jamaica’s sole
provider of telecommunications services after it had acquired the majority of
government shares in the domestic component. All other providers of domestic service
had since departed, leaving Cable and Wireless the sole investor in both the domestic

2l5Ibid. p. 56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152
and international segments.

While the domestic component repeatedly changed service providers, the
international component, by contrast, was characteristically more stable, with Cable and
Wireless as the component’s only provider of international telecommunications services
since its inception in 1870. Unlike the domestic component, which initially was more
profitable and more regulated, the international component of the sector was relatively
less regulated. It operated without a license, with minimum to no regulation, and with a
fixed price system.216

In 1961, in the shadows of Jamaica’s independence, Cable and Wireless
successfully negotiated with the soon-to-be newly independent state its first exclusive
license to provide external services under the Radio and Telegraph Control Act. Prices
remained low and continued so until the late 1970s. Cable and Wireless increased its
investments in the segment with the addition of an earth station and the development of
its satellite technology. In 1968 it renegotiated with the government and received a
twenty-year extension of the 1961 license that allowed it to operate until 1988.217 Cable

2l6Ibid, p. 60
2l7Ibid, p. 63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153

and Wireless operated the international segment jointly with the state even as the
domestic component remained completely nationalized.218

In 1971, Cable and Wireless began negotiations with the state for the creation of
the nation’s first international telecommunications service provider. Jamintel was
created as a joint venture between Cable and Wireless and the Jamaican government in
which Cable and Wireless owned 49 percent of the shares and the government owned
51 percent and operated as a separate entity from the domestic service provider. The
Jamaica Public Utilities Commission licensed Cable and Wireless under this new
arrangement. In addition, the government assumed the cost of the international
telecommunications operations that had formerly been wholly owned and operated by
Cable and Wireless. By 1975, the international segment experienced yet another
milestone with the introduction of international direct dialing. This milestone triggered
a tremendous boom in Jamintel’s profit levels.

Cable and W ireless an d the Jamaica Telecom m unications Sector
Jamaica’s telecommunications sector has endured many changes since Jamaica’s
independence in 1962. However, the presence of Cable and Wireless in the international
component has remained a constant since 1870. Its presence shaped and conditioned
Jamaica’s modem telecommunications sector. First, Cable and W ireless’ presence was
proved profitable for its operations in the domestic segment.

Even as the state

218 W int p .50.
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nationalized the domestic component, Cable and Wireless continued to hold 51% of the
shares of the international component, maintaining control over Jamintel during the
state take-over o f the domestic component. By 1987, when the state privatized the
sector, Cable and Wireless took the opportunity to solidify its control over the entire
telecommunications sector through the acquisition of the majority 80% of the shares of
both the domestic and international components. Upon privatization of the sector, Cable
and Wireless renegotiated a favorable 25-year agreement in 1987.

In

addition

to

the

continued

rise

in

revenue

from

international

telecommunications, three factors have led to Cable and W ireless’ presence and
dominance in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector. The first was Jamaica's regulatory
regime, from which Cable and Wireless benefited greatly; the second was Cable and
W ireless’ ability to minimize the risks involved in operating within the Jamaican
economy; and the third was the strategic importance of Jamaica, which allowed the
company the opportunity to fulfill its goals for the Caribbean region.

The Sector’s Regulatory Clim ate
The telecommunications sector’s regulatory and pricing regime consisted of
three features: a) the negotiation of license agreements, b) the regulation of operations
within the sector; and c) the creation of incentives by the state that encouraged corporate
expansion within the sector - and which time and again proved favorable to Cable and
Wireless. The licensing of telecommunications operators was central to the operation of
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the sector. The speed with which the state awarded the operator its license and the
duration and conditions of the license determined the nature of the relationship between
the operators in the sector and the state. It affected the level of involvement the operator
elected to undertake as well as the risks it was willing to assume. Cable and W ireless’
license negotiations had been speedy, generous and favorable. Dunn and Gooden
contend that the terms of the negotiations between Cable and Wireless and the Jamaican
government were “unduly generous.” 219

The state’s generosity toward Cable and Wireless was evident in both the 1968
and 1988 negotiations in which the company was granted a 20-year monopoly over all
aspects of domestic telephone operations in the latter instance, and control over the
international component in the former. In addition, it was granted other sub-licenses to
operate in the areas of external telecommunications, wireless telephone, telegraph, telex
and teleprinting services.220 Dunn and Gooden note that globally, the average length of
a license is approximately 7 to 10 years, a period that allows a company to recover its
investments. Furthermore, the Ministry also allowed Cable and Wireless the right to
install and to approve the installments of all attachments to the network by any of its
users, and the right to levy tariffs or fines for any unauthorized connections. Cable and

2i9Hopeton S. Dunn and Winston S. Gooden, “Telecommunications in Jamaica” at
http:/www.vii.org/papers/jama.htm. p. 2.
220Ibid.
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Wireless’ license also guaranteed a return rate of between 17.5 and 20% of assets that
were revalued to adjust for inflation.

Additionally, Cable and Wireless received favorable treatment with regards to
the protection and regulation of operations within the sector. McCormick argues that
the regulatory regime in Jamaica, as well as in other developing nations, can best be
described as lacking both the power to exert regulatory control over the sector and the
presence of any well-constituted set of regulatory policies.221 Spiller and Sampson also
note that the Public Utilities Commission, which was charged with the responsibility of
regulating the sector, had, on occasion, faced great challenges due to the company’s
accounting procedures. These accounting procedures, they argue, were

“designed to

facilitate control by the holding company rather than by the regulators.”222

The state’s regulatory regime facilitated Cable and W ireless’ preferential access
to investment opportunities within the sector, from which it benefited significantly.
Moreover, Ministry inducements resulted in Cable and Wireless" increasing investment
levels that led it to expand its operations in the sector. The Ministry also guaranteed
Cable and Wireless exclusive access to investment opportunities, as evidenced in the
1988-privatization negotiations, which facilitated the state transfer of its ownership of

221 Patricia M cC orm ick, “T ele co m m u n ic atio n s Privatization Issues in Jam aica, “ in
T elecom m unications P o lic y . Vol. 17, No. 2, March 1993, p. 151.
222Spiller and S am pson, p. 54
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shares in the domestic component, and its portion of shares owned in the international
component, to Cable and Wireless. During these negotiations, Cable and Wireless was
the only private entity invited to the negotiating table. Once there, the terms the
company received added up to enormous benefits - benefits that Wint argues were
tantamount to a government “giveaway” of shares to Cable and Wireless.223

These

“giveaways” were the contractual arrangement between Cable and Wireless and the
state, in which Cable and Wireless included a twenty-five year monopoly agreement
instead of the seven to ten year norm, with an added benefit of the guarantee of return of
between 17% to 20% on assets, among others. These “giveaways,” W int further states,
were the result of the state’s weak bargaining position.224

Familiarity with Jamaica and the Risks Involved in Business Operations
Cable and Wireless’ longevity in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector gave it a
familiarity with the risks involved in its Jamaica operations. Its longevity included its
ability to survive a period of nationalization, emerging as the only supplier in both
domestic and international operations when the sector was later privatized. However,
while the domestic component was nationalized, Cable and Wireless maintained
majority control of the international component, which remained privatized. It operated
in partnership with the state during this period, and its profits in the international
component increased while the component expanded.

22Wint. p. 68.
224Ibid, p. 68..
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When the domestic component was privatized in 1989, Cable and Wireless
acquired majority control of that component as well, making it the only supplier in the
sector. The company had outlived all other foreign suppliers. Jamaica began to rely on
Cable and Wireless for its technology, capital and expertise to modernize the country’s
aging telecommunications infrastructure, while the company,

in turn, enjoyed

unrestrained access to the domestic telecommunications market.22'’ It experienced a
favorable economic climate in which both its needs and the needs of the state were
adequately met, compared to the less than viable operations of its predecessors T&GT
and The Continental Telephone Company.226

The Sector’s Strategic Importance
After five years of state ownership of the domestic telecommunications
operations under the Manley regime, the Seaga regime assumed control of the
government in 1982, touting a privatization agenda.227 Moreover, Seaga became the
recipient of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program from 1982 to 1987, which was in
harmony with his administration’s privatization agenda. Privatization negotiations
began in 1985 and ended successfully in 1987 with the sale of state shares to Cable and
Wireless. Seaga’s privatization agenda allowed Cable and Wireless to acquire

22-Tbid.
226lbid, p. 57.
22,Wint p. 50; McCormick p. 151.
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controlling interests in the sector, resulting in the shift of 100 percent of state ownership
of the domestic component to the private sector. Thus, state ownership of the domestic
component shifted from 100% of the telecommunications shares in 1987 to 0%
ownership by 1990.

The sale in 1987 of Jamaica’s domestic segment to Cable and Wireless signaled,
for the first time, Cable and W ireless’ control of both the domestic and international
components of the sector. Cable and Wireless gained control of JTC and Jamintel and
was in a position to realize the company’s strategic plans for the region. As Cable and
Wireless acquired shares in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector, it simultaneously
undertook a multi-year program to acquire telecommunications markets across the
globe.

Beginning in 1986, the company purchased shares in the telecommunications
sectors of Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis in the Caribbean, and as well as in the South
Pacific, Sub-Sahara Africa, and in the Middle East.228 Wint maintains that Cable and
W ireless’ acquisition of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector was central to the
company’s vision for the region and was consistent with its initiatives throughout the
globe. Cable and W ireless’ domestic and international acquisitions in Jamaica, Wint
argues, would complement its other acquisitions in the Caribbean, making it well suited

228 W int p.60.
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as a regional hub.229It was this strategic interest in the Caribbean that, according to Wint,
was the driving force behind Cable and W ireless’ acquisition and control of the majority
of the shares in the sector.230 Jamaica’s market size was therefore, not an indicator of its
importance to Cable and Wireless.231

While W int’s analysis demonstrates a clear interest on the part of Cable and
Wireless in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector, his conclusion that Cable and
W ireless’ interest in Jamaica was more strategic than economic is rather dubious. The
period of 1985 to 1987 when Cable and Wireless strategically sought to acquire
holdings in Jamaica from the privatization of the sector was also the period in which the
Digiport Project had its genesis. During this period, Jampro had initiated a feasibility
study, which indicated the revenue potential of the establishment of an offshore
information processing industry. This industry, using telecommunications satellite
technology, would have the potential of transcending the local market to reach its
multinational clientele worldwide, extending to corporations located within the
industrialized nations. The income-generating potential of Jamaica’s informationprocessing industry was clearly established.2’2 Cable and W ireless’ interest in providing

229Ibid.
230Ibid.

231Ibid.
232

See “Proposal for the Provision o f E n hanced T elecom m u nicatio ns Services for
Ja m a ic a ’s F ree Zon e,’’ (JA), 1986.
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services for the Digiport project and its concerns about competition from the American
Satellite Company clearly demonstrated economic concerns more than strategic
considerations.233

Cross-Subsidization and the Political Economy of the Jamaican
Telecommunications Sector: 1980-1990

Figure 5-1: Real revenue per line JTC and Jamintel, 1972-91
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From 1980 until 1990, two trends began to emerge in the revenue of Jamaica’s
telecommunications sector. The first trend was the rapid increase in revenue in the
international segment, reflecting more than a 100 percent increase over that of the 1980
level. [Fig. 5-1] It began with close to $J 4,000 per line in 1980 and increased to $J
8,000 per line in 1989. Net profits in real income for the provision of international
services increased significantly from less than $J 50,000 in 1981 to $J 200,000 in 1989.
[Fig. 5-2]234 Thus, the steady increase in profits from 1980-1989 in the international
component, made it central to the survival of the sector as a whole.

This boom in the sector was attributed to two domestic actions.235The first was
the introduction of international direct dialing in 1977 which resulted in an increase in
international long-distance calling, with calls more than doubling between 1980 and
1989. [Fig 5-2] With the exception of the period between 1984-1985 when the level of
international calls remained constant, growth in international direct long-distance calls
continued virtually uninterrupted for the remainder of the decade, albeit at a reduced
rate of growth after 1984. [Fig. 5-2]

234 For total n u m b er o f lines see A p pendix VII: N u m b e r o f Main Lines (T housands)
23\Spiller and Sam pson, pp. 65-71.
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Fig: 5-2

Jamintel’s Total Profits, 1973-91

300

200

1E3
100

1E2
1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Perpetual Inventory Model
- X - GROSS PROFITS —I— NET PRO FITS

NET AFTER-TAX - S - IN T I CALLS

Source: Spiller and Sampson p. 68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

International Calls (in Logs 1972=100)

Profits in Real 1991 J$ (000)
(Thousands)

250

164

The second factor that added to the growth of the international segment was Prime
Minister Seaga’s reversal of the former Prime Minister Michael Manley’s “controversial
socialist policies.”2'’6 These policies included Manley’s decision in 1976 to establish
diplomatic relations with Cuba during his visit to Cuba. Castro subsequently visited
Jamaica a year later, and the reciprocal visits resulted shortly thereafter in an influx of
Cuban doctors to provide medical services to Jamaica. Other controversial Manley
policies included the nationalization of the bauxite and telecommunications sectors, a
land reform policy, which consisted of the expropriation of lands and businesses
without compensation, and a controversial Crash Program where transfer payments
were made to large numbers of individuals. 237 Manley’s policies led to the flight of both
domestic and foreign capital from the nation, further intensifying the pressure from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to liberalize the Jamaican economy.

The result of the flight of capital from Jamaica was the involvement of the IMF in
Jamaica’s economic affairs. The flight had produced a strain on the nation’s balance of
payment reserves and the fiscal budget of the Manley regime, increasing the pressure for

236 Ibid, p. 42.
237Ne!son, W. Keith and N ovella Z. Keith. The Social Origins o f D em ocratic
Socialism in Jam aica (P hiladelphia: T e m p le University Press, 1992) p. 260. T he Crash
Program was an e m p lo y m en t creation program where opportunities were created for the
society's poorest through the cleaning o f road em b an k m e n ts and gullies, roads and
buildings m aintenance, and som e construction projects.
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reform from the IMF.238 Seaga’s electoral victory and his determination to reverse
Manley’s policies began a flow of new and increased investment back into the
telecommunications sector. Segments of the business community which had fled to the
United States during the Manley regime for fear of losing their businesses, returned to
Jamaica, their fears now relieved.

Thus, renewed confidence resulted in increased

investments in many areas of the economy including the telecommunications sector, and
increased telecommunications revenues at the start of the decade.239 This trend,
however, would not continue.

While revenue from the international service increased continuously, revenue
from the domestic segment experienced a downturn.

In 1980, revenue from the

domestic component, which had increased by 50 percent over the 1977 level, began to
experience a sharp reduction in income - which was in direct proportion to the
increasing flight of capital that was taking place during the same period. This reduction
continued until 1989 where it rested at less than 60 percent of the 1980 level. [Fig. 5-1]
Income from domestic services declined from $J 6,000 per line in 1980 and continued
steadily downwards to approximately $J 3,000 per line in 1989. In 1984, for the first
time in the sector’s history, revenue from domestic services fell and continued to fall
below that of the international component [Fig.5-1], primarily due to outmoded

238 Wint, p. 53.
239Ibid.
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equipment unable to meet the segment’s demands.240 The continued decline in income
in this segment foretold a potential disruption in the segment’s ability to continue
providing domestic services. It led to the proposal of a cross-subsidization measure that
would offset declining revenue in the domestic component with revenue from the more
vibrant international segment.

Figure 5-3: Jamaica Telephone Company’s gross and net profits, 1970-91
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The Cross-Subsidization Measure
The proposed cross-subsidization measure was designed, and depended on, the
successful negotiations and implementation of three prerequisite steps - with no
guarantee that under separate ownership of domestic and international services, the
providers of international services could be relied on to consistently transfer the needed
revenue to the providers of domestic services. Thus, the first step in cross-subsidization
was the merger of the international and domestic operations of Jamintel and JTC under
a single entity that would facilitate the transfer of state shares to the private sector; the
second was the privatization of the sector to comply with IMF structural adjustment
mandates; the third was the establishment of the necessary regulatory framework that
would guarantee Cable and Wireless monopoly control of both segments. The new
regulatory regime would ensure that income from both domestic and international
components would not be diverted to the emerging competitive international suppliers
that resulted from the new international separate satellite policy. All three steps
constituted the restructuring of Jamaica’s telecommunications regime, which was
instituted in 1987 in order to facilitate the new cross-subsidization arrangement.

The Merger of the Jam aica Telephone Company and Jamintel
The first step in the cross-subsidization scheme was the merger between JTC and
Jamintel. Negotiations for the merger began in 1985 between Cable and Wireless and
the Jamaican government through its agent, the National Investment Bank of Jamaica
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(NEBJ), the autonomous quasi-governmental body headed by Mayer Matalon.
Negotiations were designed to bring together under one entity, Jamaica’s state-owned
domestic component and its international component, which was majority-owned by
Cable and Wireless.

The process began with the creation of a holding company,

Telecommunications of Jamaica, TOJ, which was chaired by Matalon, who also served
as the chairman of the domestic service provider JTC. 241 Negotiations successfully
ended on May 19, 1987, with an agreement between the government, Cable and
Wireless, and the new entity, Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ).

As a result of the negotiations, TOJ was incorporated as a private company that
would serve as the holding company of both JTC and Jamintel. The two entities turned
over their shares to the new TOJ, and in return, they received shares in the newly
formed TOJ. Under the merger agreement, both JTC and Jamintel became wholly
owned subsidiaries of TOJ. The state agreed to divest itself of any remaining shares it
still held in either of the two pre-existing companies. New regulatory procedures for
licensing and price setting were set into place. The Board of Directors of TOJ
established a date of April 1, 1991, in which all aspects of the merger would be
completed.

The Board stipulated that the merger was designed to create greater

efficiency and that TOJ would be the coordinator of different functions which prior to
the merger had been handled separately by the individual firms.

24lWint. p. 55.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

169
The Privatization of the Jamaican Telecommunications Sector
The second step in the cross-subsidization scheme was the privatization of both
Jamaica Telephone Company and Jamintel in which the state-owned shares in the newly
created TOJ would be transferred to Cable and Wireless. Privatization was more than
the mechanism through which cross-subsidization would occur. This solution also
represented the method that met the approval of the international community to address
Jamaica’s poor economic performance. When Seaga was elected Prime Minister in
1981, the new administration’s first challenge was to address the nation’s economic
concerns.242 These concerns included escalating oil prices, high importation of consumer
goods, escalating flight of capital, high debt obligations and declining bauxite and
agricultural revenues on which the nation very heavily depended. The new regime also
encountered an increased budget from the social programs established under the Manley
regime.

As a result of the nation’s poor economic performance, the IMF had proposed a
comprehensive plan of economic restructuring aimed at increasing competition, the
reduction of the public sector in some areas, and a reduction in the national deficit.243
These prescriptions were included in the IMF Structural Adjustment Program of 1982-

242Seaga began serving in 1982.
243 McCormick, p. 156.
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1987 as a precondition for future IMF structural adjustment loans.244 At the heart of this
proposal was the privatization of industries that had been nationalized under the Manley
regime. Other IMF measures included the removal of price and wage controls, foreign
exchange controls, food subsidies, tariffs, and extensive financial reforms. To address
the problems in the Jamaican telecommunications sector, the IMF prescribed a
mandatory privatization program, which Seaga accepted. Seaga’s privatization endeavor
was designed to reverse the nationalization policies of the previous Manley regime in
order to restore economic performance to previous levels.

The first act in the privatization process, after the creation of TOJ, was the transfer
of shares to the private sector, following a prescribed formula of 80% / 20% indigenous
/ foreign ownership that was based on a post-independence decision to ‘Jamaicanize’
the sector. The formula required that Cable and Wireless control a maximum of 20% of
the shares.

However, at the conclusion of the privatization negotiations, the state

elected to digress from its “Jamaicanization” goal, opting instead for a larger foreigncontrol of the sector.

The privatization began in July of 1987, when Cable and Wireless received its
first 20% of state-owned shares. By October of that year, the state transferred an
additional 19% of the shares to Cable and Wireless, bringing its shares to 39%, with the
state maintaining the remaining 61%>. In September of 1988, in accordance with its

244lbid.
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“Jamaicanization” policy, the goal of which was to increase indigenous ownership, the
state transferred 21% of its total shares to the locally owned Industrial Commercial
Development (ICD), the largest non-financial private company that was listed on the
Jamaican Stock Exchange, and which was owned by Eli Matalon, brother of Mayer
Matalon. The state continued holding 40% of the total shares, while Cable and Wireless
maintained 39%. With this proportion, the state continued to hold the largest interest in
the sector.

In July of 1989, the state sold an additional 20% of its totally held stock to Cable
and Wireless, which at that point assumed the controlling interest in the sector, its
stocks totaling 59%, and the state’s, 20%. In November of 1990, the state disbursed the
remaining 20% of its shares to Cable and Wireless, bringing Cable and W ireless’ total
to 79% of the total shares and 21 % to indigenous, that is, Jamaican ownership. Clearly,
the remaining percentage of Jamaican ownership of the sector reflected a reversal of the
previously stated “Jamaicanization” objective.245

Moreover, as the state privatization of the telecommunications sector and the
newly established Digiport project was being negotiated, Cable and Wireless was
simultaneously successfully negotiating with the state for the exclusive provision of the
project’s satellite services as Intelsat’s signatory. Cable and W ireless' success was

24riHopeton S. Dunn and Winston S. Gooden,“Telecommunications in Jamaica” at
http:/www.vii.org/papers/iama.htm.http://wvvw.vii.org/papers/jama.htm. p. 3.
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sealed with the purchase of 35% of the shares in the Digiport project. AT&T, the U.S.
signatory to Intelsat, was invited to acquire 35% o f the total shares while the remaining
30% was acquired by T O J.246 Cable and Wireless and TOJ became the majority owners
of the project, making Intelsat, rather than the American Satellite Company, the supplier
of satellite services to the Digiport.

Monopolization and Regulatory Oversight
The third step taken by the state in the cross-subsidization scheme was the
establishment of the new regulatory framework. In 1987, when the merger between the
domestic and international components under TOJ was finalized, the Ministry of Public
Utility and Transport issued a new license for TO J’s operation in compliance with
Jamaica’s Telecommunications Act. This license guaranteed the company a 25-year
monopoly for the provision of both domestic and international services. Jamaica
Telephone would exclusively provide domestic telephone services, while Jamintel
would exclusively provide international services.

The Ministry assumed the role of

sole regulator of the sector. Its primary task was to end competition in the sector.

At the issuance of these licenses, Jamaica Telephone and Jamintel were each 80%
owned by Cable and Wireless and 21% owned by Industrial Commercial Development
Ltd. The new license barred the participation of interest groups from decision-making

246McComnick, p. 152.
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in the sector, a privilege which had been granted under the previous license.49 This new
arrangement ensured the success of the new cross-subsidization scheme given that the
American Satellite Company, and any other operator that threatened the sector’s ability
to generate a profit, were restricted, thus, making all profits from the provision of
international services available to TOJ for subsidization of the domestic component.

Jamaica’s decision to eliminate competition in the telecommunications sector
came at a pivotal time in the history of the international satellite system. In 1987, the
year the restructuring began, Intelsat granted conditional approval for PanAmSat to
operate its twenty-four transponders for provision of services to the U.S. and Peru. This
action broke new ground for the international satellite system, creating a more
competitive international environment. Soon other firms such as Orion followed suit,
creating a niche for companies such as the American Satellite Company that emerged as
intermediaries or brokers for the new emerging satellite companies.

Cross-subsidization and its Discontents
Spider and Sampson note that the shift in the state’s policy from its original goal
of indigenous ownership to the disbursement of state-owned shares to Cable and
Wireless was due to “strong fiscal and foreign exchange pressures” in 1988 to 1989.39
Instead of offering the shares to the local business enterprises as the post-independence

"Spider and Sampson p. 40.
"Spider and Sampson, p. 77.
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‘Jamaicanization’ policy of 1966 mandated, the state instead opted for the wholesale
distribution of its shares to Cable and W ireless.40 Spiller and Sampson argue that the
nation’s economic crisis, coupled with its demand for foreign exchange, made the sale
of shares to Cable and W ireless more desirable for addressing the issues with which the
nation was faced, than the planned indigenous ownership of the telecommunications
sector Cable and Wireless possessed the needed finances and foreign exchange. The
state depended on Cable and Wireless for the needed foreign exchange, capital,
technology, and entrepreneurial leadership. That dependence was, therefore, a deciding
factor in the state’s decision not to ‘Jamaicanize’ the sector.

Wint notes that the privatization negotiations between the state and Cable and
Wireless demonstrated several features of Jamaica’s domestic telecommunications
sector. First, Cable and W ireless’ management enjoyed amicable relations with the state
in its operation of the sector.41 As a result of the company’s importance to the sector the
state was more than willing to conduct the privatization negotiations in secrecy rather
than to invite the participation and involvement of other players. The process was
therefore not open to bids from other suppliers.42

4(,Ibid. p. 39.
41 Wint, p. 60.
42Ibid, p. 58.
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Wint argues that the outcome of the privatization process demonstrated that the
regime had ulterior motives other than meeting IMF Staictural Adjustment requirements
for dissolving the shares. He points out that the level of secrecy with which the shares
were transferred to Cable and Wireless reflected other motives. Wint contends that the
regime motivation might have been the state’s desire to acquire Cable and W ireless’
technological expertise, their capital, as well as their managerial expertise for the
modernization of Jamaica’s telecommunications infrastructure.43 Nevertheless, these
goals could also have been achieved using the resources of the American Satellite
Company since the Digiport project was only one aspect of Jamaica’s strategy to
modernize the infrastructure, and one which the initial feasibility study done by Jampro
demonstrated would enhance the overall income and goals of the sector. The level of
secrecy therefore represented the protection of Cable and W ireless’ control of the sector
rather than a mere acquisition.

Dunn and Gooden attribute to the regulatory regime that existed between the state
and Cable and Wireless the method by which the state transferred ownership to Cable
and Wireless, and the ease with which Cable and Wireless was able to gain ownership
of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector. The state failed to open the sale of shares in
TOJ to the highest bidder. Instead, it allowed Cable and Wireless to be the only bidder.
Telecommunications policymaking in Jamaica, as well as in other Caribbean nations,
they argue, has traditionally followed the pattern of a “private, almost secret

43Ibid. p. 57.
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arrangement between political and bureaucratic elites within the state, on one hand, and
the foreign or local operating company on the other.”44 They claim that in Jamaica, this
modus operandi has continued because the leadership in the Ministry of Public Utilities
holds views that tire similar to those held by elite managers within Cable and Wireless.
As a result, Cable and W ireless “has been operating without any independent regulatory
control to represent or protect the public interest.”45 The Ministry’s stated preference for
the operation of Cable and Wireless resulted in a shift in the Ministry’s role, that is, the
Ministry became the protector of Cable and W ireless’ interests. In carrying out its role,
the Ministry would soon articulate Cable and W ireless’ interests as the interests of the
sector and the nation as a whole.46

Dunn and Gooden attributed the exclusion of competition in the divestment of
telecommunications assets as the result of the “secret arrangement between political and
bureaucratic elites within the state” which characterizes the regulatory environment
between the state and Cable and Wireless. This arrangement was one that had been
forged as a result of Cable and W ireless’ ability to survive despite the sector’s legacy of
discontinuity.

The

sector’s history included

the

fluctuation

between

different

telecommunications providers such as Telephone and General Trust (T&GT) and

44 Dunn and Gooden, p. 3.
45Ibid.
46Letler from The Ministry to Jampro dated August 28, 1985, (JA), in which the
Ministry strongly stated its opposition to the use of a US firm for the Digiport project.
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Continental Telephone Company. It was only two decades prior to the privatization
attempt of 1985 during which the operations of both companies proved unsuccessful
and unproductive, and resulted in the state extricating the Continental Telephone
Company’s holdings by nationalizing its assets in 1975. On the other hand, the
operations of Cable and Wireless had proven successful, with its profits increasing
significantly from the provision of international services and realized returns - all of
which allowed the state to realize a sizable revenue.47 [Fig. 5-2]

Wint also raises concerns about the National Investment Bank of Jamaica’s (NIBJ)
ability to promote the nation’s interests with Mayer Matalon at its helm, and who also
headed TOJ, given his fraternal relationship to Eli Matalon, the head of Industrial
Commercial Development Ltd., which acquired the state’s 21% share that was slated for
indigenous ownership. 48 Wint describes this arrangement as a “sweetheart deal” in
which actors who headed the privatization negotiations - the Matalon family and Cable
and Wireless - stood to gain both personally and corporately from the outcome of the
negotiations. The negotiations, structured in this manner, would inevitably eliminate
outside bidding through secret agreements between interested parties.

This Cable and Wireless / Matalon “sweetheart deal” of high returns and lengthier
monopoly privileges in the sector, W int further contends, was the price the state had to
47In Figure 5-2, state revenue is indicated by the gap between gross profits and net
after tax
48Wint, p. 55
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pay in order to accomplish its goal of modernizing the sector. This reliance on the
sector, Wint maintains, placed the state in a weak negotiating position. On the other
hand, the state had in fact benefited from the investment decisions and the flow of
capital and income generated from Cable and W ireless’ operation in the island when
compared to its negative experiences with other providers such as Continental
Telephone Company and T&GT. The new competitive international environment and
Jamaica’s new niche in the offshore information industry made other alternatives
available to the state, such as the American Satellite Company, on which to base its
economic development agenda.

Nevertheless, Cable and Wireless and Jamaica’s

domestic providers in favor of the exclusive use of Cable and Wireless, resisted the
possibility of considering alternative service providers.

Jamaica’s

sector

had

initially

involved

the

provision

of

domestic

telecommunications services by several different telecommunications providers.
Because of the failure of these firms to realize a profit on their investments, the sector
experienced turnovers in the providers of services, which in turn, led to the reduction of
investment capital to the sector. Cable and Wireless, however, remained the exception.
It remained a constant supplier of international services and later, a supplier of both
domestic and international components. Therefore, a more plausible explanation of the
Ministry’s willingness to transfer capital to Cable and Wireless without seeking the
highest bidder may be attributed to the Ministry’s institutional memory of failed efforts
in the past. The state’s past unsuccessful and unfavorable experiences with T&GT and
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Continental Telephone Company contrasted with long and close relations with Cable
and Wireless that were likely to explain the preferential treatment accorded to it.

Conclusion
Beginning in 1980, Jamaica’s telecommunications sector faced several challenges,
at the heart of which was the new competitive globed telecommunications environment.
The new international global environment created new economic possibilities for
Jamaica - it as well created new challenges for the nation’s development. Jampro rose
to the new opportunities with the introduction of the Jamaica Digiport initiative that
would establish a new offshore information processing industry, and which would
become a revenue source for the nation’s economic development.

The Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport also rose to the occasion to address
the new challenges that were posed by the global economy. The Ministry’s cross
subsidization strategy resulted in a stringent regulatory program whereby all entries into
Jamaica’s telecommunications sector were categorically denied.50

Its decision to

obstruct competition reflect its view that the introduction of competition in value-added
and long distance services would undercut the success of the cross-subsidization efforts
and would be a liability to the regime.’1 The closing of Jam aica’s telecommunications
sector was the Ministry’s attempt to prevent the liberalization that w'as occurring in the

M,Spiller and Sampson, p. 78.
51Ibid. p. 76.
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U.S., European, and Japanese telecommunications market in 1984.

The Ministry as

well did not want its initiative to revive Jamaica’s domestic component through the
proposed cross-subsidization measures to be undermined by the U.S. presidential
decision to establish a separate satellite system policy.

Amidst these international dynamics, Jampro initiated the Jamaica Digiport
project, expecting to gain from the more enhanced services and competitive pricing
structures of the new international environment. Jampro proposed using the American
Satellite Company to provide international satellite services for the Digiport. However,
introducing a new actor to the international component at that historical juncture raised
concerns from both the Ministry and Cable and Wireless as to the viability of cross
subsidization as a strategy for the revival of the fledgling domestic component. The
Ministry’s deliberation with Cable and Wireless resulted in the unification of both
international and domestic components in order to subsidize the domestic segment with
income from the international segment. Thus, Jampro’s proposal to use a non-Intelsat
satellite became an unwelcome gesture.
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CHAPTER SIX
DOMESTIC POLITICS, THE INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE REGIME AND
THE JAMAICA DIGIPORT INTERNATIONAL

Introduction
The 1988 decision of the Jamaican government to establish the U.S.$ 2 million
Jamaica Digiport International facility heralded Jamaica’s official entry into the
information industry. This decision was the outcome of a series of negotiations that
lasted five years, beginning with a plan that would include the use of competitive
satellite systems and ending with the closing of the sector to competition. This chapter
seeks an answer to the question of why Jamaica undertook this course of action and why
it was able to bypass the new international practices of competition in the sector. It
examines the decision-making process that surrounded the acquisition of satellite
technology for the Digiport project in order to determine the factors that impinged on
the choice and the closing of the sector to competition.

The Digiport project was expected to attract new foreign investment to
Jamaica’s offshore information processing industry while creating job opportunities.
Located in the Montego Bay Free Zone area, the project targeted foreign firms which
provided services in the area of airline and hotel reservations, credit authorization, and
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other office procedures in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.52 The
Digiport facility was expected to provide long distance voice, international toll-free
(800) calls, facsimile, video links, and high-speed data transmission services between
Jamaica and the United States.

The final arrangement for the Digiport was based on a consortium of three
telecommunications suppliers: American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) which
owned 35% of the total shares, Cable and Wireless International which owned 35%, and
Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ) which owned 30% of the shares. AT&T and
C&W were responsible for providing international services, whereas TOJ provided
support for the domestic telecommunications network. The consortium elected to
remain within the Intelsat satellite system.

The final agreement on the teleport project was the result of years of negotiation
and conflict between Jampro and the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport. Jampro
had partnered with Teleport International in this venture using the satellite technology
and services of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) and American Satellite
Company. Lending its support to the Ministry’s opposition was Telecommunications of
Jamaica - which included Jamintel and Jamaica Telephone company, Industrial

-^The Montego Bay free port zone at that time was one of two facilities which
consisted of space for factories and warehouses that received 100%= tax exemption for all
businesses, exemption front custom and import duties, exemption from foreign exchange
control and no restrictions on the repatriation of profits and assets.
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Commercial Development, - the largest indigenous company on the Jamaican Stock
Exchange, the National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ), and the most powerful
political family - the Matalons, who owned shares in TOJ and ICD, and included a
family member who also headed the NIBJ. The anti-liberalization coalition also
included international support from Comsat, which objected to Jamaica’s use of a nonIntelsat satellite system.

At the heart of the conflict was the issue of whether Jamaica would remain
within the Intelsat satellite system or would take advantage of the new climate of
liberalization that had swept the telecommunications industry in the 1980's, particularly
in the area of satellite technology. JNIP viewed the new economic climate as an
opportunity to take advantage of competitive prices and improved technology in the
telecommunications market. Jamintel’s view, however, was that the new climate of
liberalization was a threat to the stability and security of the business environment to
which the carriers had grown accustomed.

As the Ministry embarked on its restructuring of the sector, the Jamaica
Promotions (Jampro) initiated its plans to establish the Digiport project. Jampro had
positioned itself to draw from the confluence of global and technological changes for its
development agenda through the establishment of an offshore information processing
industry where the Digiport, using the competitive American Satellite Company (ASC),
would generate newr sources of revenue from which the state would benefit.
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decision to use ASC, however, failed to materialize. This chapter chronicles the
activities that led to ASC’s defeat.

At one level the project signaled a new income stream for Jamaica’s
development. Yet at another, it represented a significant threat to existing revenue
sources that promised to undermine the cross-subsidization agenda that was being
negotiated between the Ministry and the sector’s service providers. The Ministry acted
to protect the sector’s revenue by monopolizing Cable and W ireless’ operations and
rigidly guarding the sector from competition. Jampro’s decision to use the American
Satellite Coiporation for the Digiport project, therefore, failed to materialize.

There are two ways that one might view Jampro’s actions in its attempt to
acquire the non-Intelsat satellite system. One might argue that Jampro attempted to
widen the conflict to the international arena in order to secure the involvement and
support of other transnational actors. Instead, Jamaica successfully managed to maintain
its autonomy from United States transnational actors. This study will argue to the
contrary. First, Jampro’s actions in the international community were solely in keeping
with the guidelines established by the FCC and by Intelsat. Second, Jamaica did not
maintain its autonomy from United States transnational actors. Rather, it merely
realigned with a different set of transnational actors whose interests were in line with
the winning coalition.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185
Jamintel, one the other hand, used its position both internally and externally to
affect outcomes. Internationally, as Jamaica’s signatory to Intelsat, Jamintel created
alliances to gain the support of other members within the Intelsat board of Governors.
Domestically, TOJ, used the influence of its chairman, Mayer Matalon, to exercise
substantial leverage to overturn the decision to acquire the more efficient, more
competitive

separate

satellite

system.

By

maintaining

the

Intelsat

monopoly

domestically, it was successful in protecting the company’s declining income through
the sector’s strategy of cross-subsidization.

At the end of the Digiport negotiations Jampro’s objectives for its operation had
been significantly transformed with regard to ownership, control and selection of
satellite technology for the operation. Domestic interests and coalition activities played
a considerable role in the decision to close the sector, and thereby mitigating the effects
of global telecommunications trends. Additionally, domestic coalition politics were
significant in the defeat of liberalization in the satellite sector. This chapter analyzes the
processes that led to this outcome, demonstrating the interaction between sector
dynamics, domestic politics, and the international telecommunications regime.

The Teleport Initiative: the Planning Stage
In 1985 JNIP embarked on a strategy to attract United States corporations to its
offshore information processing industry. JNIP was the agency charged with the
responsibility of “promoting sustainable economic development in Jamaica by assisting
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the private sector to create jobs and increase productivity, capital formation and foreign
exchange earnings in targeted industries through the effective delivery of technical,
promotional and facilitator services both locally and overseas.”'’3 JNIP enlisted the
services of Teleport International (TI), a United States coiporation, to undertake a
feasibility study to determine whether the establishment of a second Free Zone would
enhance Jamaica’s information processing industry. The study concluded with a
recommendation for the establishment of a second Free Zone as well as the
establishment of teleport facilities. These facilities were to consist of two elements: a
satellite earth station and a local area network (LAN) serving companies in the free zone
area. The facilities were intended to reduce costs by buying satellite circuits on a
wholesale rather than retail basis.

JNIP embraced the idea of a teleport for several reasons. First, the deregulation
of the United States telecommunications industry created a number of new domestic
telecommunications entities, such as the American Satellite Corporation (ASC), that
served as either suppliers or brokers of services in the market of international satellite
services and were independent of the Intelsat system. JNIP had hoped to attract such
companies with the expectation of receiving cheaper and more enhanced satellite
services that were expected to accelerate the development of this sector. Third, the
project would incorporate a new and more favorable exchange rate adjustment policy

53Taken from Jampro’s Mission Statement in the lobby of Jampro’s headquarters
in Kingston, Jamaica. West Indies. Prior to 1985, Jampro had been operating under the
name Jamaica National Investment Program (JNIP).
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intended to attract service industries such as data entry and hotel, airline and car
reservation firms. The teleport would then be marketed to serve the needs of United
States corporations. Fourth, the teleport project would coincide with a grant from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that was intended to
enhance the development of Jamaica’s information sector.54

In November of 1984 JNIP entered into discussions with Teleport International
to attract labor-intensive United States companies to Jamaica to take advantage of the
information service industries. The goal of the teleport initiative was to provide
“innovative communications services of the highest quality and lowest price” and “to
create the technological climate for an information services corporation to shift labor
and communications intensive operations offshore to a lower wage/higher productivity
location.”55 Teleport International’s plan was to increase employment within the
Jamaican labor force, while bringing facilities and telecommunications technology to
Jamaica that w'ould serve the telemarketing, reservation centers (hotel, airlines), remote
secretarial services, and data entry companies.''’6 Foreign companies would establish
their offices in the Jamaica Free Zone where they would use the teleport facilities to
conduct their businesses between Jamaica and their home countries. The teleport would
ensure reliable, high speed, and high quality communications for voice, data and video.
54Interview with McLarty and Gooden. See also “Jamaica Digiport International:
Creating jobs earning Foreign Exchange in The Daily Gleaner, July 24lh 1989.
5'Memo from Jampro to the Prime Minister, Oct 11, 1985 p.9 (Jamaica).
^’Interview with Mr. Winston Gooden on July 20lh 1993
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Teleport International proposed to accomplish this by providing Jamaica with private
two-way lines or one-way switched or unswitched voice, data, and video services
between points within the Free Zone and points outside of Jamaica. Under the
leadership of Teleport International, Jamaica would develop closer economic and
technological ties to the information industry of the United States.57

Teleport International argued that the use of a U.S. private non-Intelsat satellite
system would be more cost effective than that provided through Jamaica International
Telecommunications Company (Jamintel) and the Intelsat system.38 First, Teleport
International asserted that non-Intelsat providers tended to be 25-30% cheaper than
Intelsat for data lines and 15-20% cheaper for voice lines. Second, the non-Intelsat
companies under consideration were technologically superior to Intelsat, and provided
greater speed. Third, U.S. satellite companies had access to and expertise in marketing
data entry, telemarketing, publishing, reservations, and other professional services
within the U.S. domestic market, making them more desirable than Jamintel.39 Fourth,
the initiative would produce an absolute increase in communications flow between the

57Ibid.
58Interview with Gooden on July 20, 1993. Also see Memo from Teleport
International to JNIP dated May 1984.
59Memo from Teleport International.
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U.S. and the Caribbean, making it consistent with the U.S. - Caribbean Basin Initiative
policy of closer involvement, and would lead to more technological transfers.60

As a result of Teleport International’s analysis, JNIP determined that the
American Satellite Corporation, a non-Intelsat U.S. satellite company, was selected to
provide private communications services between the United States and the Caribbean.
JNIP anticipated that this arrangement would produce an approximately 90% reduction
in costs below the current Intelsat rate.61 The anticipated savings was also expected to
make Jamaica more attractive to foreign companies that are both labor intensive and
communications intensive (that is, data entry and reservation firms), and who would
transfer production from the U.S. and other countries to Jamaica in order to benefit from
the cheaper labor force and the relatively lower telecommunication costs.62

The question of whether the American Satellite Corporation would divert
business from Intelsat was a decision of whether or not to proceed with Teleport
International’s plans. Because the teleport initiative was conceived as an entirely new
category of services, Teleport International argued that it would not attract existing
business from Intelsat and would not harm the existing Intelsat arrangements. Teleport
International further asserted that bringing new enterprises into the existing system

60Memo from Teleport International.
6lSee letter from Teleport International to JNIP dated August 21, 1985, as well as
the application to the Ministry for a license dated October 2, 1985, (JA)
62 Memo from Teleport International.
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would lead to more traffic over the public switched network, which would only benefit
Intelsat and its Jamaican signatory.63

On November 2nd, 1984, when JNIP announced the teleport project, it
immediately proceeded to establish a consortium of service providers that would under
gird the teleport initiative.64 Interested parties included Nippon Telephone and
Telegraph (NTT), Ceito (a Japanese trading company), the American Satellite
Corporation, and the Bank of Tokyo. NTT sought to make the teleport project the
company’s first international project since the breakup of the NTT monopoly, and in
keeping with the company’s decision to find “good business ventures throughout the
world.”66 In December of 1984, NTT met with JNIP and Jam aica’s Prime Minister
Edward Seaga to discuss the teleport and to view the location. The Prime Minister
expressed his firm commitment to the Teleport International project. 66 His support was
followed by instructions to the Ministry of Public Utility and Transport in January of
1985 to ensure that Jamintel would refrain from any developments that would in any
way conflict with, or undermine, the teleport project. This project, the prime minister
declared, “forms the basis on which a whole range of data processing industries, as well

“ Interview with Gooden, August 1993.
64Ibid.
“ Quoted from correspondence between NTT and JNIP in December 1984, (JA)
“ Ibid.
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as book publication and offshore businesses are expected to be established in Montego
Bay in an area reserved for the purpose.”67

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Teleport Initiative
The ability to operate the Digiport using a private satellite system was predicated
upon the successful maneuvering of three processes - two of which were external and
one internal. These were:
1. A license from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, because a U.S.
satellite company would be providing services between the United States and
Jamaica

2. Approval from Intelsat to operate non-Intelsat satellite services

3. A special license pursuant to the Radio and Telegraph Control Act, from the
Jamaican Ministry of Public Utility and Transport (MPUT).

Jamaica’s use of the American Satellite Corporation first required a license from
the United States’ Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ensure non
interference with the Intelsat system.68 Under the FCC’s Buckley Letter, applicants
wishing to be connected with the international public switch therefore had to file under
section 214 of the United States Communications Act of 1934 and Part 63.01 of the

67Letter to Jamintel from Prime Minister Seaga dated January 28, 1985. (JA).
“ Federal Communications Commission, Separate Systems Notice, 100 FCC 2d at
294, 314; Separate Systems Order. 101 FCC 2d at 1090; Separate System First
Reconsidered paragraph 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

192
Communications rules. These FCC provisions ensured that the activities of the United
States’ separate satellite systems were in keeping with United States treaty obligations
with Intelsat, which prevented connection to the international public switch network by
domestic separate satellite systems. Teleport International therefore requested permission
from the FCC to construct satellite facilities and for the American Satellite Corporation to
operate, transmit and receive satellite services for the provision of non-switched private
telecommunications lines that would be connected to the international public switched
system tor business communications between the United States and Jamaica.69 The
Jamaican government initiated the procedure with an inquiry addressed to the United
States Ambassador to Jamaica about the process. In response to Jampro's inquiry, the
United States ambassador explained in a letter that:70

U.S. policy and practice in authorizing international
satellite

communication

services

is

that

any

U.S.

international satellite system separate from Intelsat for
international public satellite telecommunications between
the

U.S.

and

communications

another
not

country

interconnected

is
with

restricted
the

to

public-

switched (telephone, telegram or telex) systems in either
country. Service is therefore restricted to ‘private, intra
corporate communications links’. Basic public telephone,
telex and telegraph are off limits. This policy was designed

69Letter from Jampro to the Prime xMinister’s office dated June 5th 1986, (JA).
™By 1985, when this letter was written, JNIP’s name had been changed to Jampro
or Jamaica Promotions.
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to protect Intelsat from traffic and revenue diversion in its
major service, international telephone.'1

The American Satellite Corporation was required to conform to the terms of the Buckley
Letter and would be granted a conditional license by the FCC to construct and operate a
satellite earth station or other transponder facilities. While the FCC’s policy prohibited
domestic satellite companies from connecting with the international public switched
network, the FCC nevertheless allowed one exception to be made under the Buckley
Letter, which states that:

certainly exceptional circumstances may exist where it
would be in the interest of the United States to use
d o m e s tic

s a te llit e s

fo r

p u b lic

in te r n a tio n a l

telecommunications within nearby countries. One such case
would be where the global system could not provide the
service required. Another case would be where the service
planned would be clearly uneconomical or impractical
using the Intelsat system.72

7’Letter from US Embassy in Jamaica, Dec 9th 1985 to Mrs Corrine
McLarty, Head of Jampro, (JA). The letter was in response to Mrs. McLarty’s
inquiry concerning the Buckley Letter, which states the conditions under which the
U.S.’s FCC would approve domestic satellite systems for use and its relevance to
Jamaica’s request for satellite service.
72James L. Buckley, Undersecretary of State, to the FCC, July 23rd, 1981.
FCC document
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On October 9, 1986, the FCC approved the provision of services between the
United States and Jamaica by the American Satellite Corporation. The FCC approval
signaled that the American Satellite Coiporation had met all of the following three
criteria: 1) the proposed service was consistent with all current FCC policies; 2) Intelsat
could not provide the proposed service, therefore the project would not cause economic
or technical harm; and 3) the proposed system was in fact a separate satellite system, that
is the provision of international service based on a satellite system that was either new or
significantly modified from the Intelsat system.7'1

Intelsat and the Teleport Initiative
The second phase of the licensing process that had to be undertaken by Jampro
was the appeal to Intelsat. Because of United States’ treaty obligations, the FCC required
that Teleport International’s request adhere to Intelsat’s Article XIV(d) on Technical and
Economic Coordination.74 Article XIV(d) specifically prohibited Intelsat member states
from engaging in any activity that would result in either technological or economic
interference with the Intelsat satellite systems. In June 1986, the government of Jamaica,
led by Jampro, petitioned the Intelsat Board of Governors for a license to establish
teleport facilities between U.S. and Jamaica using a two-way transponder provided by the
73INTELSAT, "Events in the United States Relating to Separate International
Satellite Systems”, BG-72-44E B/6/87, Pg 5. The document may be found at the FCC
office in Washington, D.C., United States of America.
74Letter from Jampro to the Prime Minister's office October 9th 1986, (JA). See
also the FCC's File # I-T-C-85-187, “American Satellite Corporation”, as well as FCC File
# I-T-C-85-188. The FCC documents may be obtained from the FCC office in
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
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American Satellite Corporation based on a satellite system that was either new or
significantly modified from the Intelsat system. Jampro had high expectations for the
approval of the teleport project based on the fact that the project was similar to existing
transponder services between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico.

The approval process consisted of three phases. First, the Director General
reviews the application and submits a recommendation to the Board of Governors.
Second, the Board of Governors, with the assistance of the Technical Committee, reviews
the request and submits its recommendations to the Assembly of Parties. Third, the
Assembly of Parties makes a final review and issues its recommendations.

Intelsat’s Board of Governors consists of states such as the U.S., which has a
direct and permanent voice.

Jamaica, however, was represented by the signatory,

Compania del Telefono de la Republica Dominicana (CODETEL), which also
represented a coalition of five other nations of the region — the Bahamas, Barbados,
Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad. In order to place the teleport project on the
agenda of Intelsat’s Board of Governors’ meeting, jampro had to achieve either a
consensus among the other five states or a majority vote of the Board. Intelsat had
historically operated on the basis of a consensus rather than a majority. Jampro, therefore,
needed to lobby the five other nations represented by CODETEL, as well as other direct
Board members to persuade them of the critical economic importance of the teleport
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project to Jamaica.7’’ Therefore, in order to gain the assent of members of its group,
Jampro needed to establish the similarities between the teleport project and the
transponder projects of Mexico and Canada which had been approved by the United
States.76

Efforts to place the teleport project on the agenda of the Intelsat Board of
Governors’ meeting in June of 1986 in Rio de Janeiro failed. Trinidad, Dominican
Republic, Bahamas, and Barbados vigorously opposed the effort, but the foremost
opposition came from Jamaica’s signatory, Jamintel. Thus, Jampro was unable to obtain
the needed majority within the Caribbean group in order to place the matter directly
before the Board. “It became apparent that Jamintel had successfully lobbied these
members who were then all strongly opposed to the teleport project.’’77 Jampro
immediately began to lobby other Intelsat countries extensively in an attempt to increase
the level of support for the teleport project. Jampro held subsequent discussions with
Australia, Canada, France and the Cameroon — board members who showed lukewarm
support. Britain and its signatory, Cable and Wireless, the Nordic group (Denmark,
Sweden, Finland and Norway) and Germany, in contrast, were very strongly opposed to
the project.78 Opponents of the project believed that it would result in a loss of revenue to

75Ibid.
76Ib icl.
77I b i d .

78lbid.
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Intelsat.79 Nevertheless, despite the lack of resounding support for the use of non-Intelsat
satellites, Jampro’s mission was not a loss. It was successful in gaining Intelsat’s
authorization for the use of the American Satellite Company.

Bureaucratic Politics and the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport (MPUT)
The third process, which had to be navigated in order to liberalize Jamaica’s
satellite service, was the acquisition of domestic licenses to operate. Teleport
International was required to obtain a special license from the Ministry of Public Utilities
and Transport pursuant to the Radio and Telegraph Control Act. This license would
determine 1) the duration of the license; 2) the exclusive nature of the license; and 3) the
length of notice that was required by the government for termination of the license
agreement. A request for a 27-year exclusive contract without prior notice of termination
was made on October 2, 1985. This request was rejected by the Ministry, which instead
recommended a seventeen-year contract - ten years of which would be exclusive, and
with a two-year notice of termination.

The Ministry stipulated that after the ten-year exclusive period, the state would
have the option of assigning or disposing of the contract, thereby allowing other
applicants to offer similar services. Since the license was for international connections,
the Ministry also objected to the provision of services from one point to another within
the country. The license would only allow services from one point in the nation directed

79Ibid.
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at another point outside the country.

The Ministry expressed continued support for the use of Jamintel over a new
carrier by ensuring its continued monopoly over the domestic market.80 As early as
August 1985, the Ministry began articulating Jamintel’s concerns regarding the scope of
the proposed license, arguing that the new license would pose a potential threat to the
domestic telecommunications entities (Cable & Wireless, Jamintel and Telephone
Company of Jamaica (TOJ)). It began to voice strong opposition to the project, for several
reasons.81 To begin with, , the Ministry harbored doubts from the outset about obtaining
external approvals through the cumbersome process from both the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission and Intelsat. Secondly, it argued that the project would be
in competition with Jamintel.82 And thirdly, the Ministry viewed with great skepticism
several claims made by Teleport International.

One claim made by Teleport International during the negotiation process was that
the American Satellite Corporation would be exempt from article 14(d) of the Intelsat
agreement, which required approval from Intelsat’s Assembly of Parties prior to the
establishment, acquisition or utilization of any satellite facilities. This claim later proved

80A letter from the Ministry to Jampro dated August 28, 1995, (JA). See also the
application for a license from Teleport International to the Ministry dated October 2, 1985,
(JA).
The Ministry raised opposition to Jampro in a letter dated August 28, 1985, (JA).

82Jbid.
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to be false. The second of Teleport International’s claims - that it could immediately
begin services as soon as the physical facilities were in place as a result of a previous
agreement with the U.S. Department of State and the FCC, also proved false.83 The
Ministry’s concerns proved to be valid when the teleport project experienced a series of
delays due to Teleport International’s inability to secure the needed authorization from
both Intelsat and the FCC as it had hoped. “We have been proven correct,” the Ministry
declared. “They cannot achieve anything before the next Assembly of Parties scheduled
for I987.”84

The Ministry’s strongest objection to the project was based on its concern that the
teleport project constituted a dramatic change from the status quo of the Intelsat
monopoly system which allowed 21 U.S. domestic satellites to provide TV, audio, and
data services to Caribbean countries on a receive-only basis. The Ministry had agreed to
the receive-only condition in 1985 and reaffirmed the agreement the very week that the
teleport project was being reviewed. The Ministry viewed the teleport project as
representing a policy shift and a violation of Jamaica’s international obligations to
Intelsat.

The Ministry expressed a third area of opposition to the teleport project. This
opposition was on the grounds that Intelsat had at that period created similar services in
X?A letter to Jampro from the M inistry’s permanent secretary dated January 16,
1986, (JA).
84A letter to Jampro from the Ministry dated January 16, 1985, (JA).
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the formation of the International Business Services (IBS). IBS was available
immediately and provided teleport services, without the lengthy approval process needed
for use of non-Intelsat systems.. Opinions differed as to the comparative costs between
IBS and domestic satellites. Teleport International argued that its proposed domestic
satellites were more cost effective than IBS. Nevertheless, the Ministry asserted that
discussions were underway between Jamintel and COMSAT, on a possible collaboration
in a teleport project.

COMSAT had no objections to the idea of partnership with other national
signatories in the establishment of a teleport. The Ministry also felt that a partnership
with COMSAT would be an attractive proposition because COMSAT possessed in-house
marketing capabilities and because it had the capabilities to undertake such a venture as
the Digiport project. The Ministry noted that they should be presented with other
available options, such as the “vastly improved” services being offered by the Intelsat
system and not just the American Satellite Company, as Teleport International was
proposing.8,1

The Ministry expressed additional concerns about the rapid increase in the number
of domestic satellite corporations, stating that they had sprung up as a result of
deregulation, noting that in a few years, very few domestic satellite companies would

toMemo to the Prime Minister from the Ministry dated October 11, 1985, p. 9,
(JA).
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remain.86 It strongly recommended that Jamaica go with the services of AT&T, RCA, or
COMSAT, which were associated with Intelsat and which had more experience in
providing telecommunications services. Moreover, they owned and operated their own
satellites, and in the case of COMSAT, had planned to build a teleport similar to that
proposed by Teleport International.87

Domestic Responses to the Jamaica Digiport Project
Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ) also had several concerns about the
teleport project and concurred with the Ministry’s objection. Jamintel was not allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of the teleport under Teleport International’s initiative as a
result of the company’s belief that Jamintel did not possess the marketing capacity or the
technological

superiority to successfully market the

newly-formed information

processing industry.88 Teleport International also believed that Jamintel was also not in a
position to provide the type of services that were being contemplated by the project.89

Jampro argued that Teleport International’s marketing package for the project was
vastly superior to those of Jamintel and that the proposed teleport would not compete
with Jamintel. Jampro assured Jamintel that neither entity would experience loss of

R6Ibid.
87Ibid.
88A letter from Jampro to both Jamintel and JTC dated April 18th 1986, (JA).
89Ibid.
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income as a result of the teleport project because of its location in the protected duty-free
zone.90 In addition, no loss in income would result, Jampro argued, since Jamintel and
JATELCO/JTC were not in the business of providing dedicated leased lines.91 Jampro
also argued that since neither entity provided dedicated leased line services, the national
interest would be better served using by the existing arrangement since the Jamaican
Government would have equity in the project.92

Hardly persuaded by Jampro’s claims, in 1985 Jamintel embarked on negotiations
with AT&T to address the shortcomings that Jampro had identified.93 Jamintel argued
that the selection of AT&T as its service provider would ensure that it would shortly be
capable of offering private line data services using U.S. domestic systems at considerably
lower prices than those stated in its original proposal, which was based on the use of the
Intelsat system at prices that would be subject to the approval of the FCC,94 Jamintel
selected AT&T because its satellite network was quite extensive and its earth terminals in
the United States were located close to major cities.95

90I b i d .
91lb id.

92Ibid.
93A letter to Jamintel from AT&T asserting AT&T’s support of JaminteFs
marketing needs, November 26, 1985, (JA).
94A letter from Jamintel to Jampro dated December 3. 1985, (JA).
"Ibid.
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Jampro, however, was not swayed by Jamintel’s vision for the future. Instead Jampro
argued that in 1986 AT&T had embarked on its own study of the feasibility of
establishing teleport facilities in Jamaica and concluded that although a teleport was
economically and technologically feasible, AT&T did not wish to establish operations in
Jamaica.96 Jampro noted that its own research also revealed that IBM had expressed
unwillingness to enter territory where AT&T feared to tread and that Sprint and MCI
wanted to wait to view the results of Jamaica’s experience before contemplating
involvement.97 Jampro was, therefore, convinced that Jamintel would never be able to
fulfill its lofty goals for establishing a teleport in Jamaica.

In April of 1986, approximately two months after Jampro and Teleport
International had reached an agreement, the Cabinet met to deliberate on granting a fouryear period of exclusive rights for the provision of services. Under the terms of the
contract, Jamintel would be restricted from providing services using Intelsat, leaving the
American Satellite Corporation free to provide cheaper services. The American Satellite
Corporation would also be allowed to compete with Jamintel with respect to local or long

"Jam pro’s “Teleport Terms of Reference,” November 2, 1984, (JA). See also letter
to Jamintel, April 18, 1986, (JA).
^Ibid-
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distance public switched services. At the end of the four-year period, Jamintel would be
free to provide satellite services.98

The provisions of the license under deliberation by the Cabinet raised several
concerns. In a letter to Jamintel and the Ministry, Cable and Wireless articulated their
concerns about the impact of the introduction of another external telecommunications
entity on the viability of both Jamintel and JATELCO." Cable and Wireless stated that

...It is our understanding that the initial proposal by Teleport International
would introduce special services which are NOT now being undertaken by
Jamintel, but what we have before us is the provision of normal externa]
telecommunications services between Jamaica and any point outside Jamaica
unless Jamintel is unwilling to provide such service or is unable to offer in place
of such services an adequate telecommunications service.” 100

Cable and W ireless’ assertion that the services that were being orchestrated by
Teleport International were nothing more than “normal external telecommunications
services,” was an assertion that the American Satellite Company was in fact encroaching

98A letter of amendment to the license agreement from the Jamaica Attorney
General’s office dated August 21, 1986, (JA).
"Letter to Jamintel and the Ministry from Cable and Wireless dated April 5, 1986,
(JA).

100A letter to Jamintel and the Ministry from the chairman of the board of
Directors of Cable and Wireless, April 5, 1986, (JA).
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on and a violation of the monopoly rights of Jamintel to provide “normal external
telecommunications services” within Jamaica.

Jamintel argued that the use of the American Satellite Corporation would cause a
diversion of income from the hotel and commercial sectors from Jamintel and JATELCO,
and would ultimately jeopardize the foreign exchange flows that would otherwise accrue
to the government.'01 Jamintel also had several concerns that the contract would permit
the American Satellite Corporation to operate, not only within the Free Zone, but to
points within Jamaica that were within a five-mile radius of the Free Zone, and therefore,
within the public external telecommunications service over which Jamintel had a
monopoly.102

Cable and Wireless disagreed with claims that the American Satellite Corporation
would be providing special services that were beyond the realm of Jamintel’s normal
activities. Cable and Wireless argued vehemently that granting a license to Teleport
International for the operation of the American Satellite Company was in fact creating
external telecommunications services that were in direct competition with Jamintel. Cable
and Wireless also noted that granting of a license for the teleport project would represent
a shift in government policy toward Cable and Wireless and a violation of the monopoly
agreement.
IOlIbid.
102A letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Mayer Matalon, Chairman of the
Jamaica Telephone company, on April 15, 1986, (JA).
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Such Licenses contravene the Government of Jamaica’s
agreement with Cable and Wireless signed November 1970,
which stated that Jamintel would be the sole licensee in the
field of overseas telecommunications in Jamaica and
Clause 17103, which indicates that if Jamintel is willing and
able

to

provide

for

all

Jam aica’s

Free

Zone

telecommunications requirements, a license cannot be
granted elsewhere.
Teleport International’s license would seem to be the
setting up of separate telecommunications facilities to serve
new industries attracted to Montego Bay and would be the
introduction of competition for international and domestic
telecommunications services in Jamaica. Moreover, the
new competition would be licensed to operate on a highly
privileged basis, without the international and public
service responsibility imposed on Jamintel, without the
obligation to share revenue with JATELCO and with all the
fiscal advantages of operating with a Free Zone area. This
new policy would severely impair Jamintel’s viability and
the interest of shareholders. Cable and Wireless therefore
fully opposes the proposition to Jam intel’s Board of
Directors.103

l03Clause 17 of the 1968 agreement between the Government of Jamaica
and Cable and Wireless. This clause was later assigned to Jamintel.
104A letter to Jamintel and the Ministry from the chairman of the board of
Directors of Cable and Wireless, April 5. 1986, (JA)..
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In May of 1986, there were discussions within the Cabinet as to whether Jamintel,
acting by itself or within any other relationship, would be able to compete against the
teleport project at the end of the four years. Jamintel was also concerned about “the
erosion of the license agreed upon” between Cable and Wireless and the Jamaican
government.105 This concern was the basis of a letter to the prime minister in which
Jamintel

stated that

“the company

(Jamintel)

now

has

in place

an external

telecommunications system which can meet all the objectives and purposes of the
proposed license to Teleport International and the needs of the Free Zone. The Company
would also undertake the enhancement of such services where necessary to support the
development of the free port.” 106

In September 1986, Jamintel and JATELCO increased the level of opposition
against the teleport project. The companies presented their arguments to the prime
minister and

to

Jampro.

They

argued

that

if the

teleport

were

to

provide

telecommunications services to all the companies in the Free Zone as well as to those
companies involved in information services outside the Free Zone, then a substantial
portion of their revenue would be lost as a result of companies that would migrate to Free
Zone areas to benefit from the cheaper services. Both companies argued that the
consequence of the teleport project would be a large number of firms switching from the

105A letter from Jamintel to Prime Minister Edward Seaga dated April 5, 1986,
(JA).
l(xTbici.
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public network of Jamintel and Jatelco to private lines of the American Satellite
Corporation the teleport.107

Jamintel initiated discussions with COMSAT and AT&T to create a joint venture
between

both companies and Jamintel to provide services comparable to American

Satellite Corporation. Jamintel argued that because of its extensive operations in the
United States, its ownership of earth satellites, and its telemarketing operations, AT&T’s
capabilities were superior to those of the American Satellite Corporation. Shortly
thereafter,

Jamintel

released

its

“Proposal

for

the

Provision

of

Enhanced

Telecommunications Services for Jam aica’s Free Zone.” In this report Jamintel declared
itself as possessing the technical capability and the international contacts to provide and
market telecommunications services to meet the objective of the Jamaican government to
attract United States investors to Jamaica’s offshore information processing industry.108 It
declared that it was able to deliver a wide range of services and to attract businesses from
both local and overseas markets. Jamintel remained committed to its stance that its
technical and marketing capabilities were indeed superior to the arrangements made by
Teleport International.

i07A letter from Mr. Mayer Matalon to the Prime Minister dated April 15, 1986
(JA).
108A letter to Jamintel and JTC from JNIP dated April 18, 1986, (JA). See also
JNIP document “Teleport Terms of Reference,” November 2, 1984, (JA). For the proJamintel position, see JaminteFs “Proposal for he Provision of Enhanced
Telecommunications Services for Jamaica’s Free Zone,” (JA).
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The Final Stage of the Teleport Project
Added to the number of dissenting voices in opposition to the use of the American
Satellite Corporation was the Industrial Commercial Development (ICD),
holding company that was

a private

the largest non-financial company listed on the Jamaican

Stock Exchange and which owned 21% of shares in the newly privatized sector. ICD
possessed the largest domestic shareholding in Telecommunications of Jamaica, the
parent company of Jamintel. ICD ’s chairman was Eli Matalon, a brother of Mayer
Matalon who headed Telecommunications of Jamaica. As chairman of the Jamaica
Telephone Company, Mayer M atalon had strongly urged the M inistry to deny licenses to
the American Satellite Company on the grounds that it was a violation of contract
agreements with Cable and Wireless and a detraction of revenue from Jamintel. Eli
Matalon, also a partner in the telecommunications sector as a head of ICD, also pressed
for the dissolution of the old partnership and encouraged Prime Minister Seaga to
commence with the new arrangement headed by Jamintel. 109

Before the Jamaican Parliament met to discuss and vote on the issue of licensing
the teleport project, many changes had transpired that significantly transformed the
project from the original conception of its authors. The first of a series of changes was the
creation of the National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ) headed by Mayer Matalon.
The Prime Minister had appointed the Bank to negotiate and oversee the government’s

109Carol S. Holzgerg, Minority and Power in a Black Society: The Jewish
Community in Jamaica (Lanham, MD: The North-South Publishing Co, 1987). pp. 207208.
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20% share in the teleport project.110 Matalon, in his capacity as the sector’s chief
negotiator was determined to preserve the viability of the newly restructured sector by
protecting it from competition. Matalon therefore strongly supported the use of Intelsat
satellites rather than a separate satellite system.1u

In several letters to the Prime Minister, Matalon urged a partnership of Jamintel
with AT&T and Cable and Wireless instead of the Teleport International arrangement.
Matalon argued that AT&T possessed the marketing skills that Jamaica needed and that
their skills were superior to those of the American Satellite Corporation.112 As a result of
these recommendations, in 1989 the Prime Minister and his cabinet authorized the
abandonment of the Teleport International consortium using the American Satellite
Corporation, and instead, gave way to the creation of the new consortium which consisted
of Jamintel, the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (AT&T), and Cable and
Wireless (C&W). Intelsat replaced the American Satellite Corporation as the provider of
satellite services.

The winning coalition of the Ministry, Jamintel and Cable and Wireless, was
amenable to the new arrangement and was willing to issue an exclusive license to the new
consortium instead of the previous one. Under the new consortium, the teleport project
11°A letter dated May 28, 1986 from NIBJ to Jampro, (JA).
’"See the letter to the Jamaican Prime Minister dated April 15, 1986, written by
Mr. Mayer Matalon, then the Chairman of the Jamaica Telephone Company.
1"Letter to the Jamaican Prime Minister dated April 15, 1986.
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was renamed the Jamaica Digiport International. Jamintel managed to achieve victory at
the domestic level, and this victory prevented Jamaica from putting into effect the
separate satellite systems rule, while instead reinforcing the monopoly system. Jamintel’s
success was despite Jampro’s appeal to the international rule pertaining to the operation
of separate satellite system.

Conclusion
The Jamaica Digiport was established as a means of providing new sources of
revenue for the state, and as a way of taking advantage of changes in the
telecommunications sector. These changes included the shift in ownership from national
telecommunication monopolies to a more competitive global environment. Changes were
also evident in the international satellite regime, which had also moved toward a more
competitive satellite market. The American Satellite Corporation and other newly
established separate satellite systems were a reflection of these global changes.
Nevertheless, despite these global changes, which were evident in Intelsat and the FCC’s
approval of the American Satellite Corporation’s involvement in providing satellite
services to Jamaica, the Jamaican government officially moved to reject the use of a nonIntelsat satellite in the provision of service for the Digiport project.

The Digiport project became the battlefield in which those in favor of opening up
the sector to foreign competition battled with those opposed. On the one hand was
Jampro in partnership with the foreign Teleport International, and on the other stood the
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Ministry and Jamaica’s telecommunications suppliers, between whom was Cable and
Wireless. The coalition effectively influenced the position of the prime minister, which
resulted in his changing his December 1984 position from that in which he instructed the
Ministry not to obstruct the American Satellite Company arrangement to his 1986
position, when

Cable and Wireless and the Intelsat system replaced the American

Satellite Company.

The restructuring which accompanied the cross-subsidization policy solidified the
monopoly control of Cable and Wireless over the sector and coincided with Jampro’s
attempt to liberalize the sector with the introduction of the American Satellite
Corporation. Jampro’s decision became a threat to the restructuring efforts, which were
designed to impede liberalization from taking root locally. Domestic interests played a
greater role in the state’s decision to close the sector, thereby mitigating the effects of
global telecommunications trends. The anti-liberalization coalition played a decisive role
in the defeat of the Digiport’s use of competitive satellite systems.

Two questions emerged from the analysis of Jamaica’s satellite acquisition for the
Digiport project: why did Jamaica take the course it did in closing the sector to
competition, and why was it able to do so in the light of existing international regulations
permitting and approving Jamaica’s use of competitive satellite systems? First, Jamaica
took the course it did because the interest of the winning coalition was one that benefited
from maintaining the Intelsat monopoly.

The

winning coalition consisted of the
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Ministry, Cable and Wireless, Telecommunications of Jamaica, ICD, the Matalon
brothers, and COMSAT, and it was opposed to competition.

Jamaica’s decision to close the sector to competition was based on its perceptions
of the needs of the domestic component, the viability of which rested heavily on the
success of the cross-subsidization between international and local communications. The
cross-subsidization policy was proposed and implemented by the Ministry to protect the
sector’s income and to address the negative effects that international competition might
have on the sector’s income. Its success required the preservation of the former monopoly
status quo. Second, Jamaica was unable to appeal to the regime regarding the decision
not to liberalize the sector because the majority winning coalition consisted of Intelsat
signatories, which served as decision makers within the regime. An appeal to Intelsat
would be an appeal to these signatories, creating the possibility for further conflict
between Jampro and its signatories.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Introduction

The establishment of

the Jamaica Digiport International in 1988 using the

satellite technology and marketing capabilities of Cable and Wireless, AT&T and the
Intelsat system was the result of five years of negotiations. This decision spelt victory for
one of two contending factions. On the one hand was Jampro in alliance with Teleport
International and the American Satellite Company which attempted to liberalize the
sector’s use of satellite technology with the operation of the American Satellite Company,
while on the other hand, the Ministry of Public Utility and Transport, in conjunction with
Telecommunications of Jamaica, ICD, NIBJ and the international support of Comsat,
elected to close the sector to competition.

The winning coalition in the Digiport negotiations desired the continuation of the
Intelsat monopoly which the sector had enjoyed since 1963. This Intelsat monopoly
operation using both Cable and Wireless and Telecommunications of Jamaica. In 1988
the Ministry extended these monopoly privileges beyond the area of satellite services to
the entire telecommunications sector. Its actions were part of a restructuring plan that was
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designed to prevent the operation of competitive satellite systems in the domestic
component.

The

goal

of

the

restructuring

plan

was

to

facilitate

the

new

cross-subsidization policy to protect the domestic component.

This satellite acquisition process which resulted in the closing of the sector to
competition raised two salient questions which this dissertation addressed. First, what
explains Jamaica’s failure to liberalize the sector’s use of satellite technology as
demonstrated in its 1988 decision to prevent competition? Second, how was it possible to
undertake this measure amidst the powerful forces of global market liberalization trends
in the telecommunications sector as well as in international regime principles and
practices? It seeks to understand why the winning coalition was able to have such a strong
influence in the face of power global trends.

This dissertation concludes that there were two overriding sectoral characteristics
which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global forces - the
liberalization of the sector and the impact of the sector’s telecommunications
multinationals on domestic politics. The first factor that led to the coalition’s success was
the structure and processes within which the regulation of the global sector occurred. The
Intelsat system functioned by setting guidelines for the operation of the global satellite.
Among the guidelines was the separate satellite systems policy whereby national systems
were permitted the use of separate systems which do not undermine Intelsat’s operations.
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Paradoxically, the decision to allow the use of separate satellite systems was
authorized by Intelsat’s signatories whose interest it was to have the sector remain closed
to competition. In Jamaica, the signatory had an interest in the market’s remaining closed
and would benefit from such a closing. As a result, Intelsat’s signatories failed to act to
open the market in accordance with Intelsat’s policies. Coalition politics within the
country had a greater effect on Jamaica's failure to liberalize the use of satellite services
than global trends and regime practices. These domestic interests in the sector served as
the second set of factors that led to the closing of Jamaica’s sector to competitive satellite
technology.

International Telecommunications Satellite Regime
One answer to the question of why the winning coalition was able to be as
effective as it was in the face of global trends and regime policies can best be understood
in the context of the Intelsat satellite regime w'hich had been in place since 1963. The
purpose of the organization was to cooperatively provide uninterrupted global satellite
services to all interested nations. Since its inception, the national signatories played a
central decision-making role in Intelsat and all decisions to allow competition in the
global satellite market had to meet with their approval. The signatories were empowered
to make decisions concerning domestic satellite operations independent of domestic
decision-making processes. This structure empowered signatories to selectively restrict
competition from non-Intelsat suppliers.
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Until 1985, Intelsat was the monopoly supplier and sole regulator of the
international satellite market. As a result of new telecommunications firms’ wishing to
enter the satellite sector, both the United States and Intelsat established separate satellite
systems policies to facilitate the operation of these independent suppliers. However, this
ruling that favored the entry of new firms was not enough to erode Intelsat's domination
of the global satellite market monopoly. The ability of separate satellite systems to
effectively operate locally was undermined by the signatories. Intelsat's continued
dominance can therefore be best explained by the actions of signatories domestically and
at the level of the international institution.

While the Intelsat system expressed a commitment to opening the system to
competition, the signatories’ interests were clearly enhanced by the preservation of the
Intelsat monopoly. As the primary decision-makers as well as the organization's principal
investors in the Intelsat system, the signatories, through the Meeting of Signatories and
the Meeting of Parties, are empowered to protect the organization's investments.

Intelsat's structure and the role played by signatories within the system therefore
functioned to protect the status quo of the single global system and to bar the entry of
other firms whose activities did not enhance Intelsat’s investment goals. Intelsat's
leadership therefore served as gatekeeper - monitoring the entry of non-Intelsat satellite
firms within the global market. As a result, the monopoly status quo remained intact
because of limitations placed by Intelsat’s signatories on the operation of competitive
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firms because the liberalization of Jamaica’s domestic satellite services was inconsistent
with signatories and their interests.

The Jamaica Telecommunications Sector
The second factor that conditioned the success of the winning coalition was their
material interests. These interests served as the impetus for their action. In 1984, when
Jampro attempted to liberalize the sector to a non-Intelsat satellite system, it was based on
two factors. First was the trend toward liberalization of the global telecommunications
services. The period had witnessed the breakup of the AT&T monopoly in the US with
similar actions in Great Britain and Japan and with it the entry of new firms into the
sector. The second reason for the decision was the set of conditionalities prescribed by
the IMF Structural Adjustment Program of 1982-1987.113 The IMF had required that
Jamaica liberalize its telecommunications sector as a precondition for receiving future.
Jamaica was subsequently able to get authorization to liberalize satellite services at two
levels, that of the FCC and Intelsat’s Director General in 1986. Nevertheless, despite
these approvals, domestic approval was not forthcoming, resulting in the closing of the
sector to competition.

Proponents of the decision to close the sector were concerned that a competitive
international environment where separate systems were allowed to operate posed a threat
to the income of Jamaica’s domestic component. While the sector had begun to

1l3McCormick, p. 146.
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experience rapid growth in international telecommunications services, that growth was
matched only by the rapid decline in revenue from domestic telecommunications services
(Fig. 5-1). The declining income in the domestic sector created a dilemma for which a
solution was sought. A cross-subsidization policy was designed to address this dilemma
by subsidizing the domestic component with income from that of the international. But
first, a major restructuring of the sector was planned that would unite both components
under a single ownership and closing the sector to competition. The interests of the
winning coalition had indeed prevailed.

Contribution to the Literature
Cortell and Davis argue that international regimes play an important role in
resolving domestic conflict particularly where there is close societal involvement in
decision-making. During such a conflict, regimes are important, they argue, because
coalition members may strategically use regime norms to enhance the probability of their
success in solving domestic disputes. This strategy has a greater propensity for success
when the decision-making institution is decentralized and there is a close societal/state
relation. Actors who are able to appeal to international regime norms are more likely to be
legitimized, resulting in the successful implementation of its policy. This appeal to
international norms is “a legal right by which to elicit the government’s implementation
of the rule’s prescription.” 114

ll4Cortell and Davis, p. 457.
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The international telecommunications satellite sector, however, is an exception to
this phenomenon. The international regime principles were at odds with the interests of
the winning coalition, many of whom were signatories of Intelsat. As a result, Jampro’s
appeal to the veiy regime principles which were approved by Intelsat itself through the
licensing process, were not honored and Jampro’s requests were denied. Jam pro’s request
to liberalize the sector was denied rather than legitimized.

Risse-Kappen also argues that international regimes are significant in affecting
domestic outcomes.

Their significance is based on three characteristics: the relative

strength of states, the nature of state-society interaction and the nature of the policy
network. Within the context of these characteristics, the extent to which the sector is
regulated at the international level, he argues, determines the effectiveness of these
structures. He concludes that international institutions are expected to reduce coalitionbuilding requirements for transnational coalitions, especially those who advocate normcompliance.115 The telecommunications satellite sector also serves as an exception to this
case. Here, although highly regulated, those advocating compliance to Intelsat’s policy to
allow liberalization were ineffective in opening Jamaica’s sector to competition. Instead,
the winners in this conflict effectively engaged in their own coalition-building to oppose
the opening of the sector to competition. Competition was effectively supplanted,
producing the outcome that was inconsistent with the decision of the Intelsat regime that
would liberalize the sector. The international regime policy which led to the consideration
115

Risse-Kappe, p. 30.
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of a competitive satellite system for the Digiport proposal constituted a conflict of
interests for the Intelsat signatories and this conflict was resolved by implementing a
decision which opposed regime policies. Jampro’s appeal to Intelsat’s rules and
agreements had failed to produce the desired outcome.

Future Research
The year 1994 signaled two major milestones in the transformation of the
international telecommunications sector. The first was the elimination of the Intelsat
regime as the international institution charged with the responsibility of global
governance in the international satellite sector. The second was the creation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) charged with the dual responsibilities of liberalizing the
global telecommunications sector and negotiating telecommunications agreements, h
April of that year, ministers from thirty-three nations signed the 1994 Marrakesh Treaty
for the establishment of the WTO.

WTO held the responsibility for administering all agreements that were
established

within

the

framework

of

the

Uruguay

Round.

In

the

area

of

telecommunications, its goals were the establishment of a multilateral trade network that
would increase the level of investment in telecommunications equipment and services
and progressively liberalize the telecommunications markets, opening up monopoly
markets to competition. The signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services had
far reaching implications since, for the first time, it placed trade in telecommunications
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services within the realm of the multilateral trading system.116 When the negotiations had
ended, sixty-nine (69) nations, forty of which were developing states, also agreed to
introduce domestic regulatory regimes consistent with the new WTO rules. Among them
were Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, three nations which have had
longstanding monopoly telecommunications sectors that have been completely dominated
by Cable and Wireless.

Several rounds of negotiations have resulted in the agreements to enhance trade in
telecommunications

goods

and

services.

The

Negotiating

Group

on

Basic

Telecommunications (NGBT), which is open to all states and the European Community,
lasted from April 1994 to April 1996 and resulted in 48 states committing to open
national

telecommunications

markets

to

competition.

The

Group

on

Basic

Telecommunications (GET), also open to all states and consisting of fifty five states and
the European Community, lasted from July 1996 to February 1997. It addressed satellite
service issues and resulted in the signing of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement
(BTA) in February 1997 and the Information Technology Agreement in April of the same
year.

The creation of the new WTO regime in 1994 represented a new' international
telecommunications regime, replacing the former Intelsat regime. Under the new accord
signed in 1997, the global sector would be governed by the rules of the WTO process.

116Http://www'.vvto.org/english/tratop e/servete e /te l04 e.htm.
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The norms of free trade would govern trade in basic telecommunications services as well
as in higher level value-added telecommunications services such as satellite, internet and
different types of data services. Parties to the WTO agreement were committed to open
up their telecommunications service markets to direct foreign investment and to the
removal of barriers within the domestic telecommunications sector, including the removal
of barriers to access of public telecom networks under nondiscriminatory terms. Truly
successful negotiations would be reflected by the opening for the first time of many
domestic markets of Intelsat’s signatories that had remained closed during the period
covered by this dissertation.

The change in the international satellite regime from Intelsat to the WTO provides
a framework for the comparative analysis of the effects of institutional factors on
domestic outcomes. Several key questions would compare the impact of the WTO on
domestic decisions to maintain an open or closed domestic sector and whether or not
there are differential effects on domestic outcomes. Other questions might include what is
the relationship between the WTO regime and the former domestic signatories. How has
domestic political outcomes been affected by this regime change, particularly as it relates
to the opening and closing of domestic telecommunications sectors? Has the new WTO
structure been more successful in addressing liberalization of domestic sectors? If so,
what is the relationship between former signatories, the state and the new corporations
seeking access to domestic markets under the new WTO system?
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Conclusion
The analysis of the Jamaica Digiport negotiations raised two key questions: why
Jamaica opted to maintain a closed telecommunications monopoly, preventing the use of
the American Satellite Corporation and how was it able to do so at that historical juncture
of increasing liberalization trends. The trend toward liberalization was evident in the
major industrialized nations, primarily the United States, Europe and Japan, even though
Intelsat very cautiously embraced the idea of liberalization. Despite limitations on the
new firms, Intelsat granted its authorization to liberalize Jamaica’s telecommunications
sector.

Despite these trends, Jamaica failed to liberalize its telecommunications sector.
This dissertation demonstrated that Jamaica’s failure to do so can best be explained by
sectoral interests and characteristics - the most significant of which were a) the role of
Intelsat’s signatories in both domestic and international decision-making of the sector; b)
the close relationship between state bureaucracies and signatories that operate in the
sector; and c) the interests of these signatories which was to maintain the monopoly
sector so as to implement the cross-subsidization of domestic operations with income
from the international operations.

The liberalization of the telecommunications sector served as a trigger for the
chain of events that followed. These events included changes in Intelsat rules and norms,
and the closing of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector to competition. While Intelsat’s
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signatories approved the use of separate satellite systems, Jamaica’s signatory had the
ability to block its enforcement, thereby ensuring that liberalization would fail. The
question posed for future research is: could liberalization in Jamaica only occur if there
were a transformation in the Intelsat regime in which there were a change in the existing
structure of governance or would a new international telecommunications satellite regime
that was structured differently be more effective in producing different domestic options?
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A PPEN D IX II: GLOSSARY
common carrier

A business organization that provides regulated
te le p h o n e ,

te le g r a p h ,

te le x ,

and

d a ta

communications to the general public and is
regulated by an appropriate regulating agency, e.g.
AT&T in the US, British Telecom in the United
Kingdom

COMSAT

Communications Satellite Corporation, the United
States’ signatory to INTELSAT,

is a private

corporation that provides technical and operational
support services for the transglobal satellite system.
COMSAT

previously

served

as

manager

of

INTELSAT.

earth station

The portion of a satellite system that is located on
the earth surface. An earth station receives signals
from and transmits to a satellite in space.

FCC

The federal Communications Commission is a
board of five commissioners appointed by the
president

of

the

United

States

under

the

communications Act of 1934. It is responsible for
regulating all interstate and foreign communications
originating in the United States by means of radio,
television, wire, cable and satellite.

fiber optics

Transmission technology in which information is
transmitted over a very thin optical beam.
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g e o s y n c h r o n o u s s a te llite

A satellite positioned about 36,000 km above the
equator.

The

satellite’s

equatorial

orbit

is

synchronous with the earth therefore the satellite
appears to be stationary. It is used for long distance
com m unication.

It

is

also

referred

to

as

geostationary satellite.

Intelsat

The

International

Telecommunications

Satellite

Organization is an international inter-governmental
o rg a n iz a tio n

responsible

for

the

d esig n ,

development, construction, and operation of the
space

segment

of the global communications

satellite system. It own and operates a global system
of

geosynchronous

satellites

that

provides

international telecommunications services all over
the world.

ITU

The International Telecommunications Union, an
international intergovernmental organization that
coordinates and regulates international services in
telephone and telegraph services.

local area network (LAN)

A

network

that

telecommunications

connects

devices

within

various
a

limited

geographical area.

PTT

Post, Telephone and Telegraph are government
agencies that provides the

services

for mail,

telephone, and telegraph in most countries of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228
world except those in North America.

public switched telephone network

A network established and operated by any common
carrier that provides circuit switching between
public users.

public utilities commission

The state regulatory board that is responsible for
communications regulation and other public utilities
regulation.

satellite

A man-made vehicle placed in orbit around the
earth to receive information from one point on earth
and re-transmitted to another point on earth, thus
providing a long distance communication link.

satellite communications

A communication
synchronous

technique in which a geo

satellite is used to relay information

from one earth station to another.

telecommunications

The process that allows the transfer of information
(audio, video, data) in the form of electromagnetic
signals from a transmitter to one or more receivers.

teleconferencing

A conference in which participants from a remote
location communicate to each other with the help of
telecommunications lines.

teleport

A telecommunications facility that consists of high
speed satellites, a private telephone network and the
capacity to transport data at high speed.
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transponder

A radio or radar transmitter/receiver activated for
transmission by reception of a predetermined signal.
C om m unications

satellites

contain

several

transponders to increase the number of transmission
channels.

video conferencing

A type of teleconferencing in which geographically
separated groups communicate with each other over
telecommunication links with the help of audio and
video technology.

Westar

The name of a communication satellite owned by
Western Union.
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APPENDIX I I I : Private Satellite Systems Providing Services by Region, 1996
North; 0 3 .3.;
America.
Central
Middle

Arfiefica,

South

Asia

Past

Caribbean

America

Europe

Australia

Africa '

PanAmSat

PanAmS

PanAmSat

PanAmS

PanAmS

PanAmS

PanAmS

at

at

at

at

Hughes*

Columbi

Asiasat

Thaicom

at
Columbia*

Asiasat

Columbia*

117

a*

Apstar

Orion*

Orion*

Asiasat

Telstar/ATT

Asiasat

Palapa

Anik

Astra

JCSAT

Alascom

Thaicom

Superbird

Hughes-

Optus

Galaxy*
BS-Yuri

GE
A me ri com*

Thaicom

EchoStar
Westar*

Source: United States General Accounting Office: Telecommunications: Competition
Issues in International Satellite Communications, p. 40.

n7Asterisks indicate United States separate satellite systems
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APPENDIX V: INTELSAT Board of Governors
VOTING SHARE

MEMBER
AFRICA GROUP I

Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia

1.12

AFRICA GROUP II

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote
d ’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Tongo, Zaire

1.29

ARAB GROUP I

Libia, Mauritania, Sudan, Syrua, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates

1.46

ARAB GROUP II

Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudia Arabia,

2.24

Yemen
ARAB GROUP III

Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar

1.61
1.16

ARGENTINA/CHILE/PARAGUAY
ASEAN GROUP I

Indonesia, Singapore

1.8

ASEAN GROUP II

Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand

1.79

ASIA PACIFIC GROUP

0.98

AUSTRIA/GREECE/SWITZERLAND/LTECHTENSTEIN

1.V3

BELGIUM/NETHERLANDS/LUXEMBOURG

1.84

BRAZIL/PORTUGAL/URUGUAY

1.76

CANADA

2.68

CARIBBEAN GROUP

Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic

0.82

CENTRAL AMERICA GROUP

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama

0.3

CHINA

1.56

COLOMBIA/ECUADOR/BOLIVIA

1.52

FRANCE/MONACO

1.52

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC

3.49

: INDIA

0.99

: IRAN/KOREA/PAKISTAN/TURKEY

3.46

ITALY/VATICAN CITY

2.14

JAPAN

4.91

NORDIC GROUP

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden
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SPAIN

1.84

UNITED KINGDOM/IRELAND
; UNITED STATES

13.84,
26.91

; VENEZUELA/PERU
Source: INTELSAT, Board os B-81-E, July 1989
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1.24

APPENDIX VI: N on-IN TELSA T Separate Systems That Received Permission to
Operate

ARABSAT

India (TV services)

ASIASAT

Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Thailand

ASIASAT-C

China

ASTRA

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway,
France, Monaco, F.R.G., Iceland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Yugoslavia

AUSSAT

Australia, New Zealand

DFS Sat

F.R.G. to France, Luxembourg and Netherlands (one way), Sweden,
Switzerland (TV Reception from Germany)

System
EUTELSAT

Monaco, UK

HISPASAT

Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Honduras

Intersputnik

Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Nicaragua, UK,
US, Vietnam, Germany, US, USSR + non-INTELSAT nations

PAPAPA B2

ASEAN, Australia, Indonesia (TV and audio use), Thailand, Sri Lanka,
Portugal, UK to Indonesia

PANAMSAT

Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belgium & Sweden, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Columbia (Latin Beam). Denmark, Ecuador, France,
Guatemala, Haiti (LB & NB), Honduras (domestic serv.), Italy, Jamiaca,
Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Netherland Antilles, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru (domestic serv.), Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad
& Tobago, UK (domestic serv.), Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, US &
Costa Rica; US & Domican Rep.; US & Eastern Europe; UK & Europe;
UK & Germany; US & Luxembourg; US & UK, US & F.R.G. between
US and Non-INTELSAT member nations in Latin America and the
Caribbean; between Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, US and nonINTELSAT Eastern European nations.

SATCOM

Denmark, US, Mexico

SATCOM II-R Greenland
SBTS AI &

Uruguay

A2
SPACENET II US & Mexico

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

234
APPENDIX VI: Non-INTELSAT Separate Systems That Received Permission to
Operate
STATIONAR- Australia
14

SUPERBIRD

Japan

TELECOM 1

China, France, Germany

TELE-X

Finland

USSR DOM
SAT
US DOM SAT
WESTAR V

US
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APPENDIX V II: Number of Main Lines (Thousands)

Year

Number of Main Lines
(Thousands)

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1987"8
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

35
36.5
38.2
42.3
47.8
50
52
54
54
54
55
59.2
62.4
67
69.8
76.7
85.2
90
106
132
168
209

Source: Alvin G. Wint. Pioneering Telephone Privatization p. 53.

118

In 1987, the fiscal year-end for both companies was changed from December to March.
The period represented by these data is the fifteen-month period from January 1986 to
March 1987.
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